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In the summer of 2014, the world was captivated by the Ice Bucket Challenge. People 
nominated each other via social media to post videos in which they dump a bucket 
filled with cold water and ice cubes on their head to promote awareness of 
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) disease and encourage donations to ALS-related 
charities. As a result of this viral trend, the national ALS Association raised over $94 
million in July and August 2014. At first glance, this social media hype seems a brilliant 
way of raising money for charity. However, many people worried that the worldwide 
donations to ALS charities would be at the cost of other charities with greater 
healthcare value, because they assumed that people who had just donated money to 
ALS would be less likely to subsequently donate money to other charities. 
The criticism on the Ice Bucket Challenge closely reflects the phenomenon that is 
investigated in the current dissertation, which is called self-licensing. Self-licensing 
implies that people allow themselves to engage in less desirable behavior because they 
previously performed good behavior. For people who participated in the Ice Bucket 
Challenge, this infers that donating money to an ALS charity can result in fewer 
charitable actions in the direct future. This dissertation reports studies that examine 
the self-licensing effect, which are presented in Chapter 2 to 7. Before turning to these 
studies, an overview is provided on what self-licensing is, why it is important to study 
self-licensing, and what is missing in the current literature on self-licensing. 
What is self-licensing? 
Self-licensing theory posits that people who behave in a good way, later feel that they 
are permitted to engage in undesirable behavior (Miller & Effron, 2010). Thus, a prior 
good deed can provide a license that allows one to perform undesirable behavior later 
on. The term self-licensing was introduced by Monin and Miller (2001), who proposed 
that people who first establish nonracist credentials through acting unprejudiced are 
subsequently licensed to display prejudiced behavior. Since then, more than 50 
separate studies on self-licensing have been published. Self-licensing is interesting and 
relevant. It is interesting because it can help explain why people engage in “bad” 
behavior and because it makes predictions about people’s internal accounting systems 
of good and bad behaviors. Self-licensing is relevant because it can both help and hurt 
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people. It can help people to loosen up a little bit, but it can hurt individual and social 
goals.  
Self-licensing related to individual behaviors 
Research suggests that behaving in a good way can result in negative behavior that 
has harmful consequences at the individual level. On a daily base, individuals are 
confronted with numerous goal-incongruent temptations, such as unhealthy high 
caloric foods when one is dieting, spending money on luxurious items while trying to 
save money for retirement, and undertaking fun activities instead of working. Self-
licensing can lead to indulgence in these various domains. Khan and Dhar (2006), who 
conducted the first studies on self-licensing related to individual behaviors, suggested 
that “a prior choice, which activates and boosts a positive self-concept, subsequently 
licenses the choice of a more self-indulgent option” (p. 260). Studies on self-licensing 
related to individual behaviors found that prior goal progress on weight loss objectives 
(Fishbach & Dhar, 2005), prior restraint (Mukhopadhyay, Sengupta, & Ramanathan, 
2008), and perceived prior effort (De Witt-Huberts, Evers, & De Ridder, 2012) can 
result in more indulgent food choices. In addition, intended virtuous behaviors (Khan 
& Dhar, 2006) and prior shopping restraint (Mukhopadhyay & Johar, 2009) can lead to 
preferences for self-indulgent hedonic over functional products. Furthermore, 
perceived goal progress on academic course work can result in greater interest in 
pursuing non-academic activities (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005). Thus, self-licensing is 
related to behaviors that are incongruent with personal goals such as dieting, saving 
money, and working.  
Self-licensing related to social behaviors 
Research suggests that behaving in a good way can also result in negative behavior 
that has harmful consequences at the societal level. For instance, participants who 
recalled prior moral behavior subsequently displayed less prosocial intentions 
towards others and cheated more on a computer task compared to participants who 
recalled prior immoral behavior (Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011). In addition, 
participants who established their unprejudiced attitudes through endorsing 
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president Obama (Effron, Cameron, & Monin, 2009) or through preferring a black over 
a white person for a consulting firm job (Monin & Miller, 2001) were subsequently 
more likely to make prejudiced decisions than participants who did not establish their 
unprejudiced attitudes. Furthermore, participants who bought more ecofriendly than 
regular products in a virtual shopping paradigm subsequently offered less money to 
other participants and stole more money from the experimenter compared to 
participants who bought more regular products (Mazar & Zhong, 2010). Self-licensing 
related to social behaviors is often referred to as moral licensing (for an extensive 
overview on moral licensing, see Chapter 2), which Merritt, Effron, and Monin (2010, 
p. 344) define as: 
When people are under the threat that their next action might be (or appear to be) 
morally dubious, individuals can derive confidence from their past moral behavior, 
such that an impeccable track record increases their propensity to engage in otherwise 
suspect actions. 
It has been suggested that moral licensing can be interpreted as part of a larger moral 
self-regulation framework, where internal balancing of moral self-worth and the costs 
associated with prosocial behavior determine whether one will display (im)moral 
behavior (e.g., Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009). According to this framework, 
establishing a moral image of oneself allows a person to display an immoral action 
without the fear of losing that moral image (leading to licensing effects). On the 
contrary, establishing an immoral image of oneself through appearing immoral to 
others creates a need for subsequent positive actions to restore the moral image 
(leading to compensation or cleansing effects; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). 
Taken together, self-licensing occurs in various domains, both with respect to the 
origin of the license and with the behavior that it instigates. Self-licensing can play an 
important role in individual self-regulatory domains. When people feel good about 
their prior actions, they become more likely to perform goal-incongruent activities, 
such as consuming unhealthy foods, spending money on luxurious items, or engaging 
in fun activities rather than studying. The negative behavior self-licensing results in 
can also have harmful consequences at the societal level, such as displaying prejudiced 
attitudes, acting dishonestly, and engaging in less virtuous behaviors.  
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Why is it important to study self-licensing? 
Interestingly, self-licensing theory seems to conflict with a number of well-established 
psychological findings and theories that highlight humans’ desire for cognitive 
consistency in their thoughts, feelings, and behavior (Abelson et al., 1986; Gawronski 
& Strack, 2012). For instance, balance theory (Heider, 1946), cognitive dissonance 
theory (Festinger, 1957), the foot-in-the-door effect (Freedman & Fraser, 1966), and the 
sunk cost effect (Arkes & Blumer, 1985) all highlight consistency as a main motivator 
in human behavior. In addition, self-perception theory asserts that the attitudes that 
people infer from observation of their prior behavior ultimately affect their subsequent 
actions (Bem, 1972). Bem would argue that people who perform a good deed would 
see themselves as being good and moral persons, which would therefore lead to future 
moral behavior as well. After all, people generally intend to maintain positive self-
images and want to act and feel like good persons (Aronson, Cohen, & Nail, 1999; 
Schlenker, 1980; Steele, 1988). Thus, self-licensing seems to be at odds with a number 
of well-established findings and theories that predict that individuals aim to be (and 
like to appear) good and consistent in their behaviors, and especially so when past 
good behaviors have just been highlighted. It is vital to investigate why people in self-
licensing situations do not seem to have the need for consistency, as this can explain 
when and why people deviate from their typical behavioral patterns. 
Besides the theoretical contradiction between self-licensing and a number of 
established psychological theories, studying licensing also has relevant practical 
implications. As outlined in the previous section, licensing can lead to a broad 
spectrum of undesirable behaviors, both at the individual and societal level. Research 
on this topic thus gives important insights into people’s motivation and behavior, and 
can ultimately prevent people from displaying goal-incongruent and vicious behavior. 
What is currently unknown about self-licensing 
Although a substantial number of studies on licensing has been published, much is 
still unknown about self-licensing. To date, it is unclear what the size of the licensing 
effect is, how robust the effect is, and what the important moderators of the effect are. 
Chapter 1 
12 
After all, moderators have to exist if both consistency and licensing effects occur. In 
addition, it is not clear whether the effects obtained in the lab are easy to replicate, 
since a large diversity of paradigms has been used to study licensing. There is not one 
solid paradigm that is often used to test self-licensing and its potential moderators in 
experimental settings. 
Moreover, only a very limited amount of research on self-licensing has been conducted 
outside of laboratory settings. Therefore, it is unknown if, when, and how self-
licensing operates in daily life. Furthermore, self-licensing shows some close 
resemblances with theorizing on motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990), which posits that 
when individuals have a preferred conclusion, they attempt to construct justifications 
that are supportive of that particular conclusion. The basic licensing idea that bad 
behavior can follow from good behavior may also exist if people are tempted to engage 
in the bad behavior and use their prior good behavior to justify engaging in it. It is 
unclear whether motivated reasoning plays a role in the process of self-licensing, 
because it has not explicitly been tested whether self-licensing can be initiated by the 
temptation to display undesirable behaviors (see Chapter 5 and 6 for further 
elaboration on this). Finally, little is known about the motivational consequences of 
having (licensing-related) reasons for displaying goal-incongruent behavior. The 
present dissertation aims to fulfill these gaps in the current literature on self-licensing.  
Overview of the current dissertation 
The dissertation consists of two parts. The first part of this presents a state-of-the-art 
overview of self-licensing. In this part, the effect size of licensing, the robustness and 
replicability of the effect, and theoretical moderators are investigated. The second part 
presents novel perspectives on self-licensing. This part investigates in which ways self-
licensing can be triggered in daily life, an alternative account of self-licensing, and the 
consequences of having (licensing-related) reasons for displaying goal-incongruent 
behavior. 
All empirical chapters are written as separate papers and could therefore be read 
independently and in any order. As a result, however, there may be some overlap 
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between the different chapters. Since the empirical chapters are written together with 
my co-authors, the word ‘we’ is used throughout these chapters. 
Part I: The State-of-the-Art of Self-Licensing 
Chapter 2. A Meta-Analytic Review of Moral Licensing 
This chapter provides a state-of-the art overview of moral licensing. A meta-analysis 
including 91 studies that compare a licensing condition with a control condition (7397 
participants) is conducted. The magnitude of the moral licensing effect is estimated 
and potential moderators of the effect are investigated. Based on this analysis, practical 
and theoretical recommendations for scholars studying the moral licensing effect are 
provided. 
Chapter 3. A P-Curve Analysis of Moral Licensing 
Chapter 3 tests the evidential value of the moral licensing effect through conducting a 
p-curve analysis (Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2014a,b) on the published moral 
licensing tests that were included in the meta-analysis from Chapter 2. The p-curve 
analysis provides a conclusive answer on whether the established moral licensing 
effect is true, or the studies merely reflect selective reporting. Unlike the meta-analysis, 
the p-curve analysis is able to provide an effect size estimate that is not influenced by 
publication bias. Implications for research on moral licensing are discussed.  
Chapter 4. Three Attempts to Replicate the Moral Licensing Effect  
Chapter 4 focuses on the replicability of the licensing effect. This chapter includes three 
studies that attempt to replicate the moral licensing effect that was previously 
established by Sachdeva et al. (2009). In their important contribution to the licensing 
literature, they found that writing about positive traits led to lower donations to 
charity and decreased cooperative behavior. They also found the opposite effect (i.e., 
moral cleansing): Writing about negative traits led to more donations to charity and 
increased cooperative behavior. Study 4.1 and 4.2 aim to replicate their findings in 
student samples (95% power based on the original effect), and Study 4.3 aims to 
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replicate the effect in a more generalizable Amazon Mechanical Turk sample (95% 
power based on the effect size from the meta-analysis in Chapter 2).  
Part II: Novel Perspectives on Self-Licensing 
Chapter 5. Two Ways in Which Self-Licensing can be Triggered 
Chapter 5 tests the proposition that there are two different ways in which self-licensing 
can be triggered; 1) a good deed can permit one to display undesirable behavior (good 
deed self-licensing) and 2) the temptation to display undesirable behavior can initiate a 
search for a license (temptation-based self-licensing). This is tested through observations 
of the natural occurrence of self-licensing. Study 5.1 explores the self-licensing effects 
people recall from their daily lives and investigates to what extent these effects reflect 
good deed self-licensing versus temptation-based self-licensing. Study 5.2 manipulates 
these different ways in which self-licensing can be triggered and explores the different 
antecedents and consequences.  
Chapter 6. Temptation-Based Reasoning 
In Chapter 6, a temptation-based reasoning model is proposed and tested. This model 
posits that people interpret reasons for indulgence in a different light depending on 
how tempting behavior is. Specifically, Chapter 6 tests whether reasons for indulgence 
are seen as more acceptable when behavior is more tempting. Study 6.1 and 6.2 test 
whether people evaluate given reasons as more acceptable reasons to indulge when 
they are confronted with more tempting behavior. Study 6.3 and 6.4 test whether 
people interpret their own recalled prior good behaviors and frustrations as better 
reasons to indulge when behavior is more tempting. Based on the findings, an 
alternative account of self-licensing is proposed.  
Chapter 7. Reasonable Reasons for Indulgence 
Whereas Chapter 6 emphasizes how reasoning processes can facilitate indulgence, 
Chapter 7 focuses on the consequences of having different reasons for giving in to 
temptation (i.e., breaking a diet by unhealthy snacking). Specifically, the affective and 
motivational consequences of having different reasons for displaying undesirable 
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behavior (i.e., breaking a diet) are investigated. This chapter builds on previous 
literature that suggests that health-interventions should focus on the most common 
reasons people have for breaking their diet. The focus from the quantitative aspects of 
breaking a diet (which reasons are most common?) is shifted to the qualitative aspects 
(what are the consequences of breaking a diet for various reasons?). Study 7.1 tests 
whether reasonable reasons for unhealthy snacking have less negative consequences 
for further goal striving than unreasonable reasons for unhealthy snacking. Study 7.2a 
and 7.2b test whether reasons for unhealthy snacking that have been identified in the 
literature differ in how reasonable they are. Finally, Study 7.3 investigates whether the 
two categories of reasons for unhealthy snacking that are most common (enjoying a 
special occasion versus opportunity-induced eating) have different motivational 
consequences. This chapter serves as a first step in exploring the consequences of 
having (licensing-related) reasons for displaying goal-incongruent behavior.  
Chapter 8. Discussion 
Chapter 8 integrates and discusses the findings from the empirical chapters. This 
chapter provides a summary of the findings throughout this dissertation and discusses 
the theoretical implications of these findings. Furthermore, the findings are placed in 
a broader theoretical framework. Finally, practical implications and future directions 














A Meta-Analytic Review of Moral Licensing 
 
Moral licensing refers to the effect that when people initially behave in a moral way, 
they are later more likely to display behaviors that are immoral, unethical, or otherwise 
problematic. In this chapter we provide a state-of-the-art overview of moral licensing 
by conducting a meta-analysis of 91 studies (7397 participants) that compare a 
licensing condition to a control condition. Based on this analysis the magnitude of the 
moral licensing effect is estimated to be a Cohen’s d of 0.31. We tested potential 
moderators and found that published studies tend to have larger moral licensing 
effects than unpublished studies. We found no empirical evidence for other 
moderators that were theorized to be of importance. The effect size estimate implies 
that studies require many more participants to draw solid conclusions about moral 









This chapter is based on Blanken, I., Van de Ven, N., & Zeelenberg, M. (2015a). A meta-
analytic review of moral licensing. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41, 540-
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Moral licensing theory posits that people who initially behave in a moral way can later 
display behaviors that are immoral, unethical, or otherwise problematic (e.g., Merritt, 
Effron, & Monin, 2010). For example, someone who has just spent some time 
volunteering for the local community center might later find it more acceptable to 
“forget” to report some additional income when filling out the tax return. The idea of 
moral licensing theory is that the prior good deed provides a ‘license’, that allows one 
to perform morally questionable behavior later on. To date, various studies on moral 
licensing have been performed, a substantial subset of which has been published. 
However, the magnitude of the effect and the specific conditions under which moral 
licensing is likely to occur remain unclear. Therefore, in this chapter, we provide a 
comprehensive overview by performing a meta-analysis across all the available 
studies on moral licensing.  
The mere existence of moral licensing, in which one allows oneself to engage in less 
moral behavior after a prior good deed, seems to be at odds with a number of well-
established psychological findings and theories that stress consistency in behavior. 
Self-perception theory, for example, asserts that people infer their attitudes from 
observations of their own behavior which ultimately affects their subsequent behavior 
(Bem, 1972). People who perform a good deed would thus see themselves as being a 
good and moral person, which would therefore lead to future moral behavior as well. 
In addition, balance theory (Heider, 1946), cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 
1957), the foot-in-the-door effect (Freedman & Fraser, 1966), and the sunk cost effect 
(Arkes & Blumer, 1985), all highlight consistency as an essential motivator of human 
behavior (for reviews see Abelson et al., 1968; Gawronski & Strack, 2012). Important 
social psychological theories thus predict that people like to be (and like to appear) 
good and moral in their actions, and especially so when past moral behavior has just 
been highlighted, as that makes it important to appear consistent. However, the moral 
licensing effect has been reported in many domains, including job hiring (Cascio & 
Plant, 2015; Monin & Miller, 2001), ambiguous racist attitudes (Choi, Crandall, & La, 
2014; Effron, Cameron, & Monin, 2009; Effron, Monin, & Miller, 2012; Mann, & 
Kawakami, 2012), donations to charity (Conway & Peetz, 2012; Sachdeva, Iliev, & 
Medin, 2009) consumer behavior (Khan & Dhar, 2006), and dishonest behavior 
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(Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011; Mazar & Zhong, 2010). As moral licensing has 
these adverse consequences for such a wide range of behaviors, research on this topic 
can give important insights into people’s motivation and behavior. 
It has been suggested that moral licensing can be interpreted as part of a larger moral 
self-regulation framework. The idea is that internal balancing of moral self-worth and 
the costs associated with prosocial behavior determine whether one will display 
(im)moral behavior (e.g., Sachdeva et al., 2009). When the moral image of oneself is 
established, an immoral action is allowed without the fear of losing that moral image 
(leading to licensing). Conversely, when one appears immoral to others, subsequent 
positive actions are needed to restore the moral image (leading to compensation or 
cleansing). However, further research is needed before it can be concluded that a 
general ‘balancing’ mechanism is responsible for both the licensing and the cleansing 
effect (cf. Chapter 4). The focus of the current meta-analysis will be entirely on the 
moral licensing effect. A meta-analysis on moral licensing will help in painting a 
clearer picture on what licensing is and when it occurs, and therefore also forms a solid 
basis for exploring how the processes of moral licensing and moral cleansing relate.  
 Definitions of moral licensing  
On a theoretical level, the process of moral licensing is defined as 
 When people are under the threat that their next action might be (or appear to 
be) morally dubious, individuals can derive confidence from their past moral 
behavior, such that an impeccable track record increases their propensity to 
engage in otherwise suspect actions (Merritt et al., 2010, p. 344). 
For our meta-analysis, we build upon the more operational definition or moral 
licensing that Merritt et al. (2010, p. 344) provide: “Past good deeds can liberate 
individuals to engage in behaviors that are immoral, unethical, or otherwise 
problematic, behaviors that they would otherwise avoid for fear of feeling or 
appearing immoral”. Moral licensing can be regarded as an example of the broader 
category of psychological licensing which is “the perception that one’s behavioral 
history, social context, or category membership permit one to legitimately do or say 
something that otherwise would discredit the self” (Miller & Effron, 2010, p. 116). For 
Chapter 2 
22 
example, being a member of a minority group can license one to criticize that group. 
Thus, moral licensing makes an appeal to someone’s past good deeds, whereas the 
broader category of psychological licensing does not necessarily involve performing 
good behavior or displaying good intentions. Studies including this particular type of 
psychological licensing are not included in the meta-analysis, since we are interested 
in the behavioral consequences of acting morally.  
Typical examples of moral licensing 
Moral licensing occurs for both individual and social behaviors. It touches upon 
relevant everyday behaviors related to welfare, job hiring, ambiguous racial attitudes, 
charity donations, consumer purchases and green consumption. For instance, 
participants who established their non-prejudiced attitudes by endorsing president 
Obama (Effron et al., 2009) or through selecting a black person for a consulting firm 
job (Monin & Miller, 2001) were subsequently more likely to make pro-white 
judgments. In a similar vein, participants who previously received feedback that they 
were close to their goal of being regarded egalitarian towards black persons seated 
themselves farther away from a black confederate than participants who received 
feedback that they were not progressing toward their goal (Mann & Kawakami, 2012). 
Furthermore, participants who recalled their own moral actions subsequently 
displayed fewer prosocial intentions (Conway & Peetz, 2012; Jordan et al., 2011) and 
cheated more to get a higher payoff (Clot, Grolleau, & Ibanez, 2014; Jordan, et al., 2011) 
than participants who did not recall their moral actions. Moral licensing also plays a 
role in the area of interpersonal decision making: Previous ethical behavior licensed 
participants to offer less money to other participants (Cornelissen, Bashshur, Rode, & 
Le Menestrel, 2013a). In addition, participants who disclosed their conflict of interest 
to the other party subsequently gave more corrupt advice (Cain, Loewenstein, & 
Moore, 2005; 2010).  
Moral licensing does not seem to be a within-domain phenomenon; the licensed 
behavior can also take place in a different area. For instance, participants who 
imagined that they would volunteer to spend time doing community service 
subsequently preferred hedonic over utilitarian products (Khan & Dhar, 2006). 
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Furthermore, in a virtual shopping paradigm, participants who bought ecofriendly 
products subsequently offered less money to another person in an ultimatum game 
and stole more money compared to participants who bought regular products (Mazar 
& Zhong, 2010).  
The current meta-analysis 
The first moral licensing study was published in 2001 (Monin & Miller, 2001). Since 
then, over 50 separate studies have been published in more than 20 articles. One reason 
for conducting the current meta-analysis was our observation that the moral licensing 
effect seems to conflict with one of the most established psychological findings that 
people want to be and appear consistent in their behavior. A second reason is based 
on our own research experiences and informal contacts with colleagues in the field, 
which indicated that it is not always easy to replicate the moral licensing effect (cf. 
Chapter 4), which suggests that the effect may not be robust or subject to moderating 
factors. Thus, a meta-analysis seems important to 1) attain a good indication of the 
effect size so we know whether real-life interventions are useful, 2) be able to run 
power analyses to create well-powered studies (and lower the chance of type II errors), 
and 3) advance the existing theoretical framework through testing for possible 
boundary conditions of the effect. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to provide 
a state-of-the-art overview of moral licensing. We report a quantitative meta-analytical 
review through examining published and unpublished experimental comparisons 
between a moral licensing and a control condition to determine the magnitude of the 
moral licensing effect and to identify the potential moderators of the effect.  
Moderators of the moral licensing effect  
We will explore the conditions under which the moral licensing effect is likely to occur 
through analyzing theoretically meaningful and methodological moderators. We will 
examine the following theoretically relevant moderators: the type of moral licensing 
induction, the behavior measured in the dependent variable, and the domain in which 
the behaviors take place. We will also examine methodological factors that do not 
touch upon theoretical distinctions in moral licensing, but are related to the specific 
Chapter 2 
24 
aspects of the research design and the current status of the research: article status and 
control condition. 
Moral licensing induction: traits versus actions 
We will compare the effects of moral licensing inductions related to prior moral traits 
versus prior moral actions. Conway and Peetz (2012) found that recalling moral actions 
led to licensing (subsequent less moral behavior), whereas recalling moral traits led to 
consistency (subsequent moral behavior). They argued that the recall of a moral action 
signals that progress towards the goal of being moral has been made, and for a 
subsequent choice between doing the morally right thing versus acting out of self-
interest (e.g., whether or not to donate money to someone in need), the goal of being 
moral becomes less important (because one already made progress towards that goal) 
and self-interest is thus more likely to win. In contrast, recalling moral traits is thought 
to activate more abstract moral identity concerns. As the recall activates the general 
concept of morality, people will subsequently behave more according to moral norms 
(and thus no moral licensing is expected). This theory predicts that licensing effects 
should only occur when induced through good actions rather than good traits. Study 
3 of Conway and Peetz (2012) provides initial support for this idea. In the current meta-
analysis we have the opportunity to further test this moderator.  
Behavior in the dependent variable: actual versus hypothetical 
We will also investigate whether the moral licensing effect differs depending on 
whether the dependent variable is actual behavior rather than hypothetical behavior 
(for instance, donating actual money versus indicating the amount of money one 
would be willing to donate). Previous research revealed that people want to appear 
moral while avoiding the cost of being moral (Batson & Thompson, 2001; Dana, Weber, 
& Kuang, 2007). That is, people will display good behavior, as long as the costs of good 
behavior do not override the benefits of self-interested behavior too much. Since it is 
relatively effortless to display hypothetical good behavior (talk is cheap), in these cases 
there may be lower willingness to display undesirable behaviors that one needs to 
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justify. Thus, one could expect that the moral licensing effect is larger when the 
dependent behavior consists of actual compared to hypothetical behavior.  
Domain: same versus different 
We will further investigate whether the size of the moral licensing effect differs 
depending on whether the good and bad behavior occur in the same or in a different 
domain. Miller and Effron (2010) pointed out that good behavior in one domain can 
not only license people to perform dubious behavior in the same domain, but also in 
unrelated domains (e.g., Mazar & Zhong, 2010). Theory and empirical work in the field 
of mental accounting reveals that people use different mental accounts to organize 
their finances (Thaler, 1985). For instance, if people receive a financial windfall in one 
domain (e.g., a refund for a delayed flight), they typically more easily spend it on 
something related (e.g., a luxurious dinner during that trip). If similar effects occur in 
the realm of moral licensing, one might expect that after doing something good in one 
domain, people more easily allow themselves to do something more questionable in 
the same domain later. Therefore, it could be expected that licensing effects are larger 
(smaller) when the moral and immoral behaviors are measured in the same (different) 
domain.  
Article Status: published versus unpublished work 
We will examine whether the magnitude of the moral licensing effect depends on 
whether the study is part of a published article or not. It could be expected that the 
moral licensing effect, like other empirical findings, is larger for studies in published 
articles since more positive findings than null- or negative- findings tend to be 
published (Ioannidis, 2005). We will later test for potential publication bias in various 
ways, but think it is essential to include study status as a control variable when we 
examine other possible moderators as well.  
Control condition: neutral versus negative 
We will further investigate whether the moral licensing effect differs depending on 
whether the moral licensing condition (in which people are for example asked to recall 
prior good behavior) is contrasted with a negative control condition (a recall of prior 
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bad behavior) or with a neutral control condition (a recall of neutral behavior). This is 
important because the opposite pattern can exist as well: Positive behavior becomes 
more likely after recalling previous negative behavior, which is called the moral 
cleansing effect (Conway & Peetz, 2012, Jordan et al., 2011, Sachdeva et al., 2009; Zhong 
& Liljenquist, 2006, but see also Chapter 4). Based on the theory of moral cleansing, 
one could expect that the moral licensing effect is larger when a negative control 
condition is used compared to a neutral one.  
In the moral licensing literature, a number of other moderators has been proposed. 
Power was insufficient to include all these possible moderators, because 1) the current 
number of included studies (n = 91) does not allow for too many moderators and 2) 
many of these hypothesized moderators were only tested in very few studies, which 
would make comparisons unreliable due to the small sample. For completeness of our 
review of moral licensing effects we do mention the proposed moderators here, hoping 
that future research can further explore these possible moderators. Specific moderators 
that were identified (stronger licensing in conditions displayed in italics) are free 
versus forced choice good behavior (Bradley-Geist, King, Skorinko, Hebl, & McKenna, 
2010), high versus low rationalizability of cheating (Brown et al., 2011), recalling recent 
versus distant good behavior (Conway & Peetz, 2012), having an outcome-based versus 
a rule-based mindset (Cornelissen et al., 2013a), focusing on goal progress versus goal 
commitment (Mann & Kawakami, 2012), and having no external incentive versus having 
an external incentive for one’s moral behavior (Clot, Grolleau, & Ibanez, 2013b; Khan 
& Dhar, 2006).  
In addition, some studies tested the moderating effect of continuous personality 
variables that we could not include in the current meta-analysis. These were being high 
versus low in self-monitoring (Cornelissen, Karelaia, & Soyer, 2013b), having a high 
versus low score on the modern racism scale (Effron et al., 2009; 2012), and having a 
strong versus weak pro-environmental identity when possibly engaging in licensing in 
the environmental domain (Meijers, Noordewier, Verlegh, & Smit, 2014).  
Taken together, we provide a quantitative meta-analytical review of moral licensing 
through examining both published and unpublished research. We will investigate the 
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estimated mean effect size of moral licensing and advance the existing theoretical 
framework on moral licensing through investigating several moderators.  
Method 
Data collection 
An extensive literature search was conducted to collect data on moral licensing, based 
on the definition of Merritt et al. (2010, p.344) “Past good deeds [or good intentions] 
liberate individuals to engage in behaviors that are immoral, unethical, or otherwise 
problematic, behaviors that they would otherwise avoid for fear of feeling or 
appearing less moral”. This included searches in Web of Science and Google Scholar 
using the following keywords1: (self-)licensing, moral licensing, psychological licensing, 
moral balancing, moral compensation, moral spillover, self-justification, (moral) credentialing 
and (moral) credential(s). Relevant journals (all RSS feeds from the European Journal of 
Social Psychology, Journal of Consumer Psychology, Journal of Consumer Research, 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Journal of Marketing Research, Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
Psychological Bulletin and Psychological Science), conference proceedings, 
dissertations, and master theses were also checked. Furthermore, we called for 
relevant studies on moral licensing (both published and unpublished, both successful 
and unsuccessful) on the Society for Personality and Social Psychology (SPSP) internet 
forum (10/18/2012) as well as via various mailing lists (SPSP, the Society for Judgment 
and Decision Making (SJDM), and the Dutch Society of Social Psychologists (ASPO)). 
Finally, we presented a preliminary version of the meta-analysis at the annual Society 
for Personality and Social Psychology Conference in New Orleans on January 17th 
2013. At this conference, we released another call for data on moral licensing. We 
considered the studies we found and received until December 1st, 2014 for inclusion.  
                                                          
1 Variants on these keywords were also used. 
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Inclusion criteria  
Studies were included if they met two criteria. First, the behavior that was measured 
had to meet our definition of moral licensing. This entails that the behavior has to take 
place in a moral domain. Licensing studies on self-regulation (e.g., Chiou, Yang, & 
Wan, 2011; De Witt-Huberts, Evers, & De Ridder, 2012; Fishbach & Dhar, 2005; 
Mukhopadhyay, Sengupta, & Ramanathan, 2008; Mukhopadhyay & Johar, 2009) do 
not fall under the definition of moral licensing and were thus not included in the 
current meta-analysis. In addition, this implies that the independent variable should 
consist of (intended) good behavior or the recall thereof. For instance, we included the 
studies by Mazar and Zhong (2010) where the independent variable consists of buying 
ecofriendly products in a virtual shopping paradigm, but we did not include the study 
by Eskine (2012) where the independent variable consists of participants merely being 
exposed to organic products, since the latter does not entail actual or hypothetical 
behavior. If there is no prior good deed (or recall thereof), there can also be no moral 
licensing according to our definition. Following this definition also implies that the 
dependent variable should measure actual or hypothetical behavior of the 
participants. Studies where the dependent variable consisted of evaluative judgments, 
for instance an evaluation of one’s morality level (Jordan et al., 2011, Study 1) or the 
perception of general undesirable behavior (Effron, Monin, & Miller, 2013, Study 2), 
were therefore not included. 
Second, reported statistics had to be adequate to calculate effect sizes. When important 
statistical information was lacking, authors were contacted for more information. 
When authors did not respond to the initial request, two reminders were sent. Studies 
that did not meet our inclusion criteria can be found in Appendix 2.1. 
 Dependent variables 
The dependent variables reported in the included studies comprise immoral behavior, 
such as cheating and stealing (Mazar & Zhong, 2010), or a decrease in moral behavior, 
such as donating less money to charity (Sachdeva et al., 2009). These behaviors are real, 
such as stealing money from the experimenter (Mazar & Zhong, 2010), or hypothetical, 
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such as indicating that one would be willing to volunteer (Conway & Peetz, 2012). 
They were either measured on a continuous scale or as a dichotomous choice between 
a virtuous and a less virtuous option. All effect sizes were recoded so that positive 
effect sizes indicated associations between previous moral behavior and a subsequent 
decrease in moral behavior. 
Moderators 
In several studies that investigated possible moderators of the moral licensing effect, 
the authors predicted a moral licensing effect in one condition but no moral licensing 
in another condition. For instance, Conway and Peetz (2012) predicted that licensing 
would occur when participants recalled a recent moral act, but not when they recalled 
a temporally distant moral act. In these cases, our default was that we did not include 
the conditions where the authors did not expect a moral licensing effect. For the 
Conway and Peetz example on recalling recent versus distant moral acts, this implies 
that we only included the condition where participants recalled a recent moral act. 
Across all the studies that we included, we made two exceptions to this default: First, 
Bradley-Geist et al. (2010) predicted that participants who freely chose to write about 
a positive (versus negative) experience with a member of a minority group would 
obtain a moral license, whereas participants who were forced to write about a positive 
(versus negative) past experience with a member of a minority group would not obtain 
a moral license. Because in many other studies on moral licensing participants are 
specifically asked to write about moral behavior or moral traits in the past and thus do 
not have a choice to write about immoral versus moral behavior (Blanken, Van de Ven, 
& Zeelenberg, 2012; Chapter 2; Clot et al., 2013b; Conway & Peetz, 2012; Cornelissen 
et al., 2013a; Jordan et al., 2011; Sachdeva et al., 2009; Schüler, Lehnhardt, & Huber, 
2012; Thomas & Showers, 2012; Young, Chakroff, & Tom, 2012), we decided to include 
the forced choice conditions from Bradley-Geist et al. (2010). Second, in Study 3 of 
Conway and Peetz (2012) the authors predicted that participants who wrote about 
moral actions would obtain a moral license, whereas participants who wrote about 
moral traits would not obtain a moral license. We decided to include both the moral 
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action and the moral trait conditions because we tested for the difference between 
moral traits versus actions in our between-study moderator section.  
For studies where authors predicted that one specific condition could have a larger 
licensing effect than the other condition, we included both effects. For instance, Monin 
and Miller (2001) predicted that participants who previously established nonracist 
credentials were more likely to display preference for a white over a black person in a 
hypothetical job hiring task compared to participants who did not establish nonracist 
credentials. They also predicted that this effect could be larger for participants who 
completed the independent and dependent variables in front of the same (versus a 
different) experimenter. For this study, we thus included both the single experimenter 
audience and the different experimenter audience conditions, because the authors had 
predicted a licensing effect in both conditions. 
Some studies tested the moderating effect of continuous personality variables 
(Cornelissen et al., 2013b; Effron et al., 2009; 2012; Meijers et al., 2014). For instance, 
Effron et al. (2009; 2012) measured whether scores on the modern racism scale 
moderated participants’ preferences for white over black persons. In these cases, we 
included the main effect size without distinguishing between participants who scored 
high versus low on the measured personality variable because (1) other studies on 
moral licensing do not differentiate between these specific variables and (2) according 
to general theorizing on moral licensing the general licensing induction should work 
for all individuals. 
We analyzed the effects of between-study moderators, that is, moderators that we 
theoretically predicted to influence the magnitude of the moral licensing effect (as 
pointed out in the introduction section) by means of a regression model. 
Overview of analyzed studies 
The dataset contains 91 different comparisons between a moral licensing and a control 
condition, with a total of 7397 participants, reported in 22 published or forthcoming 
journal articles and 8 unpublished manuscripts. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the 
included studies.  
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Table 2.1  
Details of all studies included in the meta-analysis (dummy coding for moderators in last columns) 
 Author (s) Year Study N d s² Licensing manipulation Dependent variable A B C D E 
1 Blanken, van de 
Ven, Zeelenberg, 
and Meijers 2014 1 64 0.08 0.06 
Pp wrote about themselves using 
positive trait words  Donation to charity 0 1 0 1 0 
2 
 
Blanken, van de 
Ven, Zeelenberg, 
and Meijers 2014 2 91 0.27 0.04 
Pp wrote about themselves using 
positive words 
Cooperative behavior in a hypothetical 
commons dilemma 0 0 0 1 0 
3 Blanken, van de 
Ven, Zeelenberg, 
and Meijers 2014 3 567 -0.05 0.01 
Pp wrote about themselves using 
positive trait words 
Donation to charity and cooperative 
behavior in a hypothetical commons 
dilemma 0 x 0 1 0 
4 
Blanken, van de 
Ven, and Zeelenberg 2012 1 86 -0.08 0.05 Pp recalled having good traits  
Participants indicated their willingness 
to fake illness at work to visit a concert 
in a hypothetical scenario 0 0 0 0 0 
5 Blanken, van de 
Ven, and Zeelenberg 2012 1 86 0.07 0.05 Pp recalled performing good behavior  
Willingness to fake illness at work to 
visit a concert in a hypothetical scenario 1 0 0 0 0 
6 
Blanken, van de 
Ven, and Zeelenberg 2012 2 38 0.05 0.11 
Pp indicated whether they are 
planning to donate their organs after 
death Everyday Cooperation Scale  1 0 0 0 0 
7 Blanken, van de 
Ven, and Zeelenberg 2012 3 49 0.49 0.08 Pp recalled having good traits  Hypothetical donation to charity 0 0 0 0 0 
8 Blanken, van de 
Ven, and Zeelenberg 2012 3 47 0.03 0.09 Pp recalled performing good behavior  Hypothetical donation to charity 1 0 0 0 0 
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9 Blanken, van de 
Ven, and Zeelenberg 2012 4 64 0.30 0.06 Pp recalled having good traits  
Willingness to fake illness at work to 
visit a concert in a hypothetical scenario 0 0 0 0 0 
10 Blanken, van de 
Ven, and Zeelenberg 2012 4 65 0.54 0.06 Pp recalled having good traits  
Willingness to fake illness at work to 
visit a concert in a hypothetical scenario 0 0 0 0 0 
11 Blanken, van de 
Ven, and Zeelenberg 2012 5 57 -0.11 0.07 Pp recalled helping a friend Willingness to Volunteer Scale  1 0 0 0 0 
12 Blanken, van de 
Ven, and Zeelenberg 2012 5 53 0.12 0.08 Pp recalled helping a stranger Willingness to Volunteer Scale 1 0 0 0 0 
13 
Blanken, van de 
Ven, and Zeelenberg 2012 6 50 0.61 0.10 
Pp recalled having good traits and 
helping a person who is walking on 
crutches 
Giving 'accidentally' overpaid (actual) 
money back to experimenter (y/n) x 1 0 0 0 
14 
Blanken, van de 
Ven, and Zeelenberg 2012 6 49 0.48 0.10 
Pp recalled performing good 
behaviors and helping a person who is 
walking on crutches 
Giving 'accidentally' overpaid (actual) 
money back to experimenter (y/n) 1 1 0 0 0 
15 Blanken, van de 
Ven, and Zeelenberg 2012 7 48 0.63 0.09 Pp recalled having good traits  
Willingness to pay for luxurious over 
purposeful goods 0 0 0 0 0 
16 Blanken, van de 
Ven, and Zeelenberg 2012 7 51 0.22 0.08 Pp recalled performing good behavior  
Willingness to pay for luxurious over 
purposeful goods 1 0 0 0 0 
17 Blanken, van de 
Ven, and Zeelenberg 2012 8 94 0.86 0.07 Pp recalled having good traits  Everyday Cooperation Scale 0 0 0 0 0 
18 Blanken, van de 
Ven, and Zeelenberg 2012 8 133 0.24 0.03 Pp recalled performing good behavior  Everyday Cooperation Scale 1 0 0 0 0 
19 Blanken, van de 
Ven, and Zeelenberg 2012 9 65 -0.19 0.06 Pp recalled having good traits  
Willingness to pay for luxurious over 
purposeful goods 0 0 0 0 0 
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20 Blanken, van de 
Ven, and Zeelenberg 2012 9 61 0.04 0.07 Pp recalled performing good behavior  
Willingness to pay for luxurious over 
purposeful goods 1 0 0 0 0 
21 
Blanken, van de 
Ven, and Zeelenberg 2012 10 61 -0.34 0.07 
Pp indicated whether they are 
planning to donate their organs after 
death + provided their address for a 
folder on organ donation Everyday Cooperation Scale 1 0 0 0 0 
22 Blanken, van de 
Ven, and Zeelenberg 2012 11 83 -0.25 0.05 
Pp indicated preference for a black 
doctor 
Willingness to hire white person for a 
job (over a black person) in a scenario 1 0 1 0 0 
23 Blanken, van de 
Ven, and Zeelenberg 2012 12 57 -0.67 0.08 Pp disagreed with racist statement 
Willingness to hire white person for a 
job (over a black person) in a scenario 1 0 1 0 0 
24 Bradley-Geist, King, 
Skorinko, Hebl, and 
McKenna 2010 1 38 -0.17 0.11 
Pp were asked to write about a 
positive experience with a black 
individual 
Willingness to hire white person for a 
job (over a black person) in a scenario 1 0 1 1 0 
25 
Bradley-Geist, King, 
Skorinko, Hebl, and 
McKenna 2010 1 35 0.66 0.13 
Pp were given the choice to write 
about a positive or negative experience 
with a black individual. Participants 
who chose to write about a positive 
experience were included. 
Willingness to hire white person for a 
job (over a black person) in a scenario 1 0 1 1 0 
26 Bradley-Geist, King, 
Skorinko, Hebl, and 
McKenna 2010 2 44 0.17 0.09 
Pp were asked to write about a 
positive experience with a hispanic 
individual 
Willingness to hire white person for a 
job (over a hispanic person) in a scenario 
2 + tolerance for prejudice scale 1 0 1 1 0 
27 
Bradley-Geist, King, 
Skorinko, Hebl, and 
McKenna 2010 2 42 0.47 0.10 
Pp were given the choice to write 
about a positive or negative experience 
with a hispanic individual. 
Participants who chose to write about 
a positive experience were included. 
Willingness to hire white person for a 
job (over a hispanic person) in a scenario 
+ tolerance for prejudice scale 1 0 1 1 0 
                                                          
2 Data on this measure were not included since there were insufficient statistics to calculate a cohen’s d effect size 
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28 Bradley-Geist, King, 
Skorinko, Hebl, and 
McKenna 2010 4 56 -0.70 0.08 
Pp were asked to write about a 
positive experience with a black friend 
Willingness to hire white person for a 
job (over a hispanic person) in a scenario 
3 + tolerance for prejudice scale 1 0 1 1 1 
29 
Brown et al.  2011 1 97 0.41 0.04 
Pp read four moral dilemmas and 
rated how likely they would be to 
behave in a prosocial 
fashion if they were to encounter such 
a situation. 
The extent to which participants cheat 
on a math task  1 1 0 1 0 
30 
Cain, Loewenstein, 
and Moore 2005 1 43 0.58 0.10 
Pp disclosed their conflict of interest to 
other pp 
Giving worse advice to increase own 
gains in a hypothetical conflict of 
interest 1 0 1 1 0 
31 
Cain, Loewenstein, 
and Moore 2010 1 348 -0.15 0.01 
Pp disclosed their conflict of interest to 
other pp 
Giving worse advice to increase own 
gains in a hypothetical conflict of 
interest 1 0 1 1 0 
32 Cain, Loewenstein, 
and Moore 2010 3 49 0.04 0.08 
Pp disclosed their conflict of interest to 
other pp 
Giving worse advice to increase own 
payoff 1 1 1 1 0 
33 Cain, Loewenstein, 
and Moore 2010 3 77 0.40 0.05 
Pp disclosed their conflict of interest to 
other pp 
Giving worse advice to increase own 
payoff 1 1 1 1 0 
34 
Cascio and Plant 2015 1 86 0.54 0.05 
Pp were asked whether they were 
interested in taking part in a 
fundraiser (skip a meal for red cross) 
Willingness to hire white person for a 
job (over a black person) in a scenario 1 0 0 1 0 
35 
Cascio and Plant 2015 2 51 0.66 0.08 
Pp were asked whether they were 
interested in taking part in a 
fundraiser (skip a meal for red cross) 
Willingness to hire white person for a 
job (over a black person) in a scenario 1 0 0 1 0 
                                                          
3 Data on this measure were not included since there were insufficient statistics to calculate a cohen’s d effect size 
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36 
Cascio and Plant 2015 3 54 1.26 0.09 
Pp were asked whether they would be 
willing to donate blood 
Explicit racism - Attitudes Towards 
Black Scale (Example item: “I would 
rather not have Blacks live in the same 
apartment building I live in”) 1 0 0 1 0 
37 
Cascio and Plant 2015 4 74 0.60 0.06 
Pp were asked whether they were 
interested in taking part in a 
fundraiser (skip a meal for red cross) Indicating stereotypes against blacks 1 0 0 1 0 
38 
Choi, Crandall, and 
La 2014 2 116 0.44 0.04 
Pp first evaluated a high-quality ad 
with a Black model and were next 
given a chance to express positive 
attitude toward the ad  
Evaluation of a second (target) ad 
including a black model on 
attractiveness 1 0 1 1 0 
39 
Choi, Crandall, and 
La 2014 3 60 0.54 0.07 
Pp first evaluated a high-quality ad 
with a Black model and were next 
given a chance to express positive 
attitude toward the ad 
Evaluation of a second (target) ad 
including a black model on 
attractiveness 1 0 1 1 0 
40 Clot, Grolleau, and 
Ibanez 2014 1 100 0.35 0.04 
Pp imagined that they previously 
performed a good deed  Cheating for higher payoff  1 1 0 1 0 
41 
Clot, Groleau, and 
Ibanez 2013a 1 367 0.23 0.01 
Pp imagined performing voluntary 
work 
Pp indicated the extent to which they 
would take actual money out of this 
public funds  1 1 0 0 0 
42 
Clot, Grolleau, and 
Ibanez 2013b 1 192 0.30 0.02 
Pp imagined engaging in a pro-
environmental activity  
Pp could allocate an amount (30€) 
between themselves and an 
environmental charity (either World 
Wildlife Fund or Greenpeace) 0 1 1 1 0 
43 
Conway and Peetz 2012 1 51 0.33 0.08 
Pp recalled moral behavior they 
performed during the previous week 




Conway and Peetz 2012 2 39 0.58 0.11 
Pp described moral behavior in the 
recent past (one week ago) Willingness to Volunteer scale  1 0 0 1 1 
45 
Conway and Peetz 2012 3 65 0.00 0.06 
Pp were asked to visualize having 
certain moral characteristics, and 
wrote about what having these traits 
would mean for their personality. 
Donation to charity; pp entered a draw 
and they could indicate how much of 
the price money would be donated to 
charity 0 1 0 1 1 
46 
Conway and Peetz 2012 3 65 0.79 0.07 
Pp were asked to visualize performing 
moral behaviors, and wrote about how 
they would perform these behaviors. 
Donation to charity; pp entered a draw 
and they could indicate how much of 
the price money would be donated to 
charity 1 1 0 1 1 
47 Cornelissen, 
Bashshur, Rode, and 
Le Menestrel 2013 1 48 0.59 0.09 
Pp remembered an episode in the past 
where they did something ethical 
Amount of money offered in actual 
dictator game 1 1 0 1 1 
48 Cornelissen, 
Bashshur, Rode, and 
Le Menestrel 2013 2 40 0.84 0.11 
Pp remembered an episode in the past 
where they did something ethical 
Amount of money offered in actual 
dictator game 1 1 0 1 1 
49 Cornelissen, 
Bashshur, Rode, and 
Le Menestrel 2013 3 50 0.53 0.08 
Pp remembered an episode in the past 
where they did something ethical Cheating for higher payoff 1 1 0 1 1 
50 Cornelissen, 
Karelaia, Soyer 2013 1 70 0.57 0.06 
Pp could indicate whether they 
supported UNICEF. 
Providing help for organization by 
investing time to develop slogans. 1 1 1 0 1 
51 Cornelissen, 
Karelaia, Soyer 2013 2 92 0.36 0.04 
Pp indicated whether they supported 
Oxfam. 
Contribute part of participation fee to 
Oxfam. 1 1 1 0 1 
52 
Effron, Cameron, 
and Monin 2009 1 84 0.44 0.05 
Pp indicated that they would vote for 
president Obama (displaying 
preference for black over white 
president) 
Willingness to hire white person for a 
job (over a black person) in a scenario 1 0 1 1 0 




and Monin 2009 2 40 0.35 0.10 
Pp indicated that they would vote for 
president Obama (displaying 
preference for black over white 
president) 
Willingness to hire white person for a 
job (over a black person) in a scenario 1 0 1 1 0 
54 
Effron, Cameron, 
and Monin 2009 3 50 0.16 0.08 
Pp indicated that they would vote for 
president Obama (displaying 
preference for black over white 
president) 
Willingness to allocate funds to a group 
of white (over black) people in a 
scenario 1 0 1 1 0 
55 
Effron, Monin, and 
Miller 2012 3 157 0.25 0.03 
Pp displayed nonracist behavior while 
having a racist alternative to their 
behavior (accused white over black 
guy for crime) 
Willingness to hire white person for a 
job (over a black person) in a scenario 
and willingness to allocate funds to a 
group of white (over black) people 1 0 1 1 0 
56 
Jordan, Mullen and 
Murnighan 2011 2 68 0.42 0.06 
Pp recalled a situation in which they 
helped other people 
Indicate willingness to donate money to 
charity, donate 
blood, volunteer 1 0 0 1 0 
57 Jordan, Mullen and 
Murnighan 2011 3 76 0.98 0.06 
Pp recalled a situation in which they 
helped other people 
The extent to which participants cheat 
on math task  1 1 0 1 0 
58 
Khan and Dhar 2006 1 108 0.62 0.04 
Pp imagined that they had 
volunteered to perform community 
service 
Preferring a vicious over a less vicious 
item 1 0 0 1 0 
59 
Khan and Dhar 2006 2a 94 0.60 0.05 
Pp imagined donating money to 
charity 
Preferring a vicious over a less vicious 
item 1 0 0 1 0 
60 
Khan and Dhar 2006 2b 80 0.56 0.06 
Pp imagined donating money to 
charity 
Preferring a vicious over a less vicious 
item 1 0 0 1 0 
61 
Khan and Dhar 2006 3 80 0.39 0.05 Pp imagined helping a foreign student 
Pp received $2 and could indicate 
whether and how much money they 




Khan and Dhar 2006 4 80 0.46 0.06 
Pp imagined that they had 
volunteered to perform community 
service 
Preferring a vicious over a less vicious 
item 1 0 0 1 0 
63 
Khan and Dhar 2006 5 66 0.56 0.06 
Pp imagined that they had 
volunteered to perform community 
service 
Preferring a vicious over a less vicious 
item 1 0 0 1 0 
64 
Leonard 2012 1 32 -0.29 0.13 
Pp imagined refusing an offer to fake 
volunteering less hours than required  
Indicate how much money they would 
keep from a wallet they found in a 
hypothetical scenario  1 0 0 0 0 
65 
Leonard 2012 1 92 -0.04 0.04 
Pp imagined refusing an offer to fake 
volunteering less hours than required  
Indicate how much money they would 
keep from a wallet they found in a 
hypothetical scenario  1 0 0 0 1 
66 
Leonard 2012 2 43 -0.02 0.09 
Pp imagined refusing an offer to fake 
volunteering less hours than required  
Indicate how much money they would 
keep from a wallet they found in a 
hypothetical scenario  1 0 0 0 1 
67 
Leonard 2012 3 64 0.01 0.06 
Pp imagined that they found a wallet 
on the floor and decided not to take 
any of the money  
Pp indicated to what extent they would 
refuse an offer to fake volunteering less 
hours than required 1 0 0 0 1 
68 
Mann and 
Kawakami 2012 1 44 0.73 0.10 
Pp received feedback that they were 
drawing closer to their goal (try to 
have positive evaluations of black 
people whenever they were presented 
with an image of blacks)  
Interpersonal closeness task – seating 
distance towards black person 1 1 1 1 1 
69 
Mann and 
Kawakami 2012 2 94 0.55 0.04 
Pp received feedback that they were 
drawing closer to their goal (try to 
have positive evaluations of black 
people whenever they were presented 
with an image of blacks Racial attitudes 1 0 1 1 1 




Kawakami 2012 3 30 0.86 0.15 
Pp received visual feedback during a 
task that indicated that they were 
becoming more positive toward Blacks 
based on physiological responses 
measured with a 
LifeShirt 
Interpersonal closeness task – seating 
distance towards black person 1 1 1 1 1 
71 
Mazar and Zhong 2010 2 76 0.29 0.05 
Pp were assigned to an on-line store 
with more green (ecofriendly) than 
conventional products. Pp made 
purchases in this store 
Amount of money offered in an actual 
dictator game 1 1 0 1 0 
72 
Mazar and Zhong 2010 3 81 0.53 0.05 
Pp were assigned to an on-line store 
with more green (ecofriendly) than 
conventional products. Pp made 
purchases in this store 
Lying about performance to gain extra 
money for the experiment and stealing 
money from envelope  1 1 0 1 0 
73 Meijers, 
Noordewier, 
Verlegh, and Smit 2014 1 40 -0.04 0.10 
Pp imagined buying environmentally 
friendly sneakers. 
Sustainable intentions measured 
through the Minton and Rose 
Behavioral Intentions Scale  1 0 1 0 0 
74 Meijers, 
Noordewier, 
Verlegh, and Smit 2014 1 40 0.83 0.11 
Pp imagined buying environmentally 
friendly sneakers. 
Sustainable intentions measured 
through the Minton and Rose 
Behavioral Intentions Scale  1 0 1 0 0 
75 Meijers, 
Noordewier, 
Verlegh, and Smit 2014 2 88 0.60 0.05 
Pp entered a webshop with heavily 
environmental apparel and were asked 
to compose an outfit. 
Environmental Concern & Pro-
environmental intentions 1 0 1 0 0 
76 Meijers, 
Noordewier, 
Verlegh, and Smit 2014 2 88 -0.24 0.05 
Pp entered a webshop with heavily 
environmental apparel and were asked 
to compose an outfit. 
Environmental Concern & Pro-
environmental intentions 1 0 1 0 0 
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77 Merritt, Effron, Fein, 
Savitsky, Tuller, and 
Monin 2012 2 70 0.48 0.06 
Pp had a chance to establish 
credentials by identifying ambiguous 
behaviors as racist 
Willingness to hire white person for a 
job (over a black person) in a scenario 1 0 1 1 0 
78 
Monin and Miller 2001 1 140 0.26 0.03 
Pp indicated whether they considered 
each of five negative statements about 
women to be right or wrong, for 
instance: “Most women are not smart” 
Willingness to hire a woman for a job 
(over a man) in a scenario 1 0 1 1 0 
79 
Monin and Miller 2001 2 110 0.71 0.04 
Pp hired a women (showing that they 
are not sexist) or a black guy (showing 
that they are not racist) 
Willingness to hire white person for a 
job (over a black person) in a scenario 1 0 1 1 0 
80 
Monin and Miller 2001 3 21 0.91 0.21 
Pp hired a black guy (showing that 
they are not racist) 
Willingness to hire white person for a 
job (over a black person) in a scenario 1 0 1 1 0 
81 
Monin and Miller 2001 3 19 0.89 0.23 
Pp hired a black guy (showing that 
they are not racist) 
Willingness to hire white person for a 
job (over a black person) in a scenario 1 0 1 1 0 
82 Sachdeva, Iliev, and 
Medin 2009 1 29 0.60 0.14 
Pp wrote about themselves using 
positive words Donation to charity 0 1 0 1 0 
83 Sachdeva, Iliev, and 
Medin 2009 2 18 1.10 0.26 
Pp wrote about themselves using 
positive words Donation to charity 0 1 0 1 1 
84 Sachdeva, Iliev, and 
Medin 2009 3 31 0.57 0.13 
Pp wrote about themselves using 
positive words 
Cooperative behavior in a hypothetical 
commons dilemma 0 0 0 1 0 
85 Schüler, Lehnhardt, 
and Huber 2012 1 62 -0.42 0.07 
Pp recalled a situation in which they 
helped other people 
Dictator game where pp could earn 
points for lottery 1 1 0 0 0 
86 
Spektor 2014 1 278 0.00 0.01 
Pp remembered and wrote down a 
concrete situation within the last 7 
days in which they felt righteous or 
honorable (moral condition) 
Pp were told that they automatically 
participated in a €100 draw and could 
donate an amount of their choice to one 
or more charities in case they won 1 1 0 0 1 
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87 Susewind and 
Hoelzl 2014 1 84 0.38 0.05 
Pp focused on progress towards 
sustainable goals Pp indicated their prosocial intentions 1 1 0 1 0 
88 
Susewind and 
Hoelzl 2014 2 62 0.44 0.07 
Pp brainstormed on a topic that clearly 
benefited others and made progress on 
their goals 
Pp divided €6 between themselves and 
another participant of the study that was 
randomly assigned to them, knowing 
that the other participant has to accept 
their decision 1 1 0 1 1 
89 Thomas and 
Showers 2012 2 76 -0.30 0.05 
Pp recalled a time when they did 
something especially moral or ethical.  
The extent to which participants cheat 
on a math task  1 1 0 0 1 
90 
Young, Chakroff, 
and Tom  2012 1 66 0.41 0.06 
Pps were asked to describe 5 good 
deeds 
Donation amount to charity - 
hypothetical amount, actual y/n and 
actual amount 1 x 0 1 0 
91 
Zhong, Ku, Lount 
and Murnighan 2009 2 68 0.29 0.06 
Pp were asked to imagine that they 
would display ethical behavior in a 
specific situation  
Willingness to display ethical behavior 
in hypothetical situation 1 0 1 1 0 
Note. N = Number of participants included in study; d = Cohen’s d effect size; s² = Within-study variance; A = Licensing induction: 
Traits (0) versus actions (1); B = Behavior measured in the dependent variable: Actual (1) versus hypothetical (0); C = Domain: Same 




Effect size measure 
We calculated Cohen’s d based on pooled standard deviations for all studies, with a 
positive d-value indicating moral licensing. For calculation of the effect sizes of the 
continuous dependent variables we used means and standard deviations. When 
information on means and standard deviations was lacking, t-values were used for the 
calculation. For calculation of the effect sizes of dichotomous dependent variables we 
used the reported χ² statistic or calculated the χ² statistic manually. For all effect sizes, 
we applied the small sample bias correction provided by Lipsey and Wilson (2001). 
The equations that we used to calculate the effect sizes can be found in Appendix 2.2. 
When the moral licensing condition (e.g., recall positive behavior) was compared to 
both a neutral (e.g., recall neutral behavior) and a negative (e.g., recall bad behavior) 
control condition, we always report the comparison between the moral licensing 
condition and the neutral control condition. Differences between comparisons with 
negative conditions versus comparisons with control conditions are analyzed in the 
between-moderator section. 
Several studies reported the effect of one independent variable on multiple dependent 
variables. For instance, Jordan et al. (2011) measured the effect of recalling (un)ethical 
behavior on (1) allowing an answer to a math task to appear on the screen, (2) whether 
the participant used that provided answer, and (3) the number of answers completed 
before participants started to cheat. To avoid statistical dependencies, in these 
situations we combined the different effects into a single effect size by averaging the 
multiple effect sizes (Hedges & Olkin, 1985; Marascuillo, Busk & Serlin, 1988; 
Rosenthal & Rubin, 1986). Some studies included two moral licensing conditions. For 
instance, Blanken et al. (2012) measured the effects of displaying prior good behavior 
and of displaying having been a good person on willingness to help and compared 
both conditions to a similar control condition. In these cases we report a separate effect 
size for each moral licensing condition. This also enabled us to code these conditions 
independently for the moderator section.  
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Random-effects model 
We examined the overall effect size of the moral licensing effect using a random effects 
model, since there was no a priori reason to assume that the true effect size is exactly 
the same across all studies (Hedges & Vevea, 1998). The model treats the heterogeneity 
as purely random; 𝜃𝑖 = 𝜇 + 𝑢𝑖, where 𝑢𝑖  ~𝑁 (0, 𝜏
2) and 𝜏2 is the residual heterogenity 
estimated with the DerSimonian-Laird estimator (DerSimonian & Laird, 1986). The 
average true effect 𝜇 is calculated via weighted least squares with weights equal to 
𝑤𝑖 = 1/(𝑣𝑖 + 𝜏 ̂
2) where 𝜏 ̂2  is the estimate of 𝜏2  and 𝑣𝑖  is the sample variance 
(Viechtbauer, 2010).  
Results4 
Mean effect of moral licensing 
The random effects meta-analysis (N = 91; 57 published and 34 unpublished studies) 
produced a mean effect size of moral licensing of d = 0.31 ([CI95] 0.23 to 0.38). The null 
hypothesis H0: μ = 0 was rejected (Z = 8.24, p < .001), showing that there is a significant 
moral licensing effect across the studies we analyzed. The between-study variance is 
τ² = .06 ([CI95] .03 to .11) with I² = 54.58% of the total variation due to heterogeneity 
among true effects; in other words, 54.58% of the variability may be attributable to 
systematic between-study differences (Higgins & Thompson, 2002). Also, the test for 
heterogeneity is significant Q(df = 90) = 198.17, p < .001, implying that other possible 
moderators are influencing the magnitude of the moral licensing effect. The forest plot 
of the meta-analysis is depicted in Figure 2.1. To conclude the main analysis, the moral 
licensing effect is small to medium in effect size. In addition, there is substantial 
variation of the effect size between studies. In the next section, we discuss possible 
publication bias and whether specific between-study moderating variables are 
responsible for this variation. 
  
                                                          
4 All analyses were carried out with the statistical software R, using the metafor 




Figure 2.1. Forest plot of all included studies on moral licensing. RE Model = Random 
Effects Model, Observed Outcome = The obtained average effect size. This figure was 
created using the metafor forest (res) function in the R metaphor package. 
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The impact of publication bias 
The existence of a positive publication bias in the licensing literature was assessed via 
two methods; by creating a funnel plot and by investigating article status (published 
versus unpublished) as a between-study moderator. First, we created a funnel plot of 
the effects sizes of the published data (n = 57) against their corresponding standard 
errors. If there is no positive publication bias, the funnel plot should be roughly 
symmetrical around the true effect size estimate, because without a publication bias 
an equal amount of studies should find smaller effects than the true effect size as there 
are studies that find larger effects. If there is a positive publication bias, high powered 
studies should be close to the average effect size and be present on both sides, whereas 
studies with smaller samples and higher variability would be more likely to only 
appear as being larger than the true effect size. Smaller studies that find no significant 
effect are unlikely to be published, and therefore the bottom side of the funnel plot 
remains relatively empty in the presence of a positive publication bias.  
Figure 2.2 shows the effect sizes in the random effects funnel plot with the filled-in 
data. In this plot, the effect size estimates from the included published studies are 
represented as black dots. The white dots represent the estimated number of missing 
studies (n = 21). Interpretation of the symmetry of the black dots in the funnel plot is 
rather subjective (Thornton & Lee, 2000), but a regression analysis can be conducted 
with the standard error as predictor of the observed outcomes. When there is a 
publication bias, the observed effect sizes are positively related to the standard error 
(showing that studies with smaller sample sizes find larger effects; Egger, Smith, 
Schneider, & Minder, 1997). The regression test for funnel plot asymmetry using the 
weighted regression with multiplicative dispersion model showed a significant effect, 





Figure 2.2. Trimmed and filled funnel plot of all published studies (n = 57) on moral 
licensing. The black dots represent the published studies on moral licensing. The white 
dots represent the estimated missing studies (n = 21). This figure was created using the 
metafor funnel (rtf) function in the R metafor package. 
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Second, we tested for study status (published versus unpublished) as a between-study 
moderator. Article status (published versus unpublished) turned out to significantly 
influence the estimated moral licensing effect size, with published studies having 
larger effects (d = 0.43, SE = 0.04) than unpublished studies (d = 0.11, SE = 0.06), 𝑄𝑀5 (1) 
= 20.66, p < .001. Both methods thus indicate the existence of a publication bias. We 
decided to keep the article status moderator in the overall meta-regression model to 
control for its effects because other between-study moderators might be mainly tested 
in published studies. 
Between-study moderators 
To estimate the amount of variance in effect sizes of the included studies that could be 
explained by the theoretically predicted between-study moderators, we fitted a meta-
regression model including all these moderators in the R script (Viechtbauer, 2010). 
Two independent coders coded the potential between-study moderators (see also the 
last column of Table 2.1). When there was disagreement, the two coders talked to the 
primary researcher and came to a joint conclusion. For three studies (Blanken et al., 
2012; 2014; Young et al, 2012), it was not possible to code one of the moderators. For 
instance, the effect size of Young et al. (2012) consisted of merged dependent variables. 
Since one variable measured hypothetical donation behavior and another variable 
measured actual donation behavior, it was not possible to indicate whether the 
behavior was actual or hypothetical. We excluded these three studies, leaving n = 88 
studies for the moderator analyses. The initial inter-rater reliability for each moderator 
was as follows: Independent variable: Trait versus Action Cohen’s  = .97; Dependent 
variable: Actual versus Hypothetical behavior Cohen’s  = .92; Domain: Same versus 
Different Cohen’s  = .64; Control condition: Neutral versus Negative Cohen’s  = 1.00. 
Initially, the moderator ‘Dependent variable: A decrease in good behavior versus an 
increase in bad behavior’ was also coded. Since coding this moderator seemed 
problematic for both independent coders (for instance, is a preference for a white over 
                                                          
5 Qm is an omnibus test that analyzes whether the effect sizes for the two moderator 
conditions significantly differ (Zhang, 1999). 
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a black job applicant an increase in bad behavior versus a decrease in good behavior), 
we decided not to include this moderator in the main regression model. 
First, we conducted separate analyses for the different moderators. The type of 
independent variable (trait versus action) did not influence the average effect size, 
𝑄𝑀 (1) = 0.05, p = .819. The type of behavior measured in the dependent variable 
(actual versus hypothetical) did not influence the average effect size, 𝑄𝑀(1) = 0.86, p 
= .354. Domain (same versus different) did not influence the average effect size, 
𝑄𝑀(1) = 0.18, p = .670. As mentioned in the publication bias section, article status 
(published versus unpublished) did significantly influence the estimated moral 
licensing effect size. The type of control condition (neutral versus negative) did not 
influence the average effect size, 𝑄𝑀 (1)  = 0.03, p = .860. Next, we analyzed the 
moderators together in a multiple regression model to control for collinearity. Table 
2.2 provides an overview of the estimated β coefficients for each between-study 
moderator and the z-scores, standard errors, and p-values. Also in this multiple 
regression model the results showed that studies in published papers tend to have 
larger effect sizes than studies from unpublished work, β = .34, p < .001. Aside from 
this moderator, no other moderators were found to have a significant effect in the 
model. Thus, type of independent variable (trait or action), type of dependent variable 
(actual or hypothetical behavior), domain of dependent variable (same versus 
different), and type of control condition (neutral versus negative), did not moderate 
the moral licensing effect size.  
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Table 2.2  
Between-study moderator estimates in the meta-regression  
Moderator β  se Z p 
Intercept .48 .09 5.30 <.001 
Induction:  
Actions (d = 0.31) vs traits (d = 0.33)  
-.04 .10 -0.39 .696 
Dependent variable:  
Actual (d = 0.36) vs hypothetical behavior (d = 0.28) 
.02 .08 0.27 .791 
Domain:  
Same (d = 0.29) vs different (d = 0.32) 
-.10 .08 -1.32 .186 
Status:  
Published (d = 0.43) vs unpublished (d = 0.11) 
.34 .08 4.57 <.001 
Control condition: 
Negative (d = 0.30) vs neutral (d = 0.31)  
-.01 .09 -0.12 .905 
 
Discussion 
In the current chapter we aimed to give a state-of-the-art overview of moral licensing 
by examining the magnitude of the moral licensing effect and testing for potential 
moderators. We found an overall average effect size of d = 0.31, [CI95] 0.23 to 0.38, that 
is statistically different from zero, suggesting that there is a small-to-medium moral 
licensing effect (Cohen, 1992). To contextualize what is meant by small-to-medium, we 
compared this effect size to other relevant effect sizes in the field. Social psychological 
effects typically yield a value of r equal to .21 (approx. 4% variance explained) 
(Richard, Bond, & Stokes-Zoota, 2003). This translates to a Cohen’s d value of 0.43. The 
moral licensing effect size is thus slightly smaller than the average effect size in social 
psychology. Of course, this does not imply that the moral licensing effect has little 
theoretical or practical relevance. 
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An important consequence of this small-to-medium effect size is that properly 
powered studies on moral licensing need far more participants than are typically used. 
We used G*power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) to determine that one 
would need 165 participants per condition to have 80% statistical power to find an 
effect of d = 0.31.6 A post hoc power analysis on all studies using our current effect size 
estimate finds that on average, the studies only have 28% power. Increasing sample 
size in moral licensing studies will help the researcher, as it increases the chance of 
finding an effect. Furthermore, it will allow for more solid conclusions, for instance 
about the various moderators that have been tested in different studies.  
Potential moderators and underlying mechanisms 
In the following section we discuss the moderators that we tested for in our meta- 
analysis and relate the findings to previously proposed mechanisms of moral 
licensing. Note that we also tested for and found a publication bias in our moderator 
tests, and we will return to that topic in a later section. 
Moral licensing induction: traits versus actions  
Conway and Peetz (2012) hypothesized that recalling prior good actions would lead 
to moral licensing, while recalling prior good traits would lead to consistency. They 
found initial support for this hypothesis. Our meta-analysis could not confirm this 
finding. That is, we found no difference in size of the moral licensing effect, based on 
whether the prior good deed was coded as an action or a trait. For our moderator 
section, we included both recalled actions and performed actions (such as buying 
ecofriendly products; Mazar & Zhong, 2010). Conway and Peetz found that recalled 
moral actions elicited self-licensed behaviors, whereas recalled moral traits provoked 
consistent good behaviors (Study 3). It may be the case that the effect obtained by 
Conway and Peetz is specific to recall paradigms, although we have no theoretical idea 
                                                          
6 This power analysis is based on a two-sided test. We think this is appropriate, 
because the alternative hypothesis (consistency in behavior) would also be 
theoretically likely. 
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why that would be the case. Future research could further test whether and how this 
moderator is important for moral licensing to occur. 
Behavior in the dependent variable: actual versus hypothetical  
It is cheap and easy for people to display hypothetical behavior (i.e., to state good 
intentions) that is in accordance with their previous laudable behavior, which would 
make a consistency effect more likely. Therefore, we expected that perhaps moral 
licensing would be stronger for actual good behavior compared to hypothetical good 
behavior. However, the meta-analysis showed no such differences between actual 
versus hypothetical behavior. There was only one study in the dataset that directly 
investigated similar actual versus hypothetical behavior as a dependent measure in 
the licensing paradigm. Young et al. (2012) investigated the effects of recalling good 
(vs bad or neutral) deeds on hypothetical and actual donations to charity. They found 
a consistency effect, such that people who recalled prior good deeds donated nearly 
twice as much to charity compared to people who recalled prior bad deeds or who 
recalled a neutral conversation. They did not find a licensing effect. They also did not 
find any differences between reported hypothetical and actual donations, similar to 
the results of our meta-analysis. However, note that the actual donation request in that 
study was directly placed after the hypothetical donation item, which might have 
facilitated this effect. 
Maybe, in the case of a hypothetical dependent variable, people are less tempted to 
display immoral behavior. When confronted with an actual choice with real 
consequences, decisions may be different. In these so-called affectively rich states 
(Rottenstreich, & Hsee, 2001), people are more likely to focus predominantly on the 
favorability of the outcomes. Therefore, more research is needed that not only focuses 
on whether the behavior is hypothetical or not, but also on how tempting it is. 
Moreover, we think that more careful consideration of the dependent variables being 
used in moral licensing studies is essential. For example, quite some research on moral 
licensing includes scales like the Everyday Cooperation Scale (De Hooge, Zeelenberg, 
& Breugelmans, 2007) and the Willingness to Volunteer Scale (DeVoe & Pfeffer, 2007) 
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as the dependent measures. Such scales measure people’s stated intention to want to 
help out (and perform good behavior). However, it could be the case that people 
overstate their willingness to help others, perhaps partly due to social desirability 
concerns. If a moral licensing condition causes people to indicate a lower willingness 
to help others, this could indeed reflect licensing. However, it could also imply that 
people who recall prior good behavior actually become more honest. When they are 
asked whether they want to volunteer, they might be more thoroughly thinking about 
it and answering it truthfully, which is usually that one actually does not have the time 
to volunteer. Both such a consistency process and moral licensing would predict lower 
scores on for example the Willingness to Volunteer Scale, but the underlying process 
is completely different. Researchers should be aware of these possible confounds when 
studying licensing with hypothetical behavioral measures. 
Domain: same versus different domain  
If effects similar to mental accounting (Thaler, 1985) occur in the realm of moral 
licensing, licensing effects would be larger when the moral and immoral behaviors 
were measured in the same domain compared to in a different domain. However, the 
meta-analysis did not find differences between immoral behaviors in the same domain 
versus in a different domain. Effron and Monin (2010) reasoned that the relative 
effectiveness of same-domain versus different-domain moral licensing depends on 
whether the immoral behavior being licensed is blatantly bad or only ambiguously 
bad. They tested this idea in studies of observers’ inclination to license the behaviors 
of other persons and found that different-domain licensing worked better than same-
domain licensing when the bad deeds were blatant. In contrast, same-domain licensing 
worked better than different-domain licensing when the bad deeds were ambiguous 
(i.e., could be construed as non-problematic). Our meta-analysis could not control for 
the ambiguity of the licensed behavior. We could not make inferences about how 
blatantly bad the behavior in the dependent variables actually was for participants, 
because it was not clear to what extent they actually justified the licensed behaviors. 
Effron and Monin tested their predictions for observer-licensing, but not for self-
licensing. Future research on self-licensing could therefore clarify whether the 
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ambiguity of the licensed behavior plays a role in the distinction between same- versus 
different-domain licensing.  
Control condition: neutral or negative control condition  
We were surprised by the absence of a difference in whether the licensing condition 
(e.g., recall a previous moral action) was compared to a neutral control condition (e.g., 
recall a previous trip to the shopping mall) or a negative control condition (e.g., recall 
a previous immoral action). This finding is surprising because researchers have 
documented the moral cleansing effect, the finding that recalling previous immoral 
behavior leads to more subsequent moral behavior (the exact opposite of the moral 
licensing effect; see Conway & Peetz, 2012; Jordan et al., 2011; Sachdeva et al., 2009; 
Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). With the existence of a moral cleansing effect, one would 
expect that the moral licensing effect should be larger when the positive condition is 
compared to the negative condition than a neutral condition. After all, if recalling 
immoral behavior leads to more moral behavior compared to a neutral control 
condition, the contrast with the recalling moral behavior condition should be even 
stronger.  
There is some discussion about whether the moral cleansing effect is indeed as strong 
as initial research suggested (cf. Chapter 4). However, another possibility is that 
perhaps recalling or performing bad or immoral behavior can induce people to feel 
good about themselves. Research on the ease of retrieval explanation of the availability 
heuristic shows that reminders of behavior only elicit feelings that are congruent with 
these behaviors if it is easy for participants to retrieve these behaviors (Schwarz et al., 
1991). If participants find it difficult to recall immoral behavior (or can only come up 
with an instance that was a very long time ago), they might infer from this that they 
are quite moral persons themselves. Furthermore, exposure to extreme stimuli from a 
category can also sometimes remind people of the other extreme of this category (Herr, 
Sherman, & Fazio, 1983). By activating the concept of immoral behavior, the 
manipulations might also have activated the concept of morality. For these reasons, 
some of the manipulations that induced immoral behavior might have inadvertently 
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also activated moral behavior somewhat, thereby leading to a moral licensing effect 
that is as large as moral licensing contrasted to neutral behaviors. 
Taken together, none of the examined moderators that were based on existing 
theorizing on moral licensing significantly moderated the moral licensing effect in the 
current meta-analysis. There are various possible explanations for this, in addition to 
the ones described above. Moderators itself might again have moderators for when the 
effect occurs or not. The studies that were included in the meta-analysis employed 
very different designs and included different populations. Variations in experimental 
design may have resulted in very different outcomes with respect to the moderating 
variables. In addition, small sample sizes of several included studies may have made 
it more difficult to perform a proper assessment of the predicted moderators as that 
made effect size estimates less precise. We therefore recommend researchers to 
critically revise the research paradigms and increase sample sizes that they employ to 
study the moral licensing effect and, if necessary, revise the theory. 
Other possible mechanisms  
The literature on moral licensing does not lack explanatory mechanisms. Conway and 
Peetz (2012), for instance, proposed that recalling distant moral behavior makes one’s 
moral values salient and induces people to act consistent with these moral values, 
whereas recalling recent moral behavior leads to moral licensing. The reason is that 
recent moral behavior reminds people that they made goal-progress towards their goal 
of being a good person. Having satisfied that goal, people can then focus attention on 
other goals, which might include for example selfish behavior. Conway and Peetz 
indeed found that recalling temporally distant moral behavior led to subsequent good 
behavior (consistency), whereas recalling recent moral behavior decreased people’s 
tendency to engage in good behavior (licensing). Consistent with that idea, Fishbach 
and Dhar (2005) found that inducing a sense of achieved goal progress can initiate 
behaviors associated with licensing in the self-regulation domain such as making 
unhealthy food choices and spending less time on course work. However, it should be 
noted that in other studies that find a moral licensing effect, people recall past moral 
behavior in which it is not specified that it has to be recent or distant moral behavior 
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(e.g., Jordan et al., 2011; Sachdeva et al., 2009). Therefore, we did not have sufficient 
information to be able to include the recency of the prior positive behavior as a possible 
moderator for the moral licensing effect in our meta-analysis. 
Another possible mechanism for moral licensing was proposed by Miller and Effron 
(2010) who distinguished two different pathways of moral licensing, namely (1) moral 
licensing via credits and (2) moral licensing via credentials. The first pathway, moral 
licensing via credits, asserts that engaging in good behaviors endows people with 
credits that function to balance out subsequent questionable behaviors, like some sort 
of moral currency. A person can perceive his recent voluntary work as a credit license 
to decline a donation request. Thus, a person who obtained a credit might think ‘I have 
done something good so I can now do something bad’. Importantly, the perceived 
meaning of undesirable acts does not change, but the expending of one’s previously 
earned credit “nullifies” the current bad deed, which makes it acceptable. The deed is 
still seen as negative, but acceptable. The undesirable behavior is thus accepted, 
because it is offset by prior good behavior. The second pathway, moral licensing via 
credentials, entails that one’s behavioral history provides a license by changing the way 
subsequent behavior is construed. These credentials function like a character witness 
on which one can repeatedly call to testify that subsequent dubious behavior is not 
wrong or immoral. For instance, previous unprejudiced behavior establishes oneself 
as an unbiased person. A subsequent discriminatory attitude is thought of as less 
prejudiced, because it came from an ostensibly unbiased source. This means that a bad 
deed is seen as less bad if a prior good deed preceded it. The credits versus credentials 
explanation of Miller and Effron could not be tested in our meta-analysis, as it was not 
possible to code participants’ thoughts on this distinction.  
Publication bias 
A meta-analysis allows one to examine publication bias, which is the tendency that 
significant results are more likely to get published than non-significant results. The 
regression model including the between-study moderators revealed that moral 
licensing studies in published papers tend to have larger effect sizes than studies that 
did not appear in published papers. The funnel plot in Figure 2.2 also points to 
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publication bias. As with any publication bias, it can be caused by researchers only 
submitting positive results, by the tendency of journals to reject studies with negative 
results, and also by the design or the execution of specific studies (for example, a part 
of the unpublished papers may suffer from methodological flaws, see Thornton & Lee, 
2000). We hope that our estimate of the effect size of moral licensing helps other 
researchers to come up with well-powered tests, for which it should be easier to 
publish those also if there is no effect. Running studies with larger samples would thus 
not only make the effect size estimates more precise, it would hopefully also help to 
reduce the publication bias. 
Possible limitations 
Although we believe that the current meta-analysis offers important insights for the 
moral licensing literature, several limitations of the analysis are noteworthy. First, a 
substantial amount of the included effect sizes is based on small sample sizes, which 
could lead to an overestimation of the true effect size (Reynolds & Day, 1984). Another 
point is that since the moderator analyses are performed on 88 studies, we could select 
a limited number of moderator variables. Furthermore, as with all meta-analyses, the 
inclusion criteria are subjective. Although we formulated clear inclusion criteria in 
advance, the inclusion of some studies was debatable. For instance, we included both 
studies in which the moral licensing induction exists of (the recall of) actual good 
behavior as well as studies in which the moral licensing induction focuses on having 
good intentions. One could argue that both types of independent variables are 
different in nature and should therefore be analyzed separately. However, according 
to the current theorizing on moral licensing, both good behaviors and good intentions 
should lead to the behaviors associated with moral licensing (Khan & Dhar, 2006). 
Another example is Study 1 by Gneezy, Imas, Brown, Nelson, and Norton (2012), in 
which the independent variable existed of a donation to charity that was automatically 
deducted from the participants’ payment or a donation to charity that was made by 
the experimenter on behalf of the participants. Gneezy et al. stated that the donation 
that was made by the experimenter on behalf of the participants would create a self-
license. However, we did not include these studies in our meta-analysis, because we 
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do not think participants necessarily perceive this kind of behavior as having done 
something good themselves, and therefore the studies did not meet our definition of 
moral licensing. Finally, although we explicitly searched for unpublished studies in an 
attempt to prevent file drawer effects, there are likely studies on moral licensing that 
we could not detect.  
Important aspects for future studies on moral-licensing 
Hofmann, Wineski, Brandt, and Skitka (2014) recently investigated everyday morality 
outside of the lab, through assessing moral and immoral acts in a large community 
sample (N = 1252). 7  They found a moral licensing pattern, in that people who 
committed a moral act had a larger likelihood of committing an immoral act later that 
day. Thus, although the average effect size of moral licensing in experimental 
paradigms is small-to-medium, moral licensing seems to occur in daily life. The moral 
licensing effect and the way it is studied thus deserve further attention. In the 
remainder of this section, we will outline recommendations for scholars studying 
moral licensing.  
The main advice is for researchers studying moral licensing to increase the power of 
the studies. As explained before, this is important because it helps the researcher by 
lowering the chance of a study not finding an effect. Note that with the average power 
of current moral licensing studies (28%), there is a 72% chance to find a non-significant 
moral licensing effect if there is an effect. Our power calculation reveals that one needs 
165 participants per cell, in order to have 80% power to find an effect as large as the 
one established in our meta-analysis.  
Moral licensing is typically seen in the temporal pattern that people who behaved in a 
good or moral way later feel justified to refrain from socially desirable or morally 
laudable actions (Miller & Effron, 2010; Monin & Miller, 2001). All studies on moral 
licensing that we are aware of investigated the phenomenon in terms of two 
                                                          
7 We did not include this study in our meta-analysis because we wanted to include 
effect sizes based on the comparison between an experimental licensing condition 
and a control condition. In this specific study there was no control condition and no 
random assignment of participants to conditions.  
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consecutive behaviors or events, where good behavior ‘A’ leads to less desirable 
behavior ‘B’. However, there is no reason to assume that the process of moral licensing 
actually operates in the order of these two consecutive behaviors. For instance, people 
may not consciously feel that after displaying certain good behavior ‘A’ they can now 
engage in undesirable behavior ‘B’, because of the prior good behavior. Perhaps people 
who face a dilemma in which they would like to engage in undesirable behavior ‘B’ 
(e.g., not donating money to charity) are more likely to find a reason why that is 
acceptable after having just performed a good action (e.g., performing voluntary work 
in a soup kitchen). In other words, moral licensing could also be a justification strategy 
that people deliberately use to excuse their morally questionable behaviors. This line 
of reasoning is illustrated by recent studies on moral credentialing. Merritt et al. (2012) 
found that people strategically attempt to earn moral credentials when they anticipate 
performing morally dubious behaviors. For instance, participants who expected that 
their future behavior could be regarded as prejudiced exaggerated how favorably they 
perceived a black person in a previous job hiring task. In a similar vein, Effron (2014) 
found that participants who were worried that their future behavior could be regarded 
as prejudiced or unethical overestimated to which extent previous nonracist choices or 
ethical behaviors proved their morality to other persons. Moreover, in their research 
on counterfactual licensing, Effron et al. (2012; 2013) showed that in order to justify 
future undesirable behaviors, people exaggerate negative counterfactuals of their 
foregone behavior. 
Thus, instead of the reasoning being “I just did good deed A, so now I can do bad deed 
B”, the reasoning might also be “I feel tempted to do bad deed B. Can I do that? Yes, 
because I just did good deed A”. This might seem like a negligible nuance, but it also 
implies that not only aspects of the prior good deed (as many theories and moderators 
now focus on), but also tempting aspects of the morally questionable behaviors might 
be an important part of moral licensing theory. This reasoning fits with a justification-
based account of self-regulation (De Witt-Huberts, Evers, & De Ridder, 2014a). Further 
studies on moral licensing might benefit from focusing on aspects of the immoral 
behavior as well.  
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Conclusion 
Going back to the main goal of conducting the meta-analysis, the best estimate we have 
of the moral licensing effect is a Cohen’s d effect size of 0.31. The effect is somewhat 
smaller than other typical effects in social psychology (Richard et al., 2003), but also 
relatively small effects can have large societal implications. An important consequence 
of our effect size estimate is that future studies on moral licensing need far more 
participants to allow for more solid conclusions. Especially when we want to delve 
further into the process of why this interesting phenomenon occurs, and what its 
boundary conditions are, the study power needs to be sufficient. The current meta-
analysis gives researchers a good starting point to determine that power. The effects 
moral licensing has on less desirable and negative behaviors show the importance of 
continuing the research on this topic: A psychological process that helps to predict 
when people display ambiguously racist attitudes, engage in cheating behavior, and 




Appendix 2.1. Overview of non-eligible studies  
Authors Study Reason for exclusion 




13 Evaluative judgment about behaviors is not a 











4 The comparison between the two acquaintance 
conditions was not included because statistical 












1 It was not possible to calculate effect sizes that 
are comparable to Cohen’s d because the 





1 Getting vaccinated is not necessarily a licensing 
induction. Instead, getting vaccinated may alter 





2 Perceived ethicality is not a behavioral 
dependent variable.  
Chiou, Yang, and 
Wan (2011)  
All The studies are on self-regulation, not on moral 
behavior. 
De Witt-Huberts, 
Evers, and De 
Ridder (2012) 
1 The studies are on self-regulation, not on moral 
behavior. In addition, perceived effort is not a 
behavioral dependent variable. 
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Effron (2014) All Exaggerating previous good behavior when 
threatened is no behavioral dependent variable. 
Effron, Monin, 
and Miller (2012) 
1, 2 Evaluative judgments about other people’s 
evaluations and perceptions about behavior are 
no behavioral dependent variables.  
Effron, Monin, 
and Miller (2012) 
4 Estimation of previous nonracist behavior is not 
a licensing dependent variable. 
Effron, Monin, 
and Miller (2012) 
5, 6 Perceived racism is not a behavioral dependent 
variable. 
Effron, Monin, 
and Miller (2013) 
All The studies are on self-regulation, not on moral 
behavior. 
Eskine (2012) 1 The studies are on self-regulation, not on moral 
behavior. In addition, an important 
precondition of licensing is that participants 
perceive their preceding behaviors as ‘good’; 










All In the costless prosocial behavior condition, a 
donation was made on behalf of the 
participants. Thus, this condition did not 
include good behavior of the participants 
themselves. In the costly prosocial condition, a 
donation was deducted from the payment of 
their participants. Participants do not 
necessarily perceive this donation as ‘good’ but 
as being disadvantaged by the experimenter. 
Since the behaviors in both conditions are not 
necessarily interpreted as ‘good’ behaviors, we 
decided to exclude both conditions. 
Jones-Doyle 
(unpublished) 




1, 2 Indicating one’s own morality is not a 
behavioral dependent variable. 
Jordan, Mullen, 
and 
1 Indicating one’s own morality is not a 





Khan and Dhar 
(2007) 
All The studies are on self-regulation, not on moral 
behavior. 
Klotz and Bolino 
(2012) 
All A model on moral licensing related to 
citizenship and counterproductive work 
behavior is proposed, but not empirically tested. 
Koritzky (2012) 1, 2 Benefitting the other player in the first game can 
be a strategy rather than licensing. 
Kouchaki (2011) All Vicarious moral licensing is no self-licensing. 
Landy (2013) All Evaluative estimations how much one is liked 
by other people is not a behavioral dependent 
variable. 
Leonard (2012) Conditions 
on food 
consumption 
The conditions on food consumption are not 
included because these conditions are on self-
regulation, not on moral behavior. 
May and Irmak 
(2014) 
All The studies are on self-regulation, not on moral 
behavior. In addition, the studies measure the 
memories consulted by the participants when 
participants have the opportunity to indulge, 





All – except 
for Study 2 
follow up 
data 
The licensing dependent variable is not 
preceded by good behavior; instead, 
participants know in advance that they may 
have to display questionable behaviors and 












All The studies are on self-regulation, not on moral 
behavior. 
Ong, Mayer, and 
Tost (2014) 
All There is no self-licensing because participants 
do not perform good behaviors themselves.  








From these correlational data, it was not 
possible to calculate an effect size that we could 




All Self-licensing is not measured; this is about the 
judgment of other’s transgressions. 
Rynn and 
Vendello (2013) 
All An important precondition of licensing is that 
participants perceive their preceding behaviors 
as ‘good’; this is not necessarily the case with a 
perceived underdog status.  
Stewart (2012) All Perceived racism is not a behavioral dependent 
variable. 
Ule, Schram, 
Riedl, and Cason 
(2009) 
1 Cooperating often enough to keep a good 
reputation, but detecting after cooperation can 
be a strategic tactic rather than licensing.  
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Appendix 2.2: Formulas used to calculate effect sizes 
























In this equation, 1X  is the mean score of the self-licensing group, 2X  is the mean 
score of the control group and s* is the pooled standard deviation, n1 is the sample size 
of the self-licensing group, n2 is the sample size of the control group, The pooled 
standard deviation includes the Hedges’g correction (Hedges, 1981). When specific 
information about the number of participants per cell was missing, we mailed the 
authors to ask for the exact numbers of participants per cell. If these numbers were still 
unknown, we divided the total amount of participants by the number of conditions. 
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In this equation, t is the t-value of the t-test and n is the total sample size. 
~ 
For Cohen’s d based on means and standard deviations and Cohen’s d based on t 
values, within-study variances (s²) were calculated through the following formula 
(Hedges & Olkin, 1985); 
 
2
2 1 2 
1 2 2 1 2
n n d
s









To convert effect sizes for studies wherein the dependent variable consisted of a binary 
choice (for instance, a choice between a virtuous and vicious option), the Phi coefficient 





In this equation, χ2 is the outcome of the chi square test (reported in the paper or 
calculated by hand), and n is the total sample size. Next, we converted Φ to Cohen’s d 















In this equation, df = n1 + n2 - 2. 
~ 
For Cohen’s d based on the Φ coefficient, within-study variances (s²) were calculated 













The 95% confidence intervals of the Cohen’s d effect size were computed in the 
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A p-Curve Analysis of Moral Licensing 
 
In this chapter we present a p-curve analysis that examines the evidential value of the 
moral licensing effect. The results show that the current body of research on moral 
licensing does not have evidential value; based on the distribution of p-values the 
published moral licensing tests do not provide support for the hypothesis that 
previous moral behavior makes it more likely that one subsequently engages in 
immoral, unethical, or otherwise problematic behavior. Since the p-curve analysis 
shows no evidential value for the moral licensing effect in the current body of 
empirical research, we strongly recommend researchers studying moral licensing to 1) 
use larger samples to study the effect, 2) first establish a reliable paradigm to study 
licensing effects before exploring moderators, and 3) start with revising the theoretical 










This chapter is based on: Blanken, I., Van Wolferen, J., Van de Ven, N., & Zeelenberg, 
M. (2015). A p-curve analysis of moral licensing. Manuscript under review.
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Moral licensing is defined as the phenomenon that when people behave in a moral 
way, they are later more likely to display behaviors that are immoral, unethical, or 
otherwise problematic (e.g., Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010). For instance, participants 
who bought ecofriendly products in a virtual shopping paradigm subsequently 
offered less money to other people in an ultimatum game and stole more money 
compared to participants who bought regular products (Mazar & Zhong, 2010). Moral 
licensing is related to behaviors in various domains such as racism (Choi & Crandall, 
& La, 2014; Effron, Cameron, & Monin, 2009; Effron, Monin, & Miller, 2012; Mann, & 
Kawakami, 2012), job hiring (Cascio & Plant, 2015; Monin & Miller, 2001), ethics 
(Conway & Peetz, 2012; Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011), and consumerism (Khan 
& Dhar, 2006). As moral licensing has adverse consequences for such a wide range of 
behaviors, it is an important phenomenon to study. However, recently some doubt 
arose concerning the robustness of this phenomenon (see Chapter 2 and 3). In the 
current chapter we conduct a p-curve analysis (Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 
2014a,b) to test the strength of the evidential value of the current body of empirical 
studies on moral licensing. 
The robustness of the moral licensing effect was called into question most clearly by 
the meta-analysis from Chapter 2. This analysis included 91 experimental studies, in 
which initial moral or good behavior was manipulated and the effect of this 
manipulation on immoral or decreased moral behavior was measured. The average 
effect size of moral licensing was found to be small-to-medium (Cohen’s d = 0.31). 
Furthermore, this analysis did not find any statistical support for moderators that were 
theorized to be of importance. For instance, this meta-analysis did not show that 
licensing conditions (e.g., recalling moral behavior) contrasted with negative control 
conditions (e.g., recalling immoral behavior) led to larger effects than licensing 
conditions contrasted with neutral control conditions (e.g., recalling neutral behavior, 
such as doing groceries). Theoretically, one would expect a larger difference between 
a licensing condition and a negative control condition. The absence of such effect was 
surprising, especially in the light of ideas on the moral cleansing effect in which 
recalling previous immoral behavior leads to more subsequent moral behavior (the 
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exact opposite of the moral licensing effect; see Conway & Peetz, 2012; Jordan et al., 
2011; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006).  
Strikingly, the only moderator that was confirmed in the meta-analysis was that 
published studies had larger effects (average d = 0.43) than did unpublished studies 
(average d = 0.11). This finding was in line with the regression test for funnel plot 
asymmetry that indicated the presence of a positive publication bias. In the current 
chapter, we continue this investigation of the robustness of the moral licensing effect, 
by submitting the published findings to a p-curve analysis. In short, a meta-analysis is 
good at testing for moderators, but not good at correcting for publication bias and 
typically leads to overestimations of the true effect size. A p-curve cannot test for 
moderators, but is not influenced by publication bias (Simonsohn et al., 2014a). 
Why use p-curve? 
Creating a p-curve is a meta-analytic technique that tests the evidential value of a set 
of published studies by analyzing the shape of the distribution of their p-values that 
are < .05 (Simonsohn et al., 2014a). Unlike traditional meta-analytic techniques, p-curve 
is able to provide an effect size estimate that is not influenced by publication bias 
(Simonsohn et al., 2014b). Even when procedures to correct for publication bias are 
applied, traditional meta-analytic techniques are biased towards the conclusion that 
an effect exists. P-curve provides a publication-bias-free answer to the question of 
whether an effect exists. If p-curve concludes a set of studies has evidential value, it 
can also produce a publication-bias-free estimate of the size of the effect. Logically, 
when p-curve concludes a set of studies does not have evidential value, the estimate 
for the effect size is zero. We refer interested readers to the original p-curve articles of 
Simonsohn et al. (2014a,b) for information about the specifics of the analysis and 
restrict ourselves to a brief explanation of how p-curve tests for evidential value.  
How does p-curve test for evidential value? 
The p-curve tests the evidential value of a set of studies: it tests whether a set of 
findings reflects a true effect (effect-size > 0). It does so based on the distribution of p-
values between 0 and .05. It allows researchers to determine whether there are many 
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‘small’ (e.g., < .01) p-values, whether the p-values are approximately equally 
distributed across the range that is generally considered to be ‘significant’ (< .05), or 
whether there are many ‘large’ (e.g., between .04 and .05) p-values. Each of the three 
outcomes described above allows researchers to draw a particular conclusion about 
the p-curved set of findings. We will discuss these three possible outcomes below.  
First, if there are many small p-values, the conclusion is that the set of p-curved 
findings has evidential value. The most intuitive way to understand why this is the 
case is to use the following example. Think about an effect we know to be true: In the 
United States, on average, men are taller than women.8 If one were to run 100 studies 
(with sufficient power) comparing the height of men and women, it is likely that one 
will find a ‘very significant’ effect in most studies. There would not be many studies 
that are not significant, and only a few would produce p-values just below .05. Figure 
3.1 shows that plotting this distribution leads to a right-skewed distribution (the p-
curve is downward sloped) that looks like the dashed line; small p-values are more 
likely to be obtained than larger ones. Therefore, when p-curve detects a distribution 
of p-values that is right-skewed, it will conclude that the set of studies that produced 
the p-values has evidential value.  
Second, the distribution of p-values can be uniform (the p-curve is horizontal): 
approximately equal amounts of small and large p-values. The conclusion that can be 
drawn from such a set of p-values is that the combined set of studies does not have 
evidential value. In other words, the set of studies does not provide support for the 
hypothesis that the effect exists. The intuition lies in the definition of the p-value. P-
values indicate the likelihood that one would observe an effect at least as extreme as 
the one observed, if there were truly no effect. Going back to the example of running 100 
studies, if they test a non-existing effect p <.05 would be observed in 5% of the studies, 
and p < .04 in 4% of the studies. Logically, .04 < p < .05 would occur 1% of the studies. 
Similarly, .01< p < .02 would also occur in 1% of the studies. Put differently, when there 
really is no effect, each p-value is equally likely to be observed. Therefore, if a p-curve 
                                                          
8 This example is also used in the original p-curve paper (Simonsohn et al., 2014a) 
and we copy it here because it works so well.  
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detects a uniform distribution of p-values, it concludes that the studies do not have 
evidential value as the results are likely to have existed due to chance. The solid line 
in Figure 3.1 represents this outcome. 
Third, if there are more large p-values than there are small ones, the conclusion is that 
the set of p-curved findings has no evidential value, and is likely to be p-hacked. P-
hacking refers to the selective reporting of analyses that produce significance (p < .05). 
It is often possible to ‘detect’ a significant effect even where there truly is no effect 
(Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011), for example by selectively dropping 
observations or by selecting the measures or studies that are being reported. The 
intuition for why this leads to an abundance of p-values just below .05 is that 
researchers search for significant effects in their data until they find one. Any p-value 
below .05 is theoretically publishable, so researchers are unlikely to keep searching 
until they find a very small p-value (e.g., < .01) when p = .049 ‘does the job’.9 This way 
of analyzing data leads researchers to falsely conclude that there is an effect, and it 
results in a left-skewed distribution that looks like the dotted line in Figure 3.1. 
Therefore, when p-curve detects a distribution of p-values that is left-skewed (the p-
curve is upward sloped), it will conclude that the set of studies that produced the p-
values has no evidential value and is likely p-hacked.  
 
                                                          
9 This is why p-curve analyses only include p-values below .05. Greater p-values 
could technically be used to test for evidential value. However, to determine whether 
a set of studies has been p-hacked p-curve assume that researchers p-hack ‘until they 
get p < .05’. Therefore, p = .05 serves as the upper boundary of p-values that can be 




Figure 3.1. Three possible distributions of significant p-values. The y-axis displays the 
frequency of p-values and the x-axis displays the value of the observed p-values. P-
curve tests the evidential value of a set of studies by determining whether the shape 
of the distribution of significant p-values looks like one of the shapes above. Sets of 
studies that have evidential value (i.e., that test true effects) produce distributions that 
look like the right-skewed dashed line. Sets of studies that do not have evidential 
value, but are not p-hacked produce uniform distributions like the flat solid line. Sets 
of studies that do not have evidential value and are p-hacked produce distributions 
like the left-skewed dotted line. 
 
The p-curve analysis produces a significance test for each of these three possible 
outcomes. These tests answer the following three questions: (1) Is the observed 
distribution significantly more right-skewed than a uniform (flat) distribution? (2) Is 
the observed distribution significantly flatter (or more left-skewed) than if the p-
curved studies had 33% power? (3) Is the observed distribution significantly more left-
skewed than a uniform (flat) distribution? Test number two requires a bit more 
explanation: The shape of p-curve depends on the statistical power of the studies that 
are submitted to it. The p-curve becomes more right-skewed as the power increases. 
A p-Curve Analysis of Moral Licensing 
77 
One intuitive way of thinking about this feature of p-curve is to go back to the example 
of studies that test whether men are taller than women. Imagine you run 100 studies 
with 20 men and 20 women (not so much power), and 100 studies with 1.000 men and 
1.000 women (a lot of power). The set of studies with N = 2.000 will produce many 
more small p-values than the set of studies with N = 40. The distribution of the N = 
2.000 set of studies would thus be much more right-skewed than that of the N = 40 set.  
Interestingly, for a given level of power, p-curve is almost the same for every 
underlying sample-size and effect-size combination (Simonsohn et al., 2014a). 
Therefore, p-curve ‘knows’ what the distribution of significant p-values in a set of 
studies would be if they had 33% power: it would be just slightly right-skewed. The 
second statistical test compares whether the observed distribution of p-values is 
significantly flatter than a line of a true effect being studied with 33% power would be. 
If the test indicates that the line is flatter than a line with 33% power would look like, 
the p-curve analysis concludes that the set of studies does not have evidential value. 
The 33% power cut-off is arbitrary (just as p <.05 to determine significance is arbitrary), 
but it is sensible: If the distribution of significant p-values is flatter than one that would 
be produced by studies that would only have a 1 in 3 chance to find an effect (if it 
exists), it makes sense to conclude that the set of studies do not provide evidence for 
the claims they test. It is important to note that the conclusion if this test is significant 
is not that the effect the studies test is false. The conclusion is merely that the complete 
set of studies that forms the p-curve does not provide evidence for the effect, as it is 
likely to have arisen based on chance.  
Finally, because the shape of the p-curve is so closely related to the power of the studies 
that are submitted to it, p-curve also gives an estimate of the average power of that set 
of studies. It is worth noting that p-curve itself always has more power than the studies 
that are submitted to it. With 20 p-values, it has more than 60% power to conclude the 
studies have no evidential value. With 20 p-values, it also has more than 80% power to 
conclude the studies have evidential value, even if those studies themselves have 33% 
power. In addition, its false positive rate is 5% (because we use α = .05 as the criterion 
for significance), but the actual false positive rate diminishes as the effect size in the 
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set of studies submitted to p-curve rises (Simonsohn et al., 2014a). Put differently, 
when there is no effect the false positive rate is at its highest (5%). This implies that the 
test that tests for evidential value is powerful, while the test that tests whether the set 
of studies does not have evidential value is very conservative. This makes it hard for 
p-curve to get it wrong.  
To summarize, we present a p-curve analysis that examines the evidential value of the 
combined set of studies documenting the moral licensing effect. P-curve provides an 
alternative method to investigate whether the published studies testing for moral 
licensing included in the meta-analysis in Chapter 2 reflect a true effect. This is 
important because in Chapter 2 we noted that there is a publication bias, something a 
meta-analysis can not fully correct for. A p-curve is not affected by publication bias 
and can thus provide a better effect size estimate in those cases (Simonsohn et al., 
2014a). If p-curve concludes that the studies that test for moral licensing have 
evidential value, we will also estimate the effect size using p-curve.  
Methods and results 
Inclusion Criteria. We used the dataset from the meta-analysis on moral licensing from 
Chapter 2. In this meta-analysis, the literature search was based on the definition of 
Merritt et al. (2010, p. 344): “Past good deeds (or good intentions) liberate individuals 
to engage in behaviors that are immoral, unethical, or otherwise problematic, 
behaviors that they would otherwise avoid for fear of feeling or appearing less moral”. 
Studies were included if 1) the behavior that was measured met this definition of moral 
licensing and 2) reported statistics were adequate to calculate effect sizes. For a more 
detailed description of the inclusion criteria, see Chapter 2.  
For the current p-curve analysis, p-values were included if they met the following 
criteria: 1) The p-value is published in a scientific journal10; 2) The p-value reflects a 
                                                          
10 One could argue that studies that passed peer-review might be better, more robust, 
or otherwise superior to studies that have not passed peer-review. In that sense, the 
current test of the moral licensing effect is more conservative than the meta-analysis 
in Chapter 2, which also included unpublished studies.  
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crucial moral licensing test; 3) The p-value is significant. The second criterion implies 
that only p-values that reflect a comparison between a moral licensing and a control 
condition are included. P-values reflecting a comparison between more than these two 
conditions or interactions with other variables are therefore not included.  
It is important to note that the second criterion also has implications for the conclusions 
we can and cannot draw. The articles we p-curved sometimes make predictions about 
interactions, or about things that are unrelated to licensing. For example, Conway and 
Peetz (2012) expected more prosocial intentions if participants recalled distant moral 
behavior than distant immoral behavior (a consistency effect), and more prosocial 
intentions if participants recalled recent immoral behavior than recent moral behavior 
(a compensatory effect). The crucial licensing test would be to compare participants 
who recalled recent moral behavior with participants who recalled recent immoral 
behavior. However, the results of this specific test are not reported. Rather, a contrast 
analysis was reported to test the interaction in which the moral-distant conditions and 
immoral-recent condition would lead to greater prosocial intentions than the immoral- 
distant and moral-recent conditions. We do not p-curve those predictions, so our 
analysis does not test whether the studies contain evidential value for those 
predictions. The selection criteria ensure that we only test the evidential value of the 
empirical support for the basic effect of moral licensing. 
In the process of including the p-values, we ran into a number of unexpected problems. 
Out of 54 published comparisons between a licensing and a control condition, 18 
comparisons (33%) were not significant (p > .05). For 10 comparisons, the crucial 
licensing test was not reported (marked with ‘x’ in the Disclosure Table). For example, 
planned contrast tests to compare the moral licensing condition with two other 
conditions were reported rather than the test between the moral licensing and the 
control condition (Cascio & Plant, 2015). In four cases, recalculation of the statistical 
tests shows that tests that were reported as significant were actually not significant (p 
> 0.05, marked with ‘xx’ in the Disclosure Table). Furthermore, six comparisons 
included statistical oddities, such as reporting different Ms and SDs for the same 
variable and larger t-values than those recalculated from the reported Ms and SDs 
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(marked with ‘xxx’ in the Disclosure Table). This is consistent with earlier findings 
which show a high prevalence of statistical reporting errors in psychological science 
(Veldkamp, Nuijten, Dominguez-Alvarez, Van Assen & Wicherts, 2014).  
The final p-curve dataset consisted of 27 p-values from 27 studies reported in 13 
articles, which in total were cited 1594 times.11 An overview of the included p-values 
can be found in the Disclosure Table. All analyses were conducted using the online p-
curve app 3.0 (http://w ww.p-curve.com /app3/). 
Robustness check 
The p-values that are submitted to p-curve should be independent of each other, so if 
a study has two dependent variables, only (the first) one can be submitted to the p-
curve. Therefore, we report a second p-curve in which the p-value from the second 
dependent variable replaces the first. This was the case for 4 out of the 27 observations. 
This serves as a robustness-check and provides an indication of the stability of the 
results of the p-curve. The results of the original p-curve and the robustness check are 
reported in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.2.  
                                                          
11 Google Scholar. June 2, 2015 
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Table 3.1  
Statistical results of p-curve and robustness check  




















values via Stouffer 
Method) 
1) Studies contain 
evidential value. 
(Right skew) 
p = .6494 
Z = -0.75, 
p = .2263 
p = .5000 
Z = -2.02, 
p = .0219 
2) Studies’ 
evidential value, if 
any, is 
inadequate. (Flatter 
than 33% power) 
p =.0114 
Z = -2.18, 
p = .0145 
p =.0296 
Z = -0.93, 
p = .1774 
3) Studies exhibit 
evidence of 
intense p-
hacking. (Left skew) 
p =.5000 
Z = 0.75, 
p = .7737 
p =.6494 
Z = 2.02, 
p = .9781 
Average power of 
tests included in p-
curve (correcting 
for publication bias) 
<5% 8% 
Note. The p-curve app provides two related tests: A binomial test and a continuous 
test. The binomial test simply tests whether the proportion of small (<.025) p-values 
is significantly (1) larger than 50%, (2) smaller than 50%, or (3) smaller than the 
percent that would be expected if the studies had 33% power. The continuous tests 
are based on Stouffer's Method we refer interested readers to Simonsohn et al. 
(2014a) for details. Put simply, this test analyzes whether the shape of the 
distribution is significantly (1) more right-skewed than a uniform distribution, (2) 
significantly more left-skewed than a mildly right-skewed distribution, or (3) more 
left-skewed than a uniform distribution.  
 
Summary of results 
Both the binomial and the continuous p-curve tests indicate that the studies’ evidential 
value is inadequate (flatter than 33% power, see the dashed line in Figure 3.1.). There 
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is no indication of p-hacking (i.e., the distribution is not left-skewed). The results of the 
binomial tests from the robustness check confirm these results. The continuous test 
from the robustness check seems to indicate that the studies have some evidential 
value. However, even this test suggests minimal evidential value (average power = 
8%) and qualitatively, both p-curves do not look like ones that a healthy literature 
would produce.  
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 provide an indication of the robustness of the results. They show 
what the p-value of each test in Table 3.1 would be if the highest or lowest k original p-
values would be deleted. These figures thus give an indication of the strength of the 
results and provide insight into whether particular results hinge on just one p-value. 
It shows that in the first p-curve, dropping the 4 highest original p-values would lead 
to significant right skew, and dropping the two highest original p-values would render 
the 33% test non-significant. In the robustness-check p-curve, dropping the lowest 
original p-value (so just one) would render the test for right skew non-significant, and 





Figure 3.3. The effects of dropping k lowest or highest original p-values on the statistical 
tests in the p-curve. 
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Figure 3.4. The effects of dropping k lowest or highest original p-values on the statistical 
tests in the robustness check p-curve. 
 
Overall, we think the conclusion that the set of studies does not have evidential value 
is justified because 1) the initial p-curve concludes that the studies evidential value is 
inadequate, 2) the robustness check concludes that there is only ‘minimal’ evidential 
value in set of studies (average power = 8%) and this test hinges on just one p-value, 
and 3) we found many errors and misreporting in the studies. Below, we elaborate on 




In the current chapter we conducted a p-curve analysis (Simonsohn et al., 2014a,b) to 
evaluate the evidential value of the published moral licensing tests reported in the 
meta-analysis in Chapter 2. We found that research on moral licensing lacks evidential 
value; the distribution of p-values shows that the complete set of published studies on 
moral licensing does not provide support for the hypothesis that previous moral 
behavior leads to immoral, unethical, or otherwise problematic behavior. 
P-curve versus meta-analysis 
The results from the p-curve analysis seem inconsistent with the meta-analysis on 
moral licensing (Chapter 2), which suggested that there is a small significant licensing 
effect (d = 0.31). A meta-analysis is a traditional approach to estimate the size of an 
effect and to test its moderators, but is not good at correcting for publication bias 
(Simonsohn et al., 2014b). The p-curve is a new method to provide an unbiased 
estimate of an effect, but since it has been introduced very recently it might have some 
as of yet unknown limitations. As outlined in the introduction, the meta-analysis on 
moral licensing revealed a positive publication bias, implying that more positive 
findings than null- or – negative- findings on moral licensing were published. This 
could have led to an overestimation of the effect size as it becomes much more likely 
that one missed some non-significant findings as they are more difficult to track down. 
The p-curve analysis is not influenced by such a publication bias, which could explain 
the different results between both methods. The more traditional meta-analyses are 
needed in addition to a p-curve analysis in order to draw a complete picture of an 
effect. P-curve analysis is not able to analyze moderators. Both methods thus 
complement each other. 
Implications  
The finding that current studies on moral licensing do not provide empirical support 
for the hypothesis that previous moral behavior leads to behavior that is less moral has 
large practical and theoretical implications for future research on moral licensing. It is 
important to note that we found no evidential value for the moral licensing effect as it 
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is currently being investigated. This does not necessarily imply that moral licensing does 
not exist: The p-curve cannot evaluate whether the theory of licensing is correct or 
incorrect, but only whether the body of empirical support for it jointly contains 
support for the existence of the effect. Therefore, we stress that the current analysis 
does not invalidate licensing theory. However, if parts of the theory are inspired by 
findings that are included in the p-curved set of findings, our p-curve analysis does 
cast doubt about the truth-value of the theory. We therefore strongly recommend 
researchers studying moral licensing to start afresh with investigating this 
phenomenon. 
When starting afresh with investigating moral licensing, we think that it is vital to 
come up with a theory of licensing that integrates the licensing process with theories 
and findings that show the importance of consistency in behavior (Abelson et al., 1986; 
Gawronski & Strack, 2012), as they predict the opposite of a moral licensing effect (e.g., 
Conway and Peetz, 2012). Consistency theory predicts that people who perform a good 
deed are expected to engage in future good behavior, as people want to appear 
consistent. A prior good deed makes one see oneself as a good person, after which one 
becomes more likely to engage in future good behavior (Bem, 1972). Since good 
behavior is not always followed by less desirable behavior, researchers should clearly 
outline under which circumstances they predict licensing versus consistency effects 
before running experiments. 
In addition, we strongly recommend researchers to conduct new studies on moral 
licensing with properly powered samples to allow for data with evidential value, as 
the p-curve analysis shows that the average power of the tests included in the p-curve 
is well below 10%. Studies on moral licensing need larger sample sizes to be able to 
reliably test for the effect and possible moderators. We think it would be helpful if 
researchers first establish the licensing effect reliably in a paradigm, before digging 
deeper into the phenomenon. 
When developing a reliable paradigm for the moral licensing effect, we think it is very 
useful to adopt a full cycle approach (Cialdini, 1980) of self-licensing. Mortensen and 
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Cialdini (2010, p.53) argue that when studying a novel phenomenon researchers 
should first  
use naturalistic observation to determine an effect’s presence in the real 
world, theory to determine what processes underlie the effect, 
experimentation to verify the effect and its underlying processes, and a 
return to the natural environment to corroborate the experimental 
findings. 
We think the initial step, testing whether and how people experience licensing in their 
daily lives, has not extensively been made yet in the self-licensing literature. If we need 
to rethink the paradigms we use to study licensing, starting with examining how it 
exists in real life is a valuable first step. 
Initial efforts have been made to investigate licensing effects outside of the traditional 
experimental paradigm and test for licensing effects in real life. Hofmann, Wineski, 
Brandt, and Skitka (2014), investigated the occurrence of moral and immoral behaviors 
in daily life. Consistent with theorizing on moral licensing, they found that individuals 
who commited a moral act earlier in a day were more likely to subsequently display 
immoral behavior, and less likely to subsequently display moral behavior. In addition, 
in Chapter 5 we find that people can recognize instances of licensing in their own past 
behavior. These past instances can be seen as fitting good deed self-licensing, where a 
good deed permits one to display undesirable behavior, or temptation-based self-
licensing, where the temptation to display undesirable behavior initiates a search for a 
license. Recently, research on licensing in the self-regulatory domain found additional 
evidence for temptation-based self-licensing (Chapter 6; De Witt-Huberts, Evers, & De 
Ridder, 2014b). Since past research on moral licensing focused on manipulating good 
behavior and did not give sufficient attention to the role of the temptingness of 
displaying the undesirable behavior, we recommend future research to consider the 
option that moral licensing can also be initiated by the temptingness of the undesirable 
behavior. 
Temptation-based self-licensing thus implies that not the prior good behavior, but the 
temptation to display undesirable behavior can trigger the process of self-licensing. 
This account of licensing seems more in line with theories on consistency, since people 
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who experience temptation-based licensing try to make their beliefs consistent with 
their desired behaviors (i.e., giving in to temptation) through searching for 
justifications. Specifically, temptation-based licensing shows some close resemblances 
with cognitive dissonance reduction, which implies that individuals want to reduce 
the negative feelings that they experience when they realize that their behaviors 
contradict their beliefs (Festinger, 1957). For observers, temptation-based licensing 
may seem to counteract consistency, but for actors it feels like making their attitudes 
and beliefs consistent with their desired behaviors (i.e., giving in to temptation).  
Finally, we believe that researchers should reflect on established theories from 
different fields that can improve the understanding of moral licensing. Several theories 
on negative spillovers, where a second action offsets the effectiveness of a prior action 
or state have previously been established in the field of economics. Examples are the 
rebound effect (Greening, Greene, & Difiglio, 2000), the Jevons paradox (Jevons, 1865), 
moral hazard (Arrow, 1963), and risk homeostasis theory (Wilde, 1998). For instance, 
research on the rebound effect shows that when households receive a high-efficiency 
washing machine, they tend to increase the frequency of clothes washing, thereby 
offsetting the beneficial effects for the environment (Davis, 2008). This may closely 
reflect what happens when people feel ‘licensed’ to display undesirable behavior. We 
think that researchers in the field of licensing should therefore consider what these 
seemingly related theories can explain and predict about the nature of moral licensing. 
Conclusion 
The p-curve analysis in the current chapter finds that the existing body of research on 
moral licensing does not have evidential value to support the existence of moral 
licensing. Importantly, this does not necessarily imply that moral licensing does not 
exist, but it does imply that research has not been able to reliably document it as the 
findings are likely to have arisen due to chance. Researchers studying moral licensing 
are strongly recommended to start afresh with investigating this phenomenon by 
establishing a robust paradigm. Recent research shows that moral licensing effects 
occur in daily life (Chapter 5; Hofmann et al., 2014), but the process may work 
differently than previously assumed (Chapter 6; De Witt-Huberts et al., 2014b). More 
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research needs to establish the evidential value of this novel approach. We also think 
that when doing so, moral licensing theory should be integrated with related theories 
from different fields. The study of moral licensing should thereby hopefully shift from 
a focus on the moral licensing effect, to a theory of moral licensing that fits with other 
established theories. 
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Disclosure Table.  
Author Quoted text from original paper 




















We predict that people who 
acquire moral credentials by 
choosing to cite positive 
experiences with a Black 
individual subsequently will be 
more likely than other people to 
show preferences for White over 









Supporting expectations, free-choice 
participants who were able to choose to write 
about a positive experience with a Black 
individual later expressed more bias toward 
White applicants (M = 4.29, SD = .64) than 
did those in the control condition (M = 3.86, 
SD = 0.57), t = -2.32, p < .05, and those in the 
forced-choice condition who were instructed 
to write about a positive experience (M = 





The reported t-values are 
larger than those 
recalculated* from the 
reported M and SDs. We 
included the p-values based 
on the reported t-values. 
 
Degrees of freedom were 
not reported so we 








Given that people feel more 
comfortable stereotyping 
Hispanics, we predicted that 
choice may not be as important of 
a factor in establishing credentials 
as it was for Study 1 when the 








A MANOVA was first conducted on the job 
suitability and tolerance for prejudice 
variables with experimental condition as the 
independent variable. Wilks’s Lambda was 
marginally significant (.98, p = .11), and Roy’s 
largest root was statistically significant (.12, p 
< .05), so separate one-way ANOVAs were 
run on each of the dependent variables. 
Experimental condition was not significantly 
related to job suitability ratings, (2, 61) = 0.45, 
p > .10, but the pattern of means was 
consistent with the evaluation items such 
that participants in the control condition 
tended to express less prejudice (M = 4.05, 
SD = 0.67) than participants in the free-choice 
condition (M = 4.15, SD = 0.63). Experimental 
condition was significantly related to the 
tolerance for prejudice scale, F(2, 62) = 3.17, p 
    Prediction sounds like 
attenuated interaction, but 
there is no direct 
comparison with Black 
person conditions.  
 
The prediction could be 
interpreted as 'choice does 
not play a role', so both 
forced and free choice 
conditions would lead to a 
licensing effect (i.e., more 
prejudice towards 
Hispanics). However, the 
authors do not test the 
comparison between forced 
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< .05. t tests revealed that individuals in the 
free-choice condition expressed greater 
tolerance for prejudice (M = 3.44, SD = 0.84) 
than did individuals in the control condition 
(M = 2.76, SD = 0.83), t = –2.76, p < .01, but 
the ratings did not differ significantly from 
those individuals in the forced-choice writing 
assignment condition (M = 2.90, SD = 0.84) 
choice and the control 
condition. So it remains 
unclear what the authors 
predict. When calculating* 
the p-values for both DVs, 
we found that for the job 
hiring task DV, the 
comparison between the 
free choice condition (M = 
4.15, SD = 0.63) and the 
control condition (M = 4.05, 
SD = 0.67) was not 
significant, t(40) = 0.50, p = 
.622. The comparison 
between the forced choice 
condition could not be 
calculated because there is 
no information about the 
mean of the forced choice 
condition. For the tolerance 
for prejudice scale DV, we 
found that the comparison 
between the free choice 
condition (M = 3.44, SD = 
0.84) and the control 
condition (M = 2.76, SD = 
0.83) was significant, (40) = 
2.64, p = .012. The 
comparison between the 
forced choice condition (M 
= 2.90, SD = 0.84) and the 
control condition was not 
significant, t(42) = 0.56, p = 
.581. 









We predicted that incentivized 
participants would not be 
credentialed because they would 
realize that their choice could be 
interpreted as reflecting their 
own self-interests as opposed to 

























A MANOVA, which included all three 
independent variables, was run on the 
dependent variables of job suitability and 
tolerance for prejudice. Given the 
theoretically relevant missing data in the Free 
Choice × Negative Valence conditions, only 
two interactions were tested: (a) the 
interaction between the incentive variable 
(avoiding prejudice, avoiding personal 
failure) and the valence (positive, negative) 
variable and (b) the interaction between the 
incentive (personal failure, prejudice) 
variable and the choice (forced, free) variable. 
Given the larger sample size in this study 
compared to Studies 1 and 2, we were able to 
enter participant gender and age as 
covariates to ensure that the conclusions 
were not affected by these demographic 
characteristics. The only significant 
multivariate effect was a two-way interaction 
between the incentive (personal failure, 
prejudice) variable and the valence (positive, 
negative) variable, Wilks’s Lambda = .96, F(2, 
130) = 2.9, p = .05. Separate univariate 
ANOVAs were run on each of the dependent 
variables. Job suitability was not significantly 
related to any of the independent variables or 
their interactions. However, the 
manipulations did affect tolerance for 
prejudice; a two-way interaction between the 
incentive variable and the valence variable 
emerged, F(1, 117) = 3.30, p = .05. Planned 
comparisons suggest that individuals in the 
avoiding personal failure incentive condition 
tended to express less tolerance for prejudice 
when they wrote about a negative experience 
    The authors do not test their 
predictions. They make 
predictions about the effects 
of incentives but do not 
have a no-incentives control 
condition.  
 
Surprisingly, the authors 
report different Ms and SDs 
for the same condition 
within the same paragraph. 
Specifically, 'individuals in 
the avoiding individual 
failure incentive condition 
tended to express less 
tolerance for prejudice 
when they wrote about a 
negative experience (M = 
2.17, SD = 0.28)...' and 
'individuals in the avoiding 
personal failure condition 
tended to express more 
tolerance of prejudice ... 
when they wrote about a 
negative experience (M = 
2.67, SD = 0.63). 
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(M = 2.17, SD = 0.28) than did individuals in 
the avoiding prejudice condition who wrote 
about a negative experience (M = 2.75, SD = 
1.17), F(1, 42) = 1.97, p < .10. Individuals in 
the avoiding personal failure condition 
tended to express more tolerance of prejudice 
when they wrote about a positive experience 
(M = 2.17, SD = 1.20) than when they wrote 
about a negative experience (M = 2.67, SD = 
0.63), but none of the other condition 





Study 4  
 
 
We anticipated that choosing to 
write about a positive interaction 
with a Black friend would result 
in the highest level of 
credentialing more so than 
choosing to write about a positive 
interaction with a black 
acquaintance. The choice of 
writing something positive and 
the ability to point to a close 
relationship with a Black person 
should give participants 
confidence that they have 






















Job suitability: Choice and closeness. There 
were no significant main effects for choice or 
closeness, nor was there a significant 
interaction between choice and closeness on 
the job suitability measure. 
Tolerance for prejudice: Choice and 
closeness. There was no main effect of choice 
on tolerance for prejudice, nor was there a 
significant interaction between choice and 
closeness. 
    The authors do not find 
what they predict. They 
predict a closeness x choice 
interaction on both 
dependent measures, but 





We hypothesized that moral 
credentialing would result in 
more misconduct when that 
misconduct is highly rationable. 
In contrast, moral credentialing 
should not enhance misconduct 
when that misconduct is 














As predicted, however, the analysis of 
variance also revealed a Credentialing × 
Rationalizability interaction, F(1, 187) = 3.80, 
p = .05, MSE = 9.44.  
   Participants in the moral 
credentialing self condition 
read four moral dilemmas 
and rated how likely they 
would be to behave in a 
prosocial fashion if they 
were to encounter such a 
situation. Moral licensing 









theory would predict that 
only participants who 
indicate that they would be 
to behave more prosocial 
display licensing effects 
(but not participants who 
indicate that they would not 
behave in a prosocial 
fashion). The authors do not 
give information on how 
participants in this 
condition responded to the 
scenarios. Theoretically, the 
licensing effect would thus 
only occur for people who 
indicate that they would 
behave prosocial, but the 
authors are not clear 
whether only these people 
are included in the moral 
credentialing self condition.  
 
When inserting the F-value 
and the degrees of freedom 
on 
http://graphpad.com/quic
kcalcs/pValue2/, we found 
that the actual p-value is not 
.05, but .0546. 
Cain et al., 
2005 
We test the following three 
predictions: .... 2) Advisors with 
conflicts of interest will give more 







More interesting, and as predicted, all three 
measures also reveal that disclosure led to a 
greater distortion of advice. The amount that 
advisors exaggerated, calculated by 
    Exact p-values are not 
reported. When calculating* 
the p-values, we found that 
























and SD's.  
subtracting advisors' own personal estimates 
from their public suggestions, was 
significantly greater in the high/disclosed 
condition than in either of the other two 
conditions (p < .05) and significantly greater 
by the other two measures as well: advisor 
suggestion minus actual jar values and 
advisor suggestion minus the average of 
personal estimates in the accurate condition 
(p < .05 for both). 
the high/undisclosed 
condition (M = 20.16, SD = 
4.81) and the 
high/disclosed condition 
(M = 24.16, SD = 8.40) were 
not significant, t(41) = 
1.9275, p = .061 (which is 
not <.05).  




We designed our first study to 
address the question of whether 
and shy advisors expect 
disclosure to shift the peak of the 










Average advice (number of jellybeans) did 
not differ significantly between subjects if we 
compare the first response of those who got 
the disclosure condition first (M = 4017, SD = 
1928) versus the first response of those who 
got the nondisclosure condition first (M = 
4333, SD = 2092). The mean difference in 
advise (disclosure minus nondisclosure, 
within subject) was 13 jellybeans (SD = 1479) 
higher for nondisclosure when the 
nondisclosure condition came first, and was 
1022 (4661) higher for nondisclosure when 
the disclosure condition came first.  
    Since the authors do not 
make clear predictions, we 
could not include this 
comparison in our p-curve 
analysis. Moral licensing 
implies, in our view, that 
advisors should give higher 
estimates of the amount of 
jelly beans in the jar when 
their COI is disclosed vs 
when it is undisclosed. This 
is not the case.  
Cain et al., 
2010 
 
(2) As in figure 1, advisors with 
conflicts of interest will give more 







Table 1. Advisor's suggestion. High-
undisclosed M = 236,138, SD = 36,071, High - 
disclosed M = 255,394, SD = 55,877.  
    The authors report a test of 
the effects of disclosure in 
the column ' high vs. high-
d', and report 'p <. 05'. Our 









recalculation* showed that 






We predicted that agreeing to 
take part in the figure fundraiser 
would license our participants to 
make a racially biased decision in 
the present (say a job was better 









Results revealed that participants in the 
future moral behavior condition were more 
likely to indicate that the job was better 
suited for a White candidate (M = 4.62, SE = 
0.13) than control participants (M = 4.16, SE = 
0.12), t(78.829) = 2.49, p = .015, d= 0.55. Thus, 
intending to perform a moral behavior in a 
few weeks led to the expression of more 










Study 2 was designed to replicate 
and extend study 1. Participants 
were once again told about the 
skip-a-meal fundraiser but 
instead of having them commit 
and provide their email address, 
the experimenter indicated that 
they were just taking a quick poll 
of students' interest in the 
fundraiser. This allowed us to 
assess whether participants 
would experience the prospective 
moral licensing effect when they 
had only indicated whether they 
anticipated taking part but had 









Results from the t-test with equal variances 
not assumed revealed that, consistent with 
Study 1, participants in the prospective moral 
behavior condition expressed greater 
preference for a White candidate (M = 4.54, 
SE = 0.20) than control participants (M = 4.00, 
SE = 0.12), t(38.1) = 2.33, p =. 025, d = 0.68. 
t(38.1) 
= 2.33 










Study 3 was designed to test the 
boundary conditions of 
prospective moral licensing. First, 
participants were asked about a 
different future moral behavior, 
donating blood, and a different 
measure of racial prejudice was 
used, responses on the Attitudes 
Towards Blacks scale (Brigham, 
1993). Second, an additional 
control condition was added to 
the design in which the 
participants were asked to 
perform a future non-moral 
behavior. This way, we ruled out 
the possibility that agreeing to 
any request, rather than a 
specifically moral re- quest, 
results in more racially biased 
responding. Finally, we were also 
interested in determining 
whether prospective moral 
licensing occurs for overt as well 
as ambiguous prejudice-relevant 
behaviors. The behavior assessed 
in both Study 1 and Study 2 was 
relatively ambiguous, and 
participants may have interpreted 
their responses as not being 
prejudiced (e.g., perceived the job 
as likely unpleasant for a Black 
officer). Examining whether the 
prospective moral licensing effect 
extends to responses to overly 
racially biased items on a self-















A one-way 3 (Future Moral vs. Future 
Nonmoral vs Control) ANOVA 
was conducted on the overt prejudice scale. 
The analysis revealed that condition 
significantly affected the amount of prejudice 
expressed, F(2, 78) = 12.136, p < .001, η² =.07 
(see Fig. 1). Planned contrasts were then used 
to compare the future moral licensing 
condition to each of the other conditions. 
Participants in the future moral condition (M 
= 2.87 SE = 0.23) expressed significantly more 
prejudice than participants in the non-moral 
condition (M = 1.43, SE = 0.21) and than 
control participants (M = 1.68, SE = 0.22), ps < 
.001, ds = 1.14 and 0.89, respectively. 
Participants in the non-moral condition and 
control condition did not differ from each 
other, p =.42. It is worth noting that if the full 
20-itemversion of the ATB is used, the 
pattern of results is similar, although weaker, 
indicating that the effect tends to be stronger 
for the more blatant items. 
    Not included because 





ormat=SEM showed that 
t(50) = 3.7398, p <.001 and 
t(52) = 4.6294, p <.001. 
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insight into whether the licensing 
is due to moral credentials being 
established or moral credits 
accumulating. If the moral 
licensing effect extends to the 
overt items on the measure of 
racial prejudice, it suggests that 
moral credits rather than moral 
credentials are at play in 






The present study was designed 
to provide a replication of moral 
request vs. non-moral request 
conditions and provide further 
evidence that prospective moral 
licensing is due to moral credits 
rather than moral credentials. 
Participants were asked about 
either participating in a future 
fundraiser or using a new email 
system, and then they completed 
an explicit measure of racial bias, 
a stereotype endorsement 
measure. The endorsement of 
negative stereotypes of Black 
people rep- resents overt 
unambiguous racial bias. If the 
moral licensing effect ex- tends to 
overt stereotype endorsement, it 
provides further evidence that 
prospective moral licensing is 










Results from the t-test with equal variances 
not assumed revealed that participants in the 
prospective moral behavior condition 
expressed stronger stereotype endorsement 
(M = 3.84, SE = 0.11) than non-moral request 
participants (M = 3.39, SE = 0.14), t(69.34) = 
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Hypothesis 1. People who first 
rate a high-quality Black-modeled 
ad (legitimacy condition) will 
discriminate against a subsequent 
low-quality Black-modeled ad 
more than those who first rate a 










Participants who first evaluated a high-
quality ad with a Black and then a low-
quality ad with a Black expressed a 
significant bias against the target ad 
compared with those who first evaluated a 
high-quality ad with a White and then a low-
quality ad with a Black (Mblack/black = 4.15 
vs Mwhite/black = 4.77, t = 2.35, p <.05). 
These results support Hypothesis 1. 
t(115) 
= 2.35 
  SDs not reported, n not 
reported, so we cannot be 
sure of df. 




Also, related to hypothesis 1, we 
predicted that discrimination 
would appear against the low-
quality ad containing Black 
model compared with the low-
quality ad with White model 
when subjects were asked to 
evaluate a high-quality ad 









When subjects gained legitimacy credits 
through the process of evaluating a high-
quality ad featuring Black model positively, 
they subsequently showed a fairly strong 
and significant bias against the low-quality 
ad containing Black model as compared with 
the low-quality ad with White model 
(Mblack/black = 4.15 vs Mblack/white = 
5.16, t = 3.49, p <.05). This pattern of data 




  SDs not reported, n not 
reported, so we cannot be 
sure of df. 




Hypothesis 2. People who acquire 
legitimacy credits will be more 
likely to spend them under the 
condition where such spending is 
sensibly justified than under the 
condition where such spending is 
not. That is, those who acquire 
legitimacy credits will be more 
likely to devaluate an ad with 
Black only when the ad quality is 
low and hence, such 








While there was a significant difference 
between control (low) and second ad of low-
quality condition (Mno/low = 3.60 vs 
Mhigh/low = 3.03, t = 2.11, p < .05). This 
suggests that people are likely to display 
prejudice expression only when it is 
normatively appropriate to do so even after 
they acquire legitimacy credits. The results 
support Hypothesis 2. 
t(58) = 
2.11 
  SDs not reported, n not 
reported, so we cannot be 
sure of df. 









We expected more prosocial 
intentions if participants recalled 
a distant moral behavior than 
distant immoral behavior (a 
consistency effect) and more 
prosocial intentions if 
participants recalled a recent 
immoral behavior than a recent 














Willingness to volunteer. As predicted, there 
was a significant interaction, F(1, 96) = 5.37, p 
= 0.23, η² = .05. 
    The licensing comparison is 
not made because it is not 
explicitly predicted. 
However, the authors write 
about moral licensing in the 
introduction: In sum, there 
is ample evidence showing 
that, sometimes, perceiving 
oneself as moral leads to a 
reduction in moral 
behavior, whereas 
perceiving oneself as less 
moral motivates increases 
in moral behavior. This 
pattern is interpreted in 
terms of moral self-
regulation, balancing moral 
self-consistent behavior 
against the costs inherent in 
prosocial behavior. It is 
furthermore predicted that 
when people recall their 
behavior in a manner that 
induces a concrete mind-set 
(e.g., recalling recent 
behavior), they should 
demonstrate compensatory 
effects: Feeling moral 
should reduce prosocial 
intentions, whereas feeling 
immoral should increase 
prosocial intentions. 
Therefore, we tested* the 
cells in which licensing is 
predicted (recent moral 
versus recent immoral 
Chapter 3 
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conditions), and found for 
the willingness to volunteer 
scales that participants in 
the recent moral condition 
(M = 5.42 ,SD = 1.37) do not 
differ significantly from 
participants in the recent 
immoral condition (M = 
5.97, SD = 1.30), t(49) = 1.46, 








We expected more prosocial 
intentions if participants recalled 
a distant moral behavior than 
distant immoral behavior (a 
consistency effect) and more 
prosocial intentions if 
participants recalled a recent 
immoral behavior than a recent 














Willingness to help. As predicted, there was, 
again, a significant interaction, F(1,96) = 5.97, 
p = 0.16. 
    The licensing comparison is 
not made because it is not 
explicitly predicted. 
However, the authors write 
about moral licensing in the 
introduction, see previous 
comment. Therefore, we 
tested* the cells in which 
licensing is predicted 
(recent moral versus recent 
immoral conditions), and 
found for the willingness to 
help people in the 
hypothetical vignettes that 
participants in the recent 
moral condition (M = 5.81, 
SD = 0.70) do not differ 
significantly from 
participants in the recent 
immoral condition (M = 
6.00, SD = 0.73), t(49) = 0.94, 
p = .353. 









In the next study, we aim to 
establish that the interaction 
obtained in Study 1 was due to 
changes in moral self-perceptions, 
rather than simply greater 
activation of moral values in the 
distant condition. We expected 
that compensatory and 
consistency patterns of 
subsequent prosocial motivation 
would occur only for self-relevant 
past behavior, not for moral 




















n for self 
vs none 
for other.) 
As predicted, results also revealed a 
significant three-way interaction, F(1,143) = 
5.48, p = .021, η² = .04. 
    The licensing comparison is 
not made because it is not 
explicitly predicted. 
However, the authors write 
about moral licensing in the 
introduction, see previous 
comment. Therefore, we 
tested* the cells in which 
licensing is predicted 
(recent moral versus recent 
immoral conditions), and 
found that participants in 
the moral condition (M = 
4.66, SD = 1.53) did not 
differ from participants in 
the immoral condition (M = 
5.51, SD = 1.34), t(37) = 1.85, 








We expected compensatory 
behavior patterns if participants 
were instructed to consider a 
concrete behavior and expected 
consistency behavior patterns if 
participants were instructed to 













As predicted the main effect of valence was 
qualified by a significant interaction, F = 4.06, 
p = .046, η² =.04. 
   Not included in p-curve 
because df’s are not 
reported (while they are in 
the other experiments). 
Cornelisse
n et al., 
2013a 
In this study, we tested our 
hypothesis that a consequential 
mind-set leads to moral 
balancing, whereas a 
deontological mind-set results in 









Participants with an outcome based mind set 
gave less coins after recalling an ethical act 
(M = 2.37, SD = 2.31) than after recalling an 
unethical act (M = 3.71, SD = 2.13), t(46) = -
2.07, p = .04 
t(46) = 
-2.07 







participants identified as having a 
rule-based mind-set to use the 
ethicality of their recalled 
behavior as a guide, such that 
those who recalled an ethical 
behavior would behave more 
fairly than those who recalled an 
unethical act. For participants 
with an outcome-based mind-set, 








The objective of the second study 
was to provide additional 
evidence for the causal role of 
ethical mind-sets as a moderator 
of moral dynamics by 
manipulating instead of 











In the outcome based mind set condition, 
participants who recalled an unethical act 
gave more coins in the dictator game (M = 
3.20, SD = 1.91) than did those who recalled 
an ethical act (M = 1.86, SD =1.96), t(39) = -
2.22, p = .03.  
t(39) = 
-2.22 
    
Cornelisse






After replication our 
hypothesized moderation effect, 
we wanted to evaluate the 
generalizability of our findings 
with a third study, so we changed 
the context to cheating behavior. 
Additionally, we evaluated the 
role of moral self-image as the 












In the outcome based mind set condition, 
participants who recalled an ethical act (M = 
1.74, SD = 2.03) cheated more than did 
participants who recalled an unethical act (M 
= 0.74, SD =1.86), t(52) = 1.97, p = .05.  
t(52) = 
1.97 
  When inserting the t-value 
and the degrees of freedom 
on 
http://graphpad.com/quic
kcalcs/pValue2/, we found 
that the actual p-value is > 
.05 (.0542) 
Cornelisse
n et al., 
2013b 
We expect that moral licensing 
effects of symbolic actions will be 
especially pronounced for 





We found a main effect of the symbolic 
action t(67) = -2.40, p <.03. 
t(67) = 
-2.40 
  "Published" as symposium 
paper, so included as 
published in this p-curve.  





concerned with impression 
management. In study 1, we 
tested whether having the 
opportunity to engage in a 











Study 2 was designed to replicate 
the moral licensing effect of 








The interaction effect of self-monitoring and 
having the opportunity to perform a 
symbolic action was not significant (t(114) = -
1.41, p = .16. For participants high in self-
monitoring (at 1 SD above the mean) there 
was a marginally significant effect of 
symbolic action (90% CI [-1.00; -0.05]). 
    The authors do not provide 
the test for the licensing 
effect and we could not 
compute it from the 
reported data. Figure 2 and 
the CI's on page 10 suggest 
that the licensing effect is 





We propose that endorsing 
Obama can license people to 
favor whites at the expense of 
blacks. Study 1 tests whether 
letting participants endorse 
Obama increases their 









As predicted, participants who completed 
the police-hiring task after endorsing Obama 
said the job was significantly better for a 
white person ( M = .55, SD = .15) than did 
control participants (M = .17, SD = .12), t(82) 
= 2.04, p = .04, d = .45. 
t(82) = 
2.04 






Simply expressing one's 
preference for a democrat may 
have been sufficient to produce 
the effect (political expression 
account). Second, perhaps seeing 
Obama activated stereotypes 
about blacks that biased 
participants' decision towards a 











Planned orthogonal contrasts confirmed our 
predictions that while responses in the 
political expression control (M = .05, SD = 
.84) and the priming control (M = .15, SD = 
1.09) did not differ significantly from each 
other, F(1,59) = .13, ns, participants in the 
credentials condition (M = .50, SD = .83) 
favored Whites for the job significantly more 
    Recalculating* t-tests for 
each comparison between 
control 1, 2, and treatment 
with assumed n = 25 per 
condition even though total 
N = 74 showed that both 
comparisons are not 
significant: t(48) = 1.91, p = 
.063 for the political 
Chapter 3 
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xx account). We conducted study 2 
to rule out these alternatives. 
priming 
control) 
than participants in the two control condition 
did F(1,59) = 5.65, p = .02  
expression control 
condition, and t(48) = 1.28, p 
= .208 for the priming 







If endorsing Obama licenses 
favoring whites, then it should 
have an especially strong effect 
on individuals whose preexisting 
attitudes dispose them towards 
white favoritism, and who should 
thus be most inhibited in the 
absence of credentials. We tested 
this prediction in study 3 by 
including a standard measure of 
prejudice: the modern racism 
scale. We predicted that the 
participants with higher MRS 
scores would be more likely to 
take advantage of credentials to 
favor whites. We predicted that 
endorsing Obama would increase 
allocations to the white 
organization, especially among 

















At 1 SD above the mrs mean, we replicated 
the moral credentials effect: the white 
organization received $16.478 more (and the 
black organization received $ 16.478 less) in 
the credentials condition than in the control 
condition, t(48) = 2.48, p = .02. As predicted, 
this effect was weaker at the MRS mean: 
credentials increased the white organization's 
allocation by $2,555, t(48) = .57. 
    Authors do not report the 
full licensing test, so we 
stayed as close to the meta 
analysis as possible (and 
looked at the effect at the 





We hypothesized that 
participants who could point to a 
racist alternative to their prior 
behavior would be more likely to 
express preferences that favored 









Consistent with this hypothesis, participants 
expressed a marginally stronger preference 
for hiring whites in the innocent black 
suspect condition (M = .29, SD = .72) than in 
the control condition (M = .11, SD = .56), 
t(155) = 1.77, p < .08, d = .028.  
    n.s. 






We hypothesized that 
participants who could point to a 
racist alternative to their prior 
behavior would be more likely to 
express preferences that favored 









Although participants tended to allocate a 
slightly greater percentage of the money to 
the white organization in the innocent black 
suspect condition (M = 54.45%, SD = 11.31) 
than in the control condition (M = 52.226%, 
SD = 10.79), this difference was not 
significant, t(155) = 1.28, p = .20, d = .21).  





We predicted that, in comparison 
to control participants, recalling 
immoral behaviors would 
increase prosocial intentions and 
recalling moral behaviors would 










As predicted, relative to the control, recalling 
moral or immoral behavior led to 
compensatory prosocial intentions, but 
remembering a positive or negative 
nonmoral behavior did not. A one-way 
anova on participants' prosocial intentions 
revealed a significant effect of condition, 
F(4,143) = 3.46, p = .01, η² = .09. Relative to 
controls, participants in the moral condition 
had marginally weaker prosocial intentions 
F(1, 143) = 3.36, p = .069, η² = .05 
    Study actually has 5 cells. 
The authors only report 
overall ANOVA on 5 cells 
and two separate f-tests for 
control <> moral and 
control <>immoral.  
The licensing test = control 
> moral. Which is n.s. 





We predicted that recalling one's 
own immoral behavior would 
lead to less cheating (and more 
persistence) than recalling one's 
own moral behavior.  
2 (self 





A comparison of the self stories indicated 
that, after recalling moral behavior, 
participants allowed the answer to appear 
more than they did after recalling immoral 
















We predict that participants will 
be more likely to choose the 
luxury option when their prior 
decision provides them with an 
opportunity to appear altruistic 










Consistent with our prediction, significantly 
more people in the license condition chose 
the designer jeans (57.4%) than in the control 
condition (27.7%, x2 = 9.7, p < .01) 
chi2(1) 
= 9.7 








We predict that participants will 
be more likely to choose the 
luxury option when their prior 
decision provides them with an 
opportunity to appear altruistic 










As we predicted, 56.6% of participants chose 
to buy the expensive sunglasses in the license 
condition; only 27.7% of participants in the 
control condition chose the expensive 
sunglasses (x2 = 7.95, p < .05) 
chi2(1) 
= 7.95 






We predict that participants will 
be more likely to choose the 
luxury option when their prior 
decision provides them with an 
opportunity to appear altruistic 










The choice results were similar to the 
previous studies: 45% of the participants in 
the control condition chose to buy the concert 
ticket, whereas 72.5% of the participants in 
the license condition opted to buy the ticket 
(x2 = 6.24, p < .05) 
chi2(1)
=6.24 






we predicted that, on average, 
participants would donate a 
smaller amount of money if they 
felt licensed by their prior 
decision than would participants 








However, consistent with our prediction, 
among those who donated, donations were 
significantly lower in the licensing condition 
(M = $1.20) than in the control condition (M 
= $1.70; t (70) = 2.73, p < .01 
t(70) = 
2.73 






We predict that participants will 
be more likely to choose the 
luxury option when their prior 
decision provides them with an 
opportunity to appear altruistic 










We replicated the licensing effect. That is, 
compared with the control condition (40%), 
significantly more participants opted for the 
designer jeans in the licensing condition 
when there was no external attribution (62%; 
x2 = 4.05, p < .05) 
chi2(1) 
= 4.05 




We predict that participants will 
be more likely to choose the 
luxury option when their prior 






The relative preference for the hedonic 
designer jeans was significantly higher in the 
license condition (M = 5.9) than in the control 
condition (M = 5.4, t(64) = 2.27, p < .05). 
t(64) = 
2.27 
    




opportunity to appear altruistic 








Specifically, in Study 1 we 
investigated the impact that 
perceived progress on the goal to 
be more egalitarian toward Blacks 
had on outgroup discrimination 
and prejudice. We proposed that 
after receiving feedback that they 
were progressing on this goal, 
participants would disengage 
from this goal by distancing 
them- selves from Blacks and by 
holding more negative implicit 
racial attitudes than would 








As predicted, participants who were given 
feedback that they were progressing on the 
goal to be positive toward Blacks (M = 7.90, 
SD = 1.18) sat significantly farther away from 
the Black confederate than did participants in 
the no-progress condition (M = 6.86, SD = 
1.93), t(41) = 2.12, p = .04, d = 0.65. 
t(41) = 
2.12 






We therefore predicted that only 
feedback on goal progress toward 
Blacks would increase seating 
proximity to a White confederate 













This effect, however, was qualified by the 
predicted Goal Feedback x Type of Goal 
interaction, F(1,287) = 5.91, p =.02, η² =.06. As 
expected, when examining goals related to 
Blacks, simple effects analyses demonstrated 
that participants who received feedback that 
they were becoming more positive toward 
Blacks subsequently sat closer to the White 
con- federate (M = 5.41, SD = 1.47) than did 
participants in the no-progress condition (M 




  Odd (implicit) reasoning: 
Sitting close to a white 
person supposedly signals 
something about what you 








We predicted that feedback on 
goal progress toward Blacks 
would decrease seating proximity 
to a Black confederate and 
increase seating proximity to a 
White confederate relative to the 



















To examine the effect that feedback related to 
progress on the 
goal to be positive toward Blacks had on 
nonverbal behavior toward Whites and 
Blacks, we performed a Goal Feedback 
(progress vs. no progress vs. no feedback) x 
Target Race (Black confederate vs. White 
confederate) ANOVA on seating distance. 
Only the Goal Feedback x Target Race 
interaction was significant, F(2, 80) = 9.53, p = 
.001, η² 
= .19. Simple effects analyses related to the 
Black confederate replicated the findings in 
Study 1, F(2, 40) = 4.82, p = .01, η² 
= .21. In particular, participants who received 
feedback that they were becoming more 
positive toward Blacks sat farther from the 
Black confederate (M = 43.78, SD = 1.81) than 
did participants in the no-progress condition 
(M = 40.38, SD = 5.13), t(27) = 2.41, p = .02, d 
= 0.88, and participants in the no-feedback 
condition (M = 37.66, SD = 7.46), t(25) = 3.08, 
p = .005, d = 1.13. Participants in the no-
progress feedback condition, alternatively, 
did not differ in seating distance to the Black 
confederate (M = 40.38, SD = 5.13) from 
participants in the no-feedback condition (M 










On the basis of research on 
behavioral priming, we predicted 
that mere exposure to green 
products would increase 
subsequent altruistic conduct; 












However, there was a significant interaction, 
F(1, 152) = 4.45, p = .037, prep = .897. 
Participants who were merely exposed to the 
green store shared more money (M = $2.12, 
SD = $1.40) than those who were merely 
exposed to the conventional store (M = $1.59, 
    Test of interest is ' 
purchased in green store" 
but is n.s. F(1,152) = 1.69 




theories on moral regulation, we 
predicted that purchasing green 
products would reduce 
subsequent altruism because it 





SD = $1.29), F(1, 152) = 2.85, p = .094, prep = 
.824. This pattern reversed in the purchasing 
conditions: Participants who had purchased 
in the green store shared less money (M = 
$1.76, SD = $1.40) than those who had 
purchased in the conventional store (M = 
$2.18, SD = 






We predicted that purchasing 
green products would establish 
moral credentials, ironically 









We found a significant difference between 
conditions in 
performance on the dots task, t(79) = 2.26, p = 
.027, prep = .913. Participants who had 
purchased in the conventional store 
identified 42.5% (SD = 2.9%) of trials as 
having more dots on the right side; this 
percentage was not significantly different 
from the actual percentage (i.e., 40%), t(37) = 
1.66, p = .106, prep = .811. Participants who 
had purchased in the green store, however, 
identified 51.4% (SD = 2.67%) of trials as 
having more dots on the right side -which 
suggests that they were lying to earn more 
money. Participants in the green-store 
condition earned on average $0.36 more than 
those in the conventional-store condition. As 
noted, independently of deciding to lie, 
participants could steal by taking more 
money from the envelope than shown on the 
summary screen. Results for this measure 
were consistent with those for task 
performance: Participants in the green-store 
condition stole $0.48 more from the envelope 
than those in the conventional-store 
condition (M = $0.56, SD = $0.13, vs. M = 








= .942. Altogether, participants in the green-
store condition left the experiment with on 
average $0.83 (SD = $0.23) more in their 
pockets than did participants in the 
conventional-store condition, t(70) = 3.55, p < 






We have argued that participants 
strategically expressed racial 
sensitivity in order to reduce their 
concern that rejecting a Black 









Yet, as predicted, this preference was 
stronger when participants had had an 
opportunity to establish credentials, (M = 
7.42, SD = 1.11) than when they had not (M = 
6.75, SD = 1.58), t(67) = 2.03, p = .05.  
t(67)=2
.03 






Each of the present three studies 
tests the hypothesis that people 
who have previously expressed 
antiprejudiced attitudes are more 
likely to express their true 
attitudes in contexts in which 
there exists the potential for 
accusations of prejudice.  
We hypothesized that 
participants would be more likely 
to explicitly express an implicit 
preference for a man when their 
previous actions provided them 












Effect of credentials. We hypothesized that 
participants in the 
"most" condition would be more likely than 
would those in the "some" condition to 
deviate from the politically correct midpoint 
option and express a preference for hiring a 
man. To test this hypothesis, we analyzed 
participants' preferences in a 2 X 3 factorial 
ANOVA, crossing gender with condition 
(most, some, and base rate). Consistent with 
predictions, this analysis yielded a main 
effect for credentials, F(2, 194) = 4.4, p < .05. 
As Figure 1 illustrates, the main effect for 
credentials reflects the fact that participants 
favored a man more in the "most" condition 
(M = 4.8) than they did in either the "some" 
or the base-rate condition (Ms = 4.3 and 4.5, 
respectively). 
F(2,194
) = 4.4 
  Unexpectedly, they only 
find the effect for men. Still, 
prediction was overall, 
therefore we included only 
the main effect of 
credentials. 







Each of the present three studies 
tests the hypothesis that people 
who have previously expressed 
antiprejudiced attitudes are more 
likely to express their true 
attitudes in contexts in which 
there exists the potential for 
accusations of prejudice.  
We hypothesized that the act of 
recommending the hiring of a 
woman [an African American] on 
one job selection task would 
increase participants' willingness 
to express the belief that a man [a 
White] was more suited for a 
position described on a second 









We conducted a 2 (credentials) X 2 (type of 
prejudice) X 2 (gender) ANOVA on the 
responses to the job suitability question. The 
only significant effect to emerge was the 
predicted main effect for credentials, F(l, 124) 
= 6.3, p < .05, all other Fs n.s. As Figure 2 
shows, participants were more likely to favor 
a White man in the credentials condition (M 
= 4.8) than in the noncredentials condition 
(M = 4.4). The fact that credentials did not 
interact with type of prejudice, F(l, 124) = 0.2, 
ns, indicates that the manipulation had 
comparable effects on the racism and sexism 
measures. 
F(1,124
) = 6.3 






Each of the present three studies 
tests the hypothesis that people 
who have previously expressed 
antiprejudiced attitudes are more 
likely to express their true 
attitudes in contexts in which 
there exists the potential for 








Expressed prejudice. To begin with, we 
checked to see whether the findings of Study 
3 replicated those of previous studies. We 
did this by comparing the credentials and no- 
credentials conditions under the same-
audience condition. The earlier findings were 
replicated in that participants who were 
given the opportunity to establish nonracist 
credentials favored a White more than did 
those who were not given the opportunity to 
establish credentials (M = 4.9 vs. 4.2), F(19) = 
2.2, p < .05. 
t(19) = 
2.2 
    
Sachdeva 
et al., 2009 
Our primary hypothesis was that 
a decrease in the moral self- 
concept leads to increased 







We compared the average donation across 
conditions using a one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). Participants in the 
neutral condition donated an average of 
    Authors do not report the 
critical licensing test. When 
calculating* the comparison 







analogous increase in the moral 
self-concept inhibits altruistic or 
prosocial behavior (relative to a 
neutral state). We also tested our 
conjecture that these effects are 
caused by changes in the self-
concept and therefore should 
occur when participants are 
taking a first-person perspective, 




$2.71 (SE = 0.85). However, the amount 
donated increased to $5.30 (SE = 1.17) in the 
negative- traits condition and fell to $1.07 (SE 
= 0.47) when participants were primed with 
the positive traits, F(2, 43) = 5.690, prep = .97, 
η² = 209.  
(M = 1.07, SD = 1.82) and 
the control condition (M= 
2.71, SD = 3.29), we found 
t(27) =1.68, p = .105 
Sachdeva 







Our primary hypothesis was that 
a decrease in the moral self- 
concept leads to increased 
prosocial behavior, but that an 
analogous increase in the moral 
self-concept inhibits altruistic or 
prosocial behavior (relative to a 
neutral state). We also tested our 
conjecture that these effects are 
caused by changes in the self-
concept and therefore should 
occur when participants are 
taking a first-person perspective, 







traits) x 2 
(perspecti







 Once again, the dependent variable was the 
amount participants indicated they would 
donate. We ran a 2 (condition: positive or 
negative traits) x 2 (perspective: self or other) 
between-subjects ANOVA on this measure. 
A significant interaction between condition 
and perspective revealed that the effect of the 
different word types was apparent only in 
participants who were told to write about 
themselves, F(1, 35) = 4.73, prep = .90, η² = 
.119. The donations of participants who 
wrote about someone they knew did not 
differ depending on whether they wrote 
about positive or negative traits (M = $4.55, 
SE = 1.42, vs. M = $3.30, SE = 1.27), but 
participants who wrote only about 
themselves gave significantly less when they 
had written a story containing the positive, 
rather than the negative, traits (M = $1.11, SE 
=0.73, vs. M = $5.56, SE =1.55 
    Authors do not report the 
critical licensing test. When 
calculating* the comparison 
between the positive traits 
(M = 1.11, SD = 2.31) and 
the negative traits (M = 
5.56, SD = 4.9), we found 
t(16) =2.46, p = .025 
 
This study has less than 10 
people in each condition to 
test an interaction. This is 
really insufficient.  
Sachdeva 
et al., 2009 
Our primary hypothesis was that 
a decrease in the moral self- 






Those in the negative-traits conditions chose 
to run the filters 73% of the time, but those 
who wrote about the positive traits were the 
F(2,43) 
= 3.59 
    




prosocial behavior, but that an 
analogous increase in the moral 
self-concept inhibits altruistic or 
prosocial behavior (relative to a 
neutral state). We also tested our 
conjecture that these effects are 
caused by changes in the self-
concept and therefore should 
occur when participants are 
taking a first-person perspective, 





least cooperative and said they would run 
the filters only 56% of the time, F(2, 43) = 








Applying the rationale of 
perspectives to the moral domain, 
we assume that different 
perspectives people take on their 
past moral behavior or nonmoral 
behavior lead to different kinds of 
feedback, which, in turn, yields 
different courses of future moral 
action. Thus, taking a perspective 
of commitment will lead to 
perceived commitment in moral 
or nonmoral behavior and 
promote a pattern of 
highlighting. Conversely, taking a 
perspective of progress will lead 
to perceived progress in moral or 
nonmoral behavior and promote 























Conversely, in the progress focused 
conditions, participants exhibited intentions 
in line with a moral balancing effect, with 
lower prosocial intentions in the sustainable 
condition (M = 3.77) compared to the 
conventional condition, M = 4.10; Contrast -
0.34, t(237) = -1.80, p = .04 one-tailed, d = 0.38. 
t(237)= 
-1.80 
  The authors only provide 
one-tailed test. When re-








Applying the rationale of 
perspectives to the moral domain, 
we assume that different 








Conversely, participants who perceived their 
behavior in terms of progress showed a 
moral balancing effect, offering less money in 
the moral condition (M = 1.86) than in the 
t(122)=
-1.75 
  The authors only provide 
one-tailed test. When re-








past moral behavior or nonmoral 
behavior lead to different kinds of 
feedback, which, in turn, yields 
different courses of future moral 
action. Thus, taking a perspective 
of commitment will lead to 
perceived commitment in moral 
or nonmoral behavior and 
promote a pattern of 
highlighting. Conversely, taking a 
perspective of progress will lead 
to perceived progress in moral or 
nonmoral behavior and promote 
a pattern of balancing. 









non-moral condition, M = 2.43; contrast = -









            Since the authors do not 
make clear predictions, we 
could not include this 
comparison in our p-curve 
analysis. They describe that 
the account of 
reinforcement will predict 
that recalling good deeds 
will lead to more good 
behavior, whereas the 
account of licensing will 
predict that recalling good 
deeds will lead to 




            The authors do not provide 
the statistics of the different 
comparisons. Therefore, we 
were not able to include 
their p-value in the table. 





Note. x = the crucial licensing test was not reported; xx = recalculation shows that test that were reported as significant were not significant at the p < .05 level; 








Three Attempts to Replicate the Moral Licensing Effect 
 
The present chapter includes three attempts to replicate the moral licensing effect by 
Sachdeva, Iliev, and Medin (2009). The original authors found that writing about 
positive traits led to lower donations to charity and decreased cooperative behavior. 
The first two replication attempts (student samples, 95% power based on the initial 
findings, NStudy4.1 = 105, NStudy42 = 150), did not confirm the original results. The third 
replication attempt (MTurk sample, 95% power based on a meta-analysis on self-
licensing, N = 940) also did not confirm the moral licensing effect. We conclude that 1) 
there is as of yet no strong support for the moral self-regulation framework proposed 
in Sachdeva et al., 2) the manipulation used is unlikely to induce moral licensing, and 










This chapter is based on Blanken, I., Van de Ven, N., Zeelenberg, M., & Meijers, M. H. 




People like to present themselves as good people, both to themselves and to others, to 
maintain a positive self-image and to feel like a moral person (Aronson, Cohen, & Nail, 
1999; Schlenker, 1980; Steele, 1988). Furthermore, central theories of human behavior 
highlight humans’ desire for cognitive consistency in their thoughts, feelings, and 
behavior (Heider, 1946; Festinger, 1957). Intriguing research on moral licensing qualifies 
this desire for consistency by suggesting that individuals who behave in a morally 
laudable way, later feel more justified to perform a morally questionable action 
(Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010; Miller & Effron, 2010). Moral licensing is found to lead 
to a broad spectrum of undesirable behaviors. For example, after (reminders of) prior 
moral or socially desirable behavior people displayed more prejudiced attitudes 
(Effron, Cameron, & Monin, 2009; Monin & Miller, 2001), cheated more (Jordan, 
Mullen, & Murninghan, 2011; Mazar & Zhong, 2010), and displayed a preference for 
hedonic over utilitarian products (Khan & Dhar, 2006). 
An important contribution to the literature on moral licensing examines how writing 
about one’s own positive or negative traits can influence donations to charity and 
cooperative behavior in a commons dilemma (Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009). In just 
four years since publication, this paper has been cited 129 times (Google Scholar, 
11/27/2013). Based on their findings, the authors argued that this moral licensing 
effect can best be interpreted as part of a larger moral self-regulation framework where 
internal balancing of moral self-worth and the costs associated with prosocial behavior 
determine whether one will display (im)moral behavior. When the moral image of 
oneself is established, an immoral action is allowed without the fear of losing that 
moral image (moral licensing). However, when one appears immoral to others, 
positive actions are needed to restore the moral image (moral cleansing). The studies 
of Sachdeva et al. (2009) comparing licensing with neutral control conditions show 
medium-sized effect sizes (d = 0.62 ([CL95] -0.11 to 1.35) for Study 1 and d = 0.59 
([CL95] -0.12 to 1.30) for Study 3)12. However, note that because of the small sample 
                                                          
12 Note that the overall differences between the three conditions (moral licensing, 
moral cleansing, and the neutral control condition) of Sachdeva et al.’s Study 1 and 
Study 3 were significant. For Study 1, no statistics on post-hoc comparisons were 
reported. When calculating the Cohen’s d effect sizes comparing the moral licensing 
Three Attempts to Replicate the Moral Licensing Effect 
121 
sizes (n = 14 to 17 per condition), the obtained effects have large variances, implying 
that the true effect sizes could range from very small to very large. 
There are no published direct replication attempts of the methodologies of Sachdeva 
et al.’s (2009) studies. Conway and Peetz (2012) conducted a study that was similar to 
Sachdeva et al.’s Study 1. However, this was not a direct replication because they 
adapted the procedure and added extra manipulations. We sought to replicate the 
studies by Sachdeva et al. to obtain additional insight in the complete moral self-
regulation framework by testing for both moral licensing and moral cleansing effects 
contrasted to a neutral control condition. 
We conducted high-powered replications of Sachdeva et al.’s (2009) Study 1 and Study 
3 in Dutch student samples with 95% statistical power based on the effect size of the 
original studies. We did a third study with a U.S. sample via Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) with 95% power based on the effect size that we obtained in our meta-analysis 
on self-licensing (d = 0.2613; Chapter 2). This study examined both dependent variables 
of original Study 1 and 3 in a counterbalanced order. For all studies, we report how 
we determined our sample sizes, all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all 
measures. 
Study 4.1. Replication of Sachdeva et al.’s (2009) Study 1  
Participants 
Using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) we calculated that at least 63 
participants were needed to achieve 95% power for the effect size of Sachdeva et al.’s 
                                                          
with the neutral control conditions, we found that for both studies, the confidence 
intervals included zero, indicating marginally significant moral licensing effects. 
13 Note that this effect size is based on a preliminary version of the meta-analysis 
reported in Chapter 2. This effect size is slightly smaller than the final effect size in 
Chapter 2, because the inclusion criteria in this preliminary version were slightly 
different (i.e., this version included studies on self-regulation and comparisons 
between licensing and control conditions that fell under our definition of licensing 
but were not necessarily expected to lead to licensing effect by the original authors, 




Study 1 (2009; N = 46). We planned to collect data for one full week, and our sample 
consisted of 106 undergraduate students who participated for course credit. One was 
removed because this participant indicated a willingness to donate 100 euro to charity, 
more than 32 standard deviations from the mean donation response. The remaining 
105 participants (25 males, 78 females, 2 unknown, Mage = 19.58) included native Dutch 
students (83.3%), non-native Dutch students (9.5%), and foreign students (4.8%). 
Participants were randomly assigned to either the positive trait (n = 35), negative trait 
(n = 34), or neutral control condition (n = 36).  
Materials and procedure  
Participants completed the study as the first of a series of experiments behind separate 
desks in the lab. The experimenter in the lab was blind to condition. Prior to the 
experiment, participants provided their informed consent. The experimenter guided 
participants to their desks and instructed them to complete the paper-and-pencil 
questionnaire. 
We obtained the original paper-and-pencil questionnaire from Sachdeva et al. (2009) 
and translated these materials into Dutch (for all materials see online supplements, 
Figure 4.1). The cover story indicated that the study was about handwriting styles. 
Depending on the assigned condition, participants were exposed to either nine 
positive trait words, nine negative trait words, or nine neutral words and were asked 
to copy each word four times and think about each word for 5-10 seconds. Next, 
participants were asked to write a short story about themselves including the words 
they just copied. 
After this manipulation, participants responded to some filler items. Subsequently, the 
main dependent variable was presented. Participants read that the lab, in an effort to 
increase social responsibility, asked all participants whether they would like to 
contribute to a worthy cause. If they would like to do so, they could pledge to make a 
small donation to any good cause of their choice. They were told that they would be 
reminded of their choice at a later time via a confirmation e-mail from the 
experimenter. Participants could select to which cause(s) they would like to donate 
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(cancer research, animal rights, ending world hunger, environmental preservation, 
human rights, veteran’s affairs, or other) and how much they would be willing to 
donate (from €0 up to €10 or another specified amount). Finally, participants 
completed seven self-presentation items from the Self-Monitoring scale (Lennox & 
Wolfe, 1984) and a set of demographic measures.  
Known differences from original study 
The only known difference between our replication and the original Study 1 and 2 of 
Sachdeva et al. (2009) was that we ran this study in a lab at a Dutch university, while 
the original study was conducted in a lab at a U.S. university. When participants were 
asked to write about the positive trait, neutral, or negative trait words, we used the 
exact instruction of the original Study 2, which explicitly stated that participants 
should use the nine given words to write a story about themselves. This was not done in 
Sachdeva et al.’s Study 1, although it was intended that participants would do so. As 
such, for this replication, we combined the best of Sachdeva et al’s Study 1 (including 
a neutral control condition) and Study 2 (the manipulation with the clearest 
instruction).  
Results  
Following our confirmatory analysis plan, we conducted Sachdeva et al.’s (2009) 
analysis to test the effect of writing about one’s own positive traits, negative traits, or 
neutral words on donation amount. Table 4.1 contains the mean responses per 
condition and statistical test. There were no significant differences between the moral 
identity conditions on donation amount14 . The results of an additional regression 
model including gender, age, and ethnicity indicated that none of these factors 
significantly predicted donation amount (all ps ≥ .321). A reviewer suggested that self-
monitoring might moderate the observed effects. It did not, p = .086. Analysis details 
for all studies are available in the online supplements (Figure 4.1).  
                                                          
14 A nonparametric independent-samples Kruskal-Wallis test (which controls for the 
skewness of the data), also found a non-significant effect, H(2) = 0.36, p = .837. 
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Exploratory analysis.  
When reading the recalled stories, we noticed that 55.7% of the participants violated 
the instructions by not writing about themselves or by using the words in a negating 
way (for instance, ‘Alyssa is a generally friendly person with a caring and 
compassionate disposition’ or ‘I am neither a very caring nor compassionate 
individual’). When we only used a post hoc selection of those that wrote about their 
own positive traits (n = 28) and compared it to the neutral control condition, there was 
still no effect (p = .756).  
Study 4.2. Replication of Sachdeva et al.’s (2009) Study 3 
Participants 
Using G*Power (Faul et al., 2009) we calculated that we should include at least 96 
participants in our study to achieve 95% power for the effect size that Sachdeva et al. 
(2009) obtained in their Study 3 (the original used N = 46). We planned to collect data 
for one full week, and our sample consisted of 150 undergraduate students who 
participated for course credit (27 males, 122 females, 1 unknown, Mage = 20.34) and 
included native Dutch students (87.3%), non-native Dutch students (7.3%), and foreign 
students (4.7%). All participants were randomly assigned to either the positive trait 
condition (n = 49), the negative trait condition (n = 52), or the neutral control condition 
(n = 49). 
Materials and procedure 
Participants first provided informed consent, and then completed the study as the first 
of a series of experiments. The lab experimenter was blind to condition. The 
experimenter led participants to a separate cubicle and instructed them to complete 
the paper-and-pencil questionnaire. 
The materials were the same as those in Study 4.1 except that the dependent variable 
was a hypothetical commons dilemma. In this commons dilemma, participants 
imagined a scenario in which they are the manager of a mid-sized industrial 
manufacturing plant. They read that all manufacturers reached an agreement to install 
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filters to eliminate toxic gasses and to run these filters 60% of the time. Running a filter 
was costly for the manufacturing plant, but would be beneficial to society. To measure 
cooperative behavior, participants were asked to indicate what percentage of time they 
would operate the filters, indicated on an 11-point scale from 0 (labeled 0%) to 10 
(labeled 100%). 
After the main dependent variable, participants explained their decision and 
completed three secondary measures; they estimated (1) the percentage of other 
managers who would not cooperate, on the same 11-point scale; (2) the amount of 
environmental damage expected when the filters would be run less than the agreed 
60% on an 11-point scale from 0 (none) to 10 (a great amount); and (3) the likelihood 
of getting caught when operating the filters less than 60% of the time on an 11-point 
scale from 0 (impossible) to 10 (certain). Finally, participants completed the seven self-
presentation items from the Self-Monitoring scale (Lennox & Wolfe, 1984) and a set of 
demographic measures.  
Known differences from original study  
The only known difference compared to the original study is that we ran this study in 
a lab at a Dutch university instead of a U.S. university. 
Results  
Following our confirmatory analysis plan, we conducted Sachdeva et al.’s (2009) 
analysis to test the effect writing about one’s own (im)moral traits on cooperation (the 
amount of time participants were willing to run the filters). There were no significant 
differences between the conditions on cooperative behavior (Table 4.1)15. Furthermore, 
there were no effects on the secondary variables (Table 4.2). The results of an additional 
regression model including gender, age, and ethnicity indicated that none of these 
demographic variables predicted cooperative behavior (all ps ≥ .257). Self-monitoring 
did not moderate the observed effects (p = .787). 
                                                          
15 A nonparametric independent-samples Kruskal-Wallis test (which controls for the 
not normally distributed data), also showed no effect, H(2) = 2.87, p = .238. 
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Exploratory analysis.  
We noticed that 48.5% of the participants violated the recall instructions and did not 
write about their own traits or used the words in a negating way. When we only used 
a post hoc selection of those who actually wrote about their own positive traits (n = 
42), there was still no difference on cooperative behavior between the positive trait 
stories about oneself and the neutral control condition (p = .197).  
Study 4.3. Replication of Sachdeva et al.’s (2009) Study 1 and Study 3 
with a general U.S. population sample on MTurk  
Participants 
Whereas in Study 4.1 and Study 4.2, we based our sample size on a power analysis 
using the original studies, for Study 4.3 we did so based on the effect size of self-
licensing that we obtained in the preliminary data of our meta-analysis (Chapter 2). 
We calculated with G*Power (Faul et al., 2009) that we would need at least 918 
participants in our study to achieve 95% power to find a self-licensing effect. The 
sample was recruited on MTurk. We included an instructional manipulation check to 
prevent inattentive participants from starting the study (see Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & 
Davidenko, 2009). Participants were asked to provide an answer to three neutral 
questions about stories and were explicitly instructed to answer 'five' on the first 
question, and 'seven' on the second and third question. Participants who did not follow 
these instructions (n = 160) could not participate in our study. Our final sample 
consisted of 940 16  participants (449 males and 491 females, Mage = 33.41) who 
participated in exchange for $1.80. All participants were randomly assigned to the 
positive trait condition (n = 306), the negative trait condition (n = 308), or the neutral 
control condition (n = 326). 
                                                          
16 We set the target higher than 918 to ensure a minimum of 918 valid participants 
after data exclusion.  
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Materials and procedure  
Participants completed the study materials via the Qualtrics survey program. 
Participants could subscribe to participate in our study entitled ’writing style and 
several questions’ if they had an MTurk approval rate that was higher than 95% and if 
they lived in the U.S. 
After finishing writing the stories with the positive traits, negative traits, or neutral 
words, participants answered the filler questions and both dependent measures from 
Sachdeva et al.’s (2009) Study 4.1 (donation amount) and Study 4.3 (cooperative 
behavior) in a counterbalanced order. Subsequently, participants completed the self-
presentation items from the Self-Monitoring scale and a set of demographic measures.  
Known differences from original study 
The study was conducted online. We made two slight changes to these materials to 
increase the credibility of the online study. First, for the cover story, we instructed 
participants that the study was about general writing styles instead of handwriting, as 
the latter would not be believable in an online study. Second, we changed the donation 
measure. We told participants that 10 of them would be randomly selected to win an 
additional $10 MTurk worker bonus. They were then asked that if they were one of 
the winners, would they be willing to donate a portion of this bonus to a cause of their 
choice from a list (cancer research, animal rights, ending world hunger, environmental 
preservation, human rights, veteran’s affairs, or other). Participants selected a cause 
and indicated the amount they would donate ranging from $0 to $10.  
Results 
Donations. 
Following our confirmatory analysis plan, we conducted Sachdeva et al.’s (2009) 
analyses to test the effect of writing about (im)moral traits on how much participants 
would want to donate to a good cause. We controlled for order effects by including 
the order in which the two dependent variables were presented as a separate 
independent variable in the model. Order did not affect the donation amount, F(1, 934) 
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= 0.78, p = .378, ηp² = .001, nor was there an interaction effect of order with the 
manipulation of what words participants wrote about, F(2, 934) = 0.42, p = .656, ηp² 
= .001. 
As Table 4.1 shows, there was a main effect of moral identity condition on donation 
amount 17 . Post-hoc Tukey tests indicated that participants in the negative trait 
condition donated more money than participants in the positive trait condition (p 
= .044) and participants in the neutral control condition (p = .020). There was no 
difference in donation amount between participants in the positive trait condition and 
participants in the neutral control condition (p = .729). Thus, we did not find a moral 
licensing effect, but we did observe a moral cleansing effect - the recall of negative 
traits increased subsequent moral behavior. Self-monitoring did not moderate the 
observed effects. 
Of the demographic variables gender, age, education level, family income, and 
ethnicity, only age significantly influenced donation amount (β = .11, t(930) = 3.36, p < 
.001). When we included age as a covariate to the effect of the manipulation on 
donation amount, the effect of the manipulation remained significant, F(2, 932) = 3.15, 
p = .043, ηp² = .007.  
Cooperative behavior.  
Next, we conducted Sachdeva et al.’s (2009) analyses to test the effect of moral identity 
condition on cooperation in a hypothetical commons dilemma. The order in which the 
dependent variables were presented did affect cooperative behavior (F(1, 934) = 11.20, 
p = .001, ηp² = .012), with participants who first completed the donation dependent 
variable displaying slightly more cooperative behavior (M = 6.47, SD = 1.77) than 
participants who first completed this cooperative behavior dependent variable (M = 
6.11, SD =1.52). The interaction between moral identity and order was not significant, 
F(2, 934) = 0.83, p = .438, ηp² = .002. We do not know why this order effect exists, but 
for the current study it is mainly important that we control for this possible influence 
                                                          
17 A nonparametric independent-samples Kruskal-Wallis test (which controls for the 
skewness of the data), found a similar effect, H(2) = 5.85, p = .054. 
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by adding it as a factor in the analyses. As Table 4.1 shows, there was no main effect 
of moral identity on cooperative behavior18, nor on the secondary variables (see Table 
4.2). Again, self-monitoring did not moderate the observed effects. 
Of the demographic variables, only one of the ethnicity dummy variables significantly 
influenced cooperation (with African Americans cooperating less than others, β = -.19, 
t(930) = -3.11, p = .002). When including ethnicity as a covariate, there was still no effect 
of moral identity condition on cooperative behavior, F(2, 933) = 0.81, p = .447, ηp² = .002.  
Exploratory analyses.  
We noticed that 43.6% of the participants violated the recall instructions and did not 
write about their own traits or used the words in a negating way. Using solely the 
coded stories about oneself in our analyses, there was a main effect of moral identity 
condition on donation amount (p = .020) with participants in the negative trait 
condition donating more money than participants in the positive trait condition (p 
= .017) and in the neutral control condition (p = .009). There was no main effect of moral 
identity condition on cooperative behavior (p = .495).  
  
                                                          
18 A nonparametric independent-samples Kruskal-Wallis test (which controls for the 




Table 4.1  







trait F p ηp² 
Dependent Variable M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)  
Study 4.1, N = 105 35 36 34    
Donation amount19 2.89 (3.64) 2.78 (3.83) 2.35 (3.28) 0.21 .810 .004 
Study 4.2, N = 150 49 49 52    
Cooperative behavior 6.29 (1.14) 5.88 (1.49) 5.84 (1.37) 1.70 .187 .023 
Study 4.3, N = 940 306 326 308    
Donation amount 4.52 (2.91) 4.60 (3.11) 5.10 (3.18) 3.20 .041 .007 
Cooperative behavior 6.27 (1.58) 6.39 (1.78) 6.21 (1.60) 0.78 .457 .002 
Note. For donation amount the answers could range from 0 to 10 euro (or participants 
could indicate another amount). For cooperative behavior, the answers indicate how 
long participants would choose to do the costly cooperative act in the scenario (run 
filters), also on a range from 0 (the least helpful) to 10 (the most helpful). The statistical 
test of Study 4.3 is the main effect, controlling for order effects. Effect sizes and 
Confidence Intervals for the moral licensing and moral cleansing effects can be found 
in the Forest plots (Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3). 
                                                          
19 For the main dependent variable, participants were asked to indicate how much 
money they wanted to donate to a good cause. If they did not answer this question, 
we interpreted their response as 0 euro. When these participants were excluded from 
the analysis, the results did not differ, F(2, 81) = 0.29, p = .747, ηp² = .007. 
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Table 4.2  







trait F p ηp² 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)  
Study 4.2, N = 150 49 49 52    
Expected cooperative 
behavior of others 
4.64 (2.56) 4.57 (2.55) 4.28 (2.74) 0.26 .770 .004 
Estimated likelihood of 
getting caught 
5.92 (1.80) 5.61 (1.85) 5.62 (1.75) 0.47 .624 .006 
Negative consequences 
for the environment 
7.22 (1.62) 6.90 (1.95) 6.62 (1.88) 1.41 .248 .019 
Study 4.3, N = 940 306 326 308    
Expected cooperative 
behavior of others 
4.72 (2.91) 4.89 (3.08) 4.51 (2.86) 1.30 .273 .003 
Estimated likelihood of 
getting caught 
6.91 (2.07) 7.09 (2.14) 7.05 (2.02) 0.63 .535 .001 
Negative consequences 
for the environment 
5.84 (2.04) 5.98 (2.11) 5.93 (1.99) .33 .721 .001 
Note. For expected cooperative behavior of others, answers could range from 0 (the 
least cooperative) to 10 (the most cooperative). For estimated likelihood of getting caught, 
answers could range from 1 (impossible) to 10 (certain). For negative consequences for 
the environment, answers could range from 1 (none) to 10 (a great amount).  
General discussion 
We made three attempts to replicate the findings of Sachdeva et al. (2009) on moral 
licensing, with samples based on pre-calculated power and pre-planned analyses. In 
the first two replication attempts using student samples, the data did not confirm the 
original results. In our third replication attempt using a general population sample the 
data did not confirm the moral licensing effect. We did, however, find support for the 
moral cleansing effect on one of the two dependent variables in Study 4.3, but not in 
Study 4.1 and 4.2.  
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Current status of the moral licensing effect 
We conducted a meta-analysis of this moral licensing effect by including both the 
original Study 1 and 3 by Sachdeva et al. and the three current replication attempts, 
using the metafor package of Viechtbauer (2010). For our Study 4.3, we used the 
average effect size of the two dependent variables. The random effects meta-analysis 
including all five studies produced a mean effect size of moral licensing of d = 0.07 
([CL95] -0.20 to 0.35). There was thus no significant moral licensing effect across studies 
(z = 0.52, p = .603). Figure 4.2 contains an overview of all moral licensing effect sizes 
(when compared to the neutral control conditions).  
Current status of the moral cleansing effect 
We conducted a meta-analysis of the moral cleansing effect by including both the 
original Study 1 and 3 by Sachdeva et al. and the three current replication attempts. 
The random effects meta-analysis including all five studies produced a mean effect 
size of moral cleansing of d = 0.04 ([CL95] -0.11 to 0.20). There was thus no significant 
moral cleansing effect across studies (z = 0.53, p = .593). Figure 4.3 contains an overview 
of all moral cleansing effect sizes (when compared to the neutral control conditions).  
Possible limitations of our replication attempts 
Although we did our best to design direct replications of the original studies, 
differences are inevitable, and some of those may be consequential for moderating the 
results. First, our Study 4.1 and 4.2 used Dutch students not U.S. students. There is no 
theoretical reason to expect different licensing effects for Dutch compared to U.S. 
citizens, but our pilot test (see online supplements) suggested that words in the 
positive moral trait condition were seen to be slightly more positive in the U.S. than in 
the Netherlands. Even so, the words were evaluated very positively in both national 
samples. Study 4.3 used a U.S. based sample, but this study differed on two aspects 
compared to the original study. It was conducted online instead of in the lab, and the 
manipulation involved donating a part of potential winnings instead of money out-of-
pocket. We cannot rule out that these procedural differences were consequential, but 
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there presently exists no theoretical reason or identification of these as boundary 
conditions on moral licensing.  
Conclusion 
Although Sachdeva et al. (2009) theorized that moral licensing and moral cleansing 
should be considered jointly as being part of a moral self-regulation process, our three 
high-powered studies did not replicate the key moral licensing effect. Further, the 
meta-analytic result suggests that the present state of evidence with this paradigm is 
not different from a null effect. Sachdeva et al. (2009, p. 524) suggested that their 
findings showed that “moral-licensing and moral-cleansing effects can act 
convergently as part of a moral self-regulation process”. Based on the present findings, 
we do not argue that the theory is incorrect, only that it lacks sufficient empirical 
support when using the Sachdeva et al. (2009) paradigm. 
We suggest three concrete steps to clarify the effects of moral licensing on social 
judgment. First, the method used by Sachdeva et al. (2009) seems unlikely to elicit 
moral licensing, especially since many participants violated the recall instructions and 
did not write about their own traits or used the words in a negating way. This is a 
procedure specific issue; it does not invalidate moral licensing more generally. Second, 
the meta-analysis in Chapter 2 suggests that the effect is relatively small. Therefore, 
small sample studies are highly inadvisable as they would need to leverage chance to 
detect a result using null hypothesis significance testing. Third, because moral 
licensing and moral cleansing are theoretically distinct, it is important to use a neutral 





Figure 4.1. Access to the data and materials of Chapter 4. 
 
  
The study reported in this article 
earned Open Data, Open Materials, 
and Preregistered badges: 
https://openscienceframework.org/project/3cmz4/ 
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Figure 4.2. Forest plot including all comparisons between the moral licensing and neutral control conditions of the original studies by 




Figure 4.3. Forest plot including all comparisons between the moral cleansing and neutral control conditions of the original studies by 








Part II: Novel Perspectives on Self-Licensing20 
                                                          
20 Note that the first part of this dissertation predominantly focused on licensing in 
the moral domain (i.e., moral licensing), whereas the second part mostly focuses on 
licensing related to goal-directed self-regulatory behaviors. As outlined in Chapter 1, 
self-licensing can lead to a broad spectrum of undesirable behaviors, both at the 
individual and societal level. For both the social and the individual domain, the 
underlying processes of the licensing effect seem very similar. Importantly, research 
on moral self-regulation (Zhong, Liljenquist, & Cain, 2009) shows that similar to 
other self-regulatory behaviors, moral behavior is characterized by internal 
regulations where the desired ‘moral self’ motivates goal achievement, and not living 







Good Deeds and Temptations:  
Two Ways in Which Self-Licensing can be Triggered 
Self-licensing theory posits that people who previously behaved in a good way more 
easily feel justified to subsequently engage in undesirable behavior. In the current 
chapter we investigated whether there are two different ways in which self-licensing 
can be triggered. We proposed that self-licensing can not only occur when a prior good 
deed makes one more likely to engage in subsequent questionable behavior (‘good 
deed licensing’), but it can also be a justification strategy that one can deliberately use 
when tempted to engage in undesirable behaviors (‘temptation-based licensing’). 
When self-categorizing (Study 5.1) or manipulating (Study 5.2) these two ways of 
licensing, the large majority of the participants indicated to regularly experience both 
good deed and temptation-based self-licensing. Importantly, we found that both ways 
of licensing have different antecedents and affective responses, highlighting the 
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Self-licensing theory posits that people who behave in a good way, later feel justified 
to perform bad behaviors (Miller & Effron, 2010; for recent overviews, see Chapter 2; 
Effron & Conway, 2015). For example, someone who has just worked out at the gym 
might later feel justified to eat a large piece of chocolate cake. In a similar vein, a CEO 
of a large company who decided to invest a lot of money in an environmental 
sustainability program might later find it more acceptable to file fraudulent tax 
returns. Self-licensing is related to a variety of individual and social behaviors in 
various domains such as racism (Choi, Crandall, & La, 2014; Effron, Cameron, & 
Monin, 2009; Effron, Monin, & Miller, 2012; Mann, & Kawakami, 2012), job hiring 
(Cascio & Plant, 2015; Monin & Miller, 2001), sustainability (Mazar & Zhong, 2010), 
consumerism (Khan & Dhar, 2006), ethics (Conway & Peetz, 2012; Jordan, Mullen, & 
Murnighan, 2011), and self-regulation (Chiou, Yang, & Wan, 2011; De Witt-Huberts, 
Evers, & De Ridder, 2012; Mukhopadhyay, Sengupta, & Ramanathan, 2008; 
Mukhopadhyay & Venkataramani, 2009). Self-licensing seems closely related to 
theories on entitlement, which posit that people can feel ‘entitled’ to take more than 
others because of their previous positions and behaviors (Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, 
Exline, & Bushman, 2004). As self-licensing has adverse consequences for such a wide 
range of behaviors, research on this topic can help explain why people feel entitled to 
and actually engage in bad behavior. 
A close look at the definitions of self-licensing lends support to the idea that self-
licensing is typically perceived as a process in which the initial good act later 
influences one’s behavior: “Self-licensing occurs when past moral behavior makes 
people more likely to do potentially immoral things without worrying about feeling 
or appearing immoral” (Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010, p. 344); “Virtuous acts can 
license subsequent asocial and unethical behaviors” (Mazar & Zhong, p. 495.); “A prior 
intent to be virtuous boosts people’s self-concepts, thus reducing negative self- 
attributions” (Khan & Dhar, 2006, p. 259). Miller and Effron (2010) argued that prior 
good behavior can create either a credit, which can later be used to trade in to 
transgress, or can serve as a credential, where the good deed creates a virtuous 
reputation after which a transgression is seen as less bad. Thus, definitions of self-
licensing clearly suggest that a prior good deed can lead to undesirable behavior. 
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The way self-licensing is typically perceived reflects how self-licensing is usually 
investigated in the lab: Initial good behavior is manipulated (and contrasted with for 
example, a neutral condition) and the effect of this manipulation on less desirable 
behavior is measured. For instance, participants who established their non-racist 
attitudes by voting for president Obama (Effron et al., 2009) or through preferring a 
black person for a consulting firm job (Monin & Miller, 2001) were subsequently more 
likely to make prejudiced judgments. Furthermore, participants who purchased green 
products in a virtual shopping paradigm offered less money in a subsequent 
ultimatum game and stole more money compared to participants who purchased 
regular products (Mazar & Zhong, 2010).  
Thus, research on self-licensing focuses on a specific sequence of two consecutive 
behaviors or events, where initial good behavior leads to less desirable behavior. This 
sequence is also reflected in how self-licensing is typically investigated. In the current 
chapter we investigate whether the reverse pattern also occurs, in which the 
temptation to display undesirable behavior leads to a retrospective search for a license. 
We believe that there are two different ways in which self-licensing can be triggered. 
When people recalled self-licensing examples from their daily lives in informal 
discussions, we noticed that some people hightlighted the intital good behavior as the 
initiator of the licensing effect (e.g., “I did yardwork and therefore I can eat pizza”), 
while others emphasized the temptingness of displaying the undesirable behavior as 
the main cause of licensing (e.g., “I really wanted to eat pizza and I can because of all 
the yardwork I just did”). Although these two expressions might seem minor 
variations of the same thing, we think they represent very different ways in which 
licensing may come about. It seems that licensing effects not only arise after people 
engaged in good behaviors (as is typically assumed), but also when they are tempted 
to engage in certain behaviors and are therefore motivated to search for reasons that 
justify this. 
The latter reasoning fits with a justification-based account of self-regulation (De Witt-
Huberts, Evers, & De Ridder, 2014a), which implies that people who face a dilemma 
in which they would like to display undesirable or bad behaviors develop and employ 
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justifications that allow performing these behaviors. De Witt-huberts, Evers, and De 
Ridder (2014b) found a correlation between the self-rated temptingness of indulgent 
behavior and the number of justifications that people indicate or generate to justify 
giving in to this temptation. Specifically, the more tempting people thought a high 
caloric chocolate bar was, the more reasons they wrote down why it was acceptable to 
eat it. Moreover, in Chapter 6 we show that when people are exposed to a temptation, 
prior good deeds become seen as a reason to justify giving in to the temptation. These 
findings suggest that licensing can also take place in a reverse order, where the 
tempting bad behavior leads to a search for a license. This seems in line with theorizing 
on motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990), which posits that when people have a preferred 
conclusion, they are likely to construct justifications that are supportive of that 
particular conclusion. So, when people are tempted to perform a bad deed, people may 
construct justifications by mentally scrolling through their prior actions until they find 
good or moral behavior that helps them justify performing the bad deed.  
We believe that investigating the different ways in which licensing may come about 
can serve as an initial step to establish a robust paradigm that documents the licensing 
effect. Despite a substantial number of published licensing studies, it is not always 
easy to replicate the ‘traditional’ licensing effect, where good behavior leads to less 
desirable behavior (cf. Chapter 4). A meta-analysis including 91 experimental studies 
(Chapter 2) revealed that the average effect size of moral licensing (i.e., self-licensing 
in the moral domain) is small-to-medium (Cohen’s d = 0.31). The meta-analysis could 
not confirm any of the moderators that were theorized to be of importance. Moreover, 
a p-curve analysis (Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2014a,b) indicated that research on 
moral licensing lacks evidential value (Chapter 3). Together, these findings call into 
question the empirical support for the licensing effect. It therefore becomes a question 
again whether licensing exists, and if so, how it functions. 
The current chapter 
There is doubt concerning the strength of the support for (moral) licensing. This 
implies that researchers would do well to restart thinking the paradigm with which 
licensing is being studied. To do so, we think it is well to adopt a full cycle approach 
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(Cialdini, 1980) of self-licensing. Mortensen and Cialdini (2010, p.53) argue that when 
studying a novel phenomenon researchers should first 
use naturalistic observation to determine an effect’s presence in the real 
world, theory to determine what processes underlie the effect, 
experimentation to verify the effect and its underlying processes, and a 
return to the natural environment to corroborate the experimental 
findings. 
We think the initial step, testing whether and how people experience licensing in their 
daily lives, has not extensively been made yet in the self-licensing literature21. If we 
need to rethink the paradigms we use to study licensing, starting with examining how 
it exists in real life is the valuable first step to start with. 
Besides starting the full-cycle approach with natural observations, we propose that 
there are two different ways in which self-licensing can come about: A good deed can 
permit one to display undesirable behavior (good deed self-licensing), or the temptation 
to display undesirable behavior can initiate a search for a license (temptation-based self-
licensing). We will explore to what extent both ways of self-licensing occur in daily life. 
In addition, we will investigate the antecedents and consequences of both ways. 
Because we propose that initial good behaviors play an important role in the 
emergence of good deed self-licensing, and the temptingness of the undesirable 
behavior is an essential trigger of temptation-based self-licensing, we will explore the 
effects of the ‘goodness’ of the prior good behavior, the ‘badness’ and temptingness of 
the undesirable behavior. To draw a completer picture of both ways of licensing, we 
will also explore the affective consequences.  
                                                          
21 A notable exception to the lack of naturalistic observations of self-licensing is the 
work of Hofmann, Wineski, Brandt, and Skitka (2014), who made a first step in 
investigating moral licensing in daily life. In a general study on moral behavior in 
daily life, participants (N = 1252) indicated five times per day whether they 
commited, were the target of, witnessed, or learned about a moral or immoral act 
within the past hour. They studied several research questions on morality in 
everyday life, and the licensing effect was one of them. Hofmann et al. found a moral 
licensing pattern, in that people who committed a moral act had a larger likelihood 
of committing an immoral act later that day.  
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Study 5.1 explores the self-licensing effects people recall from their daily lives and 
investigates to what extent these effects reflect good deed self-licensing versus 
temptation-based self-licensing. In Study 5.2 participants are randomly assigned to 
recall either good deed licensing or temptation-based licensing and we explore the 
different antecedents and affective consequences. These studies will serve as a first 
step to verify different manifestations of the self-licensing effect in daily life. This will 
enable researchers in the field to more effectively comprehend what self-licensing is, 
how it works, and when it occurs.  
Study 5.1. Recalls of self-licensing 
In Study 5.1, we explore to what extent self-licensing effects occur in daily life and 
whether these effects are triggered by good deeds (good deed self-licensing) or the 
desire to justify displaying undesirable behaviors (temptation-based self-licensing). 
We explained undergraduate psychology students the concept of self-licensing. 
Subsequently, they indicated whether they themselves ever experienced it, and if so 
they were asked to recall their latest experience of self-licensing and answer several 
questions about this situation.  
Method 
Two hundred and seventy-five Tilburg University undergraduate psychology 
students (72 males and 203 females, Mage = 20.16) participated in a 60-minute research 
session with several unrelated experiments. At the start of our study, participants read 
the following:  
In the past few years, psychologists investigated the ‘self-licensing effect’, 
which implies that people allow themselves to engage in certain behaviors 
because they previously displayed good behaviors.  
Subsequently, participants were asked whether this ever occurred to them. 
Participants who indicated that this had ever occurred to them were asked to recall the 
most recent situation in which they allowed themselves to display certain behaviors 
after previous good behavior. To obtain more insight in the natural occurrence of self-
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licensing, participants were then asked to indicate when this situation took place (see 
Table 5.1 for answer options) and whether others were present during these behaviors 
(yes / no). They were also asked to specify how they felt after displaying these 
behaviors (feeling in general, -3 = not good at all, 3 = very good; happiness, satisfaction, 
regret, guilt, 0 = not at all, 6 = very much).  
To test our proposition that licensing can be triggered both by good deeds and the 
desire to justify displaying undesirable behaviors, participants were asked to indicate 
which of the following descriptions corresponded best to the licensing episode they 
had recalled: a) after displaying good behavior, I felt that I had permission to display 
certain behaviors; b) when I wanted to display certain behaviors, I justified these 
behaviors through my previous good behaviors; c) I do not know. Finally, participants 
indicated to what extent they regarded the licensed behavior that they engaged in as a 
reward for their prior good behavior (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). The domains in 
which the good behaviors and licensed behaviors took place were coded by the first 
author (these data can be found in Appendix 5.1). 
 Results and discussion 
Almost all participants indicated that they experienced self-licensing effects (95.3%, n 
= 262)22. The large majority of the participants experienced such an effect within the 
last month (Table 5.1). In addition, most participants (67.3%) indicated that the 
licensed behaviors took place in the same domain as the previous good behaviors. For 
example, the prior good deed was ‘working very hard’, after which the participant 
allowed himself a free evening in which he did nothing but relax. Participants 
displayed the licensed behaviors both in the presence of others (56.5%) and alone 
(43.5%).  
Most participants indicated that their recalled situation resembled good deed self-
licensing, where prior good behavior leads to subsequent bad behavior (53.8%). Also, 
a substantial number of participants (37.0%) indicated that their recalled situation 
                                                          
22 Participants who indicated that they did not experience self-licensing effects (n = 
13) did not fill out the other questions. 
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resembled temptation-based self-licensing, where displaying bad behavior was 
justified using the prior good behavior. This points to our initial idea that many of the 
cases of licensing might actually start with a temptation to do something with more or 
less undesirable consequences, for which the prior good deed is used as a justification. 
The rest of the participants (9.2%) indicated that they did not know which of the two 
descriptions best resembled their recalled behaviors. 
 
Table 5.1  
Timing of most recent recalled self-licensing experience in Study 5.1 
Timing Percentage of 
respondents 
n 
Within the past seven days 42.7% 112 
Within the past month 46.6% 122 
Within the last two months 5.3% 14 
Within the last year 5.3% 14 
 
Note that we do not wish to make the claim that these percentages of the two suggested 
pathways to licensing are hard and exact numbers. First, in the instructions we had to 
choose how to describe the licensing process. We chose to describe it as ‘doing 
something because you did a good deed before’. Both ways of licensing fit this 
described process, but it seems better suited to trigger examples of good deed licensing 
(as it interprets the good deed as the trigger of licensing) than temptation-based 
licensing (that interprets the temptation as the trigger). If we had chosen to describe 
licensing as “wanting to do something that was undesirable, but allowing yourself to 
do it anyway because of something good you have done before", we would have likely 
found relatively more examples of temptation-based licensing. Similarly, perhaps 
temptation-based licensing is a less socially desirable response, because admitting that 
one aimed to justify doing something undesirable might be seen as less positive than 
indicating that one felt licensed to display bad behavior after displaying good 
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behavior. The exact numbers should thus be interpreted with care, but the fact that a 
large proportion of participants indicated that their recalled self-licensing episode 
fitted better with temptation-based licensing seems an important novel finding.  
Interestingly, these two ways of licensing differently affected how people felt after 
displaying licensed behaviors (Table 5.2). Participants who indicated that their recalled 
situation resembled good deed licensing experienced more positive and less negative 
emotions after displaying the self-licensed behaviors, compared to participants who 
indicated that their behavior resembled temptation-based self-licensing. In addition, 
participants who indicated that their recalled situation resembled good deed licensing 
regarded their licensed behavior more as a reward for their good behavior compared 
to participants who indicated that their behavior resembled temptation-based 
licensing. 
To conclude, the results of Study 5.1 show that people can quite easily recall self-
licensing experiences from their daily lives. In fact, 95.3% of the participants could 
recall a licensing episode and 89.3% of these participants indicated that the latest 
experience of it had occurred in the last month. This frequency of occurrence testifies 
to the importance of self-licensing theory. This frequency-estimate is even likely to be 
an underestimation, as these are only the examples people were aware of while some 
licensing perhaps occurs without conscious awareness (e.g., Khan & Dhar, 2006). 
Interestingly, these results show that recalls of self-licensing experiences can be 
differentiated in two sizeable categories of responses: good deed licensing or 
temptation-based licensing. The different ways of self-licensing also seem to lead to 
different emotional effects. In Study 5.2, we manipulate these different ways of self-





Affective responses after engaging in self-licensing of participants separated by self-classified 
good deed and temptation-based ways of self-licensing in Study 5.1 
 Good deed 
licensing 
 




n = 97 
   
Emotional responses after 
licensed behavior 
M (SD) M (SD) F(1,236) p ηp² 
Overall valence 5.80 (1.12) 4.78 (1.42) 83.30 <.001 .14 
Happiness 4.47 (1.13) 3.62 (1.42) 26.45 <.001 .10 
Satisfaction 4.56 (1.12) 3.51 (1.49) 38.82 <.001 .14 
Guilt 1.30 (1.34) 2.58 (1.61) 44.13 <.001 .16 
Regret 1.17 (1.63) 2.49 (1.62) 45.06 <.001 .16 
Reward 4.71 (1.51) 5.73 (1.03) 38.31 <.001 .14 
Note. Participants indicated their feeling in general from -3 (not good at all) to 3 (very 
good), the extent to which they experienced different emotions from 0 (not at all) to 6 
(very much), and the extent to which they experienced the licensed behavior as a reward 
for their good behavior from 0 (not at all) to 7 (very much). 
 
Study 5.2. Recalling the different ways of licensing 
In Study 5.2, we manipulated the recall of the different ways of licensing by explaining 
participants about self-licensing either as initiated by the good deed (Good Deed 
Licensing condition) or as initiated by the desire to display undesirable behavior 
(Temptation-Based Licensing condition). Similar to Study 5.1, participants indicated 
whether they ever experienced such effects, recalled their latest experience of this 
effect, and answered several questions about this situation. Furthermore, we now used 
a sample recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), that yields a sample that is 
broader in age range and education level than the sample we had used for Study 5.1. 
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Method 
Five hundred and one U.S. based participants (308 males and 193 females, Mage = 31.79) 
completed our study on MTurk. Participants were randomly assigned to the Good 
Deed Licensing condition (n = 260) or to the Temptation-Based Licensing condition (n 
= 241). Participants in the Good Deed Licensing condition read the following: 
Research has shown that after doing something good, people often allow 
themselves to do something that they would normally refrain from (e.g., I did 
good deed A, therefore I feel I can now allow myself to do B). Do you recognize 
this in your own behavior?  
Conversely, participants in the Temptation-Based Licensing condition read: 
Research has shown that when people want to do something they would 
normally refrain from, they often justify these behaviors by thinking about 
something good they did before (e.g., I wanted to do A, and allowed myself to 
do so because I had done good deed B before). Do you recognize this in your 
own behavior?  
Participants were asked whether this ever occurred to them. Participants who 
indicated that this had ever occurred to them were asked to recall the most recent 
situation where they recognized the described behaviors. Next, they indicated when 
this situation took place, how much time there was between the good behavior and 
licensed behavior, and whether other people were present during this situation. 
Subsequently, participants evaluated both their good and their licensed behaviors 
(both behaviors were rated on three dimensions: -5 = very bad, 5 = very good; -5 = very 
negative, 5 = very positive; -5 = very unfavorable, 5 = very favorable, αgood behavior = .94, 
αlicensed behavior = .93). In addition, participants were asked to indicate how tempting and 
how attractive the licensed behavior was (1 = not at all, 7 = very much, r = .50, p < .001) 
and how they felt after displaying these behaviors (overall valence, -5 = not good at all, 
5 = very good; happiness, satisfaction, regret, guilt, 0 = not at all, 6 = very much). Finally, 
participants indicated to what extent they regarded the licensed behavior that they 
displayed as a reward for their prior good behavior (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). The 
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domains in which the good behaviors and licensed behaviors took place were coded 
by the first author (these data can be found in Appendix 5.1). 
Results and discussion 
The majority of the participants indicated that they experienced self-licensing effects; 
this was the case in both the Good Deed Licensing condition (76.9%) and the 
Temptation-Based Licensing condition (73.9%)23. The percentage of participants that 
recognized the specified self-licensing in themselves did not differ between conditions, 
χ2 (1, N = 501) = 0.63, p = .426. Note that the percentage of participants who indicated 
that they did not experience these effects in daily life is higher than in Study 5.1, where 
it was only 4.7% of the participants who did not experience such effects. Specifying the 
recall of self-licensing to one of the two ways of self-licensing thus likely reduced the 
chance that people recognized it in their own behavior. Another possibility would be 
that this sample is more representative than our student sample in Study 5.1. Still, a 
substantial amount of people experienced self-licensing and also did so within the last 
month, confirming that self-licensing occurs to most people and rather frequently as 
well. 
A nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test (as responses were given on an ordinal scale, 
see Table 5.3) showed that participants in the Good Deed Licensing condition 
indicated that the moments of recent self-licensing experiences took place (marginally) 
further in the past than participants in the Temptation-Based Licensing condition, U = 
15991, p = .087. In addition, participants in the Temptation-Based Licensing condition 
indicated more time had passed between their previous good behavior and their 
licensed behaviors, compared to participants in the Good Deed Licensing condition, U 
= 12937, p < .001 (see Table 5.3 for responses).  
Participants displayed the licensed behaviors both in the presence of others (57.7%) 
and alone (42.3%), with no difference between conditions, χ2(1, N = 378) = 0.020, p = 
.917. Table 5.4 contains the responses to the questions on how people evaluated both 
                                                          
23 Participants who indicated that they did not experience self-licensing effects did 
not fill out the other questions. 
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the prior good behavior and the licensed behavior (how bad or good the behavior was 
seen to be), with the tests on whether the responses differed between conditions. 
Participants in the Temptation-Based Licensing condition indicated that the licensed 
behavior they displayed appeared to be more negative than participants in the Good 
Deed Licensing Condition (this difference was marginally significant). In addition, 
participants in the Temptation-Based Licensing condition indicated that the licensed 
behavior was more tempting and more attractive to them than participants in the Good 
Deed Licensing condition. There was no difference in the evaluation of previous good 
behaviors between both conditions. This shows that for temptation-based licensing, 
the licensed behavior was both more tempting and attractive, but at the same time also 
appeared to be somewhat more negative. In other words, this was a stronger 
temptation with both more desirable and undesirable characteristics. Finally, in Study 
5.1 we found that participants who self-classified their licensing episode as good deed 
self-licensing more often saw their licensed behavior as a reward for their prior good 
deed, but this was not the case in this study. We have no clear explanation why this 





Recency of latest recalled self-licensing experience and time between the good and the licensed 
behaviors in Study 5.2 
 Good Deed Licensing 
 
n = 200 
Temptation-Based 
Licensing 
n = 178 
Moment of last episode   
Within the past seven days 117 (58.0%) 115 (64.6%) 
Within the past month 40 (20.0%) 27 (20.8%) 
Within the last two 
months 
16 (8.0%) 12 (6.7%) 
Within the last year 23 (11.5%) 14 (7.9%) 
Earlier  4 (2.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
Time between the good 
and the licensed 
behaviors 
  
+/- one hour 97 (48.5%) 45 (25.3%) 
+/- one day 54 (27.0%) 58 (32.6%) 
+/- one week 35 (17.5%) 47 (26.4%) 
+/- one month 5 (2.5%) 15 (8.4%) 
> one month 9 (4.5%) 13 (7.3%) 
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Table 5.4 
Evaluations of behavior for the Good Deed Licensing and the Temptation-Based Licensing 
conditions in Study 5.2 
 Good Deed 
Licensing 
 




n = 178 
   
 M (SD) M (SD) F p ηp² 
How good / positive / 
favorable would you rate the 
good behavior? 
3.59 (1.53) 3.34 (1.75) 2.12 .146 .01 
How good / positive / 
favorable would you rate the 
licensed behavior? 
-0.48 (2.49) -0.96 (2.42) 3.53 .061 .01 
To what extent do you regard 
the licensed behavior as a 
reward for your previous good 
behavior? 
5.35 (1.52) 5.34 (1.29) 0.00 .987 .00 
How tempting / attractive was 
the licensed behavior? 
5.46 (1.26) 5.74 (1.00) 5.61 .018 .02 
Note. Participants evaluated both their good and their allowed behaviors on three 
dimensions (-5 = very bad, 5 = very good; -5 = very negative, 5 = very positive; -5 = very 
unfavorable, 5 = very favorable). For both the good and the allowed behavior, the answers 
on these three items were averaged into one scale (α = .94 and .93, respectively). 
Participants rated the rewarding value of their good behavior on one item: ‘to what 
extent do you regard the behavior that you allowed yourself to display as a reward for 
your previous good behavior?’ (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). Participants rated the 
temptingness of their allowed behaviors on two items: ‘how tempting was this 
behavior for you?’ and ‘how attractive was this behavior for you’ (1 = not at all, 7 = very 
much) (r = .50). These items were averaged into one item.  
 
Table 5.5 displays how positive and negative people felt after displaying the licensed 
behavior, with the statistical tests comparing the differences between conditions. There 
was no difference between conditions in how good (or bad) people felt themselves in 
general. For specific positive emotions, there was no effect for happiness and only a 
marginally significant effect for satisfaction (in that participants in the Good Deed 
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Licensing condition felt more satisfied than those in the Temptation-Based Licensing 
condition). This is different from Study 5.1, where participants who self-classified their 
licensing episode as good deed licensing felt better, happier and more satisfied than 
participants who classified it as temptation-based licensing. For guilt and regret we 
find the same as we did in Study 5.1: Participants who recalled an episode of 
temptation-based licensing felt more regret and guilt than participants who recalled 
an episode of good deed licensing.  
Table 5.5 
Emotional responses for the Good Deed Licensing and the Temptation-Based Licensing 
conditions in Study 5.2 
 Good Deed 
Licensing, 
 




 n = 178 
   
Emotional 
responses  
M (SD) M (SD) F p ηp² 
Overall valence 0.85 (2.59) 0.61 (2.67) 0.74 .390 .00 
Happiness 3.65 (1.74) 3.42 (1.75) 1.70 .193 .01 
Satisfaction 4.12 (1.71) 3.81 (1.69) 3.15 .077 .01 
Guilt 2.33 (1.83) 2.78 (1.86) 5.53 .019 .01 
Regret 2.27 (1.85) 2.80 (1.91) 7.77 .006 .02 
Note. Participants evaluated their general feeling from -5 = very bad to 5 = very good. All 
specific emotions were rated from 0 = not at all to 6 = very much. 
 
To conclude, the results of Study 5.2 show that self-licensing can come about in two 
different ways. The majority of participants was able to recall self-licensing effects in 
both the Good Deed Licensing condition (76.9%) and the Temptation-Based Licensing 
condition (73.9%). Furthermore, the results show that temptation-based licensing is 
more likely to arise when the behavior one would normally refrain from is more 
tempting (and perhaps more negative, this latter result being marginally significant). 
Likely as a consequence of this, people experience more negative emotions (guilt, 
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regret) after temptation-based licensing compared to good deed licensing. In support 
of this reasoning, there was a clear correlation between the negativity of the behavior 
that one would normally refrain from and the negative emotions after displaying this 
behavior (r = .37, p < .01). Our results also reveal that people who experience 
temptation-based licensing seem to go further back in time to find a good reason as 
there is more time between the prior good behavior and the licensed behavior than for 
people who recalled an episode of good deed licensing. Participants who experienced 
good deed self-licensing did not regard the good behavior as more good, positive, or 
favorable than participants who experienced temptation-based self-licensing. Thus, 
whereas temptation-based licensing is characterized by more tempting and more 
undesirable behavior one would otherwise refrain from, good deed licensing is not 
characterized by more positive good behaviors. Combined with the results of Study 
5.1, these findings support our theorizing that licensing can be initiated through both 
good behavior and the temptation to engage in less desirable behavior, and that both 
ways of licensing lead to different affective responses. 
General Discussion 
The purpose of the present chapter was to investigate whether there are two different 
ways in which self-licensing can be triggered. We proposed that self-licensing can not 
only occur when a prior good deed makes one more likely to engage in subsequent 
questionable behavior (good deed licensing), but it can also be a justification strategy 
that one can deliberately use when tempted to engage in undesirable behaviors 
(temptation-based licensing). To test this proposition, we explored to what extent both 
ways of self-licensing occur in daily life. Our studies show that the large majority of 
people experiences self-licensing in their daily lives. People recalled the most recent 
episode they could think of; in more than 80% of the cases the licensing episode 
occurred within the last month. These results testify to the importance of self-licensing, 
as most people experience it regularly. Importantly, our findings show that people 
experience both good deed and temptation-based licensing. 
In support of this distinction between two possible ways of self-licensing, participants 
categorized their own recalled episodes of licensing in Study 5.1. The results confirmed 
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that most participants categorized their licensing experiences as good deed licensing, 
but also a considerable percentage of the participants indicated to have experienced 
temptation-based licensing. Furthermore, testifying to the qualitative different 
experiences of both ways of self-licensing, those who classified their experiences as 
temptation-based licensing experienced fewer positive emotions and more negative 
emotions after displaying the licensed behavior than participants who self-classified 
their experiences as good deed licensing. In Study 5.2, where we specifically asked 
participants to either recall a temptation-based licensing episode or a good deed 
licensing episode, the results showed that temptation-based licensing is more likely to 
be activated when the behavior one would normally refrain from is both more 
tempting and marginally more negative. Again, participants experienced more 
negative emotions after temptation-based licensing experiences compared to good 
deed licensing experiences. Together, these findings support our theorizing that both 
ways of self-licensing exist, and that both ways lead to different affective responses 
Participants who experienced temptation-based self-licensing indicated that there was 
more time between the initial good behavior and the licensed behavior compared to 
participants who experienced good deed self-licensing. Together with the findings that 
the licensed behaviors of the temptation-based way of licensing were classified as 
more tempting and marginally more negative, this suggests that people are ‘willing’ 
to go further back in time to find a reason to engage in more tempting and more 
desirable behavior. This seems consistent with motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990), 
which posits that when individuals want to draw a conclusion they search for 
justifications to support this particular conclusion. Thus, the temptation to display 
undesirable behavior creates to the desire to conclude that these behaviors are 
acceptable, which initiates a search for reasons (which could also be found further back 
in time). In Chapter 6 we found that prior good deeds can serve as such a reason to 
give in to temptation. 
As outlined in the introduction, definitions of self-licensing indicate that a prior good 
deed can cause undesirable behavior. We believe that temptation-based licensing is 
fundamentally different from this typical definition of good deed licensing. Whereas 
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good deed licensing implies that prior good behavior can create a credit to build a 
‘savings’ account that one can spend on undesirable behavior (Miller & Effron, 2010), 
temptation-based licensing suggests that individuals who are tempted to display 
undesirable behavior will retrospectively search for a license. Thus, participants who 
experience temptation-based licensing do not have pre-earned credits. 
We believe that both ways of self-licensing can be reflected in the research paradigms 
that are typically used to investigate the effect, where initial good behavior is 
manipulated and the effect of this manipulation on less desirable behavior is measured 
(e.g., Effron et al., 2009; Mazar & Zhong, 2010; Monin & Miller, 2001). The 
manipulations of good behaviors might have led to less desirable behaviors, as good 
deed licensing would predict. However, it could also be the case that participants felt 
tempted to engage in the “bad” behavior, and that this temptation made them search 
for a compelling reason, which was found in the salient prior good behavior. Either 
way, the phenomenon of self-licensing seems broader than the idea that a prior good 
deed leads to the undesirable behavior. Therefore, studies on self-licensing should also 
consider the possibility that the temptingness of the undesirable behavior can trigger 
the licensing process. 
The possibility that self-licensing is initiated by the temptation to engage in certain 
behaviors is especially reflected in research on moral credentialing that suggests that 
people strategically attempt to earn moral credentials when they anticipate performing 
morally questionnable behaviors. For instance, participants who anticipated that their 
future behavior could be regarded as prejudiced exaggerated how favorably they 
perceived a black person in a previous job hiring task (Merritt et al., 2012). In a similar 
vein, Effron (2014) proposed that participants who were concerned that their future 
behavior could be regarded as prejudiced or unethical overestimated to what extent 
their previous non-racist choices or ethical behaviors proved their morality to other 
persons. Furthermore, in their research on counterfactual licensing, Effron, Monin, and 
Miller (2012; 2013) argued that in order to justify future undesirable behaviors (i.e., 
acting prejudiced and eating unhealthy foods), people tend to exaggerate negative 
counterfactuals of their foregone behavior. For instance, individuals who were 
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tempted to eat cookies rated previously declined foods as unhealthier compared to 
control participants who were not tempted. Thus, in these examples there was no 
direct good deed leading to a bad deed. Rather, the temptation to display undesirable 
behaviors made prior deeds seem as better reasons to give in to temptation. Further 
research should determine whether the licensed behaviors in these studies are indeed 
perceived as tempting as we would predict they likely are. 
The findings of the current chapter have important implications for manipulations and 
measures used in self-licensing studies. Since the results of both studies are consistent 
with the idea that there are (at least) two different ways in which licensing can be 
triggered, researchers should carefully consider how they induce self-licensing. For 
instance, studies searching for moderators of the licensing effect predominantly 
focused on aspects of the prior good deed, but it can be very useful to focus on the 
temptingness of the undesirable behavior as well, given that licensing can also be 
elicited through the latter. Ultimately, emphasizing the role of the temptingness of the 
undesirable behavior in the emergence of the licensing effect can possibly explain why 
it is sometimes hard to replicate the ‘traditional’ good deed self-licensing effect (cf. 
Chapter 4): In some cases, the undesirable behavior that was measured in the 
paradigms may have not been that tempting for participants. 
Implications 
The distinction between the two ways of licensing gives important insights into the 
underlying processes of the self-licensing effect. Self-licensing theories and studies 
typically focus on aspects of the prior good deed, while for many instances of licensing 
people actually focus first and foremost on the desired bad deed. Thus, not only 
aspects of the prior good deed, but also tempting aspects of the undesirable behaviors 
are an important part of self-licensing theory. 
We started this chapter with a short overview of the wide range of behaviors for which 
self-licensing can have adverse consequences. Our finding that a substantial part of 
self-licensing is triggered by the temptingness of the undesirable behavior can assist 
professionals in different domains (e.g., healthcare, ethics, etc.) in preventing such 
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adverse effects. Based on our results, we argue that at times when people are tempted 
to engage in these undesirable behaviors, justifying giving in through using prior good 
behaviors should become more difficult. For instance, health practitioners can use 
descriptive norms (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990) to inform people that healthy 
behaviors, such as working out and eating vegetables are normal rather than good 
(e.g., “75% of the people works out regularly”). This should be done at critical 
moments when people are tempted to indulge. In this way, the good behavior ‘loses’ 
its licensing capacities, which makes it harder to justify the undesirable behavior. 
Another way of making justifying through previous good deeds more difficult is to 
implement a system where people have to justify their choices to others. For instance, 
people who intend to save money can engage in a “commitment system” where they 
have to explain all their expenditures to other people. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we studied daily occurrences of self-licensing. This research has 
identified that there are at least two ways in which licensing can come about: good deed 
self-licensing, where licensing is triggered by aspects of the prior good deed, and 
temptation-based self-licensing, where licensing is triggered by the desired bad deed. We 
found that both ways have different antecedents and affective responses, highlighting 
the importance for researchers in the field to distinguish between these two ways of 
licensing. We hope that our findings stimulate further research on self-licensing and 





Appendix 5.1. Categories of self-licensing 
Categories of recalled self-licensing behaviors in Study 5.1 
Category Good behavior fell 
in this category 
Licensed behavior 
fell in this category 
Studying / working 
(vs relaxing / being lazy) 
180 (64.5%) 122 (44.4%) 
Working out / eating healthy 
(vs not working out / eating 
unhealthy) 
54 (19.6%) 70 (25.5%) 
Saving money 
(vs spending money) 
6 (2.2%) 35 (12.7%) 
Refrain from drinking alcohol 
/smoking 
(vs drinking and smoking) 
4 (1.5%) 12 (4.4%) 
Helping a friend 4 (1.5%) 0 (0.0%) 
Other 14 (5.1%) 23 (8.4%) 
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Categories of recalled self-licensing behaviors in Study 5.2 
  All participants 
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CHAPTER 6  
Temptation-Based Reasoning 
 
Building on theories of motivated reasoning and reason-based choice, we propose and 
test a temptation-based reasoning model where people interpret reasons for 
indulgence in a different light depending on how tempting behavior is. We expected 
that reasons for indulgence are seen as more acceptable when behavior is more 
tempting. In two studies we indeed find that the more tempting behavior is, the more 
people evaluate given reasons as acceptable reasons to indulge (Study 6.1 and Study 
6.2). Furthermore, Study 6.3 and 6.4 revealed that both recalled prior good behaviors 
and recalled prior frustrations are interpreted as good reasons to indulge when 
confronted with tempting behavior. This process of temptation-based reasoning can 
shed new light on existing theories on how people deal with temptations, notably 










This chapter is based on: Blanken, I., Van de Ven, N., & Zeelenberg, M. (2015c). 
Temptation-based reasoning. Manusript under review.
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A temptation is, by definition, a strong urge to do or have something that also has 
negative consequences. Examples of temptations are: unhealthy, high caloric foods 
when one is dieting, attractive, interested people when one is in a committed 
monogamous relationship, checking social media during working hours, and 
spending money on luxurious items while trying to save money for retirement. 
Temptations thus represent a conflict between wanting something while preferring to 
resist it at the same time. Put differently, temptations represent a self-control problem. 
Much is learned over the last decades about how self-control may operate (Baumeister, 
Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Fishbach, 2009; Muraven & 
Baumeister, 2000), but we think that an important aspect of temptations and how 
people deal with them is understudied. In the present chapter, we investigate what 
happens when people are confronted with temptations, as we believe that the 
temptation itself may already influence the thoughts and feelings of people, and these 
in turn influence the likelihood of acting on the temptation. We propose that the 
presence of a temptation causes people to look for reasons that allow them to act on it, 
that make giving in acceptable. In other words, temptations elicit a search for 
justifications. We believe that this also implies that the more tempting behavior is, the 
more people will regard any reason for giving in to temptation as an acceptable reason 
(“It is like putting butter in front of a cat”). People are thus expected to interpret 
reasons in a different light when confronted with a temptation.  
This reasoning builds on various different lines of research. First, Kunda’s (1990) 
theory on motivated reasoning posits that when individuals have a preferred 
conclusion, they are likely to construct justifications that are supportive of that 
particular conclusion. If we translate the ideas on motivated reasoning to temptations, 
this would imply that a temptation itself creates the desire to conclude that indulgence 
is acceptable, which in turn influences the reasoning process. People thus search for 
acceptable reasons to justify the desired indulgence. In a similar vein, research on 
moral reasoning shows that people first arrive at certain moral judgments, and 
subsequently try to construct reasons that support their judgments (Haidt, 2001). 
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Our reasoning also builds on reason-based choice research, which shows that many 
real life decisions are not necessarily based on a rational calculation of costs and 
benefits of taking an action, but on finding reasons or justifications that support one 
course of action above the other (Bastardi & Shafir, 2000; Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 
1993). Thus, when people favor product A over product B, they will actively look for 
reasons that will justify this preference. For instance, physicians sometimes request 
additional tests that do not influence their treatment decisions, but provide them with 
extra reasons to justify the treatments they previously prescribed (Manktelow, 2012). 
In other words, actions for which reasons exist are more acceptable, and when one thus 
wants to act a certain way, finding reasons for doing so would help. 
Our work further builds directly on the seminal work by Langer, Blank, and 
Chanowitz, (1978). When these researchers asked people using a copying machine if 
they could go first, the requests were typically denied. However, when they provided 
a reason for their request (‘because I’m in a rush’ or ‘because I have to make copies’) 
people complied and let them use the machine first. It thus seems that sometimes 
people simply need a reason or justification in order to do something.  
Note that all these lines of research show that people like to find reasons for what they 
want to do. We extend these different lines of research to the field of temptations. We 
believe that when people are tempted to display certain behaviors, they search for 
justifications and any reason may serve as one. Importantly, we do not only believe 
that people who want to give in to temptation are more likely to find reasons (as 
theories on motivated reasoning and reason-based choice would predict), but, and this 
is where our contribution lies, we also expect that people regard a similar reason as 
more compelling when the temptation is stronger. Thus, we hypothesize that people 
would find a certain reason more acceptable when the temptation is stronger than 
when it is less strong. If externally provided or created reasons are actually regarded 
as better reasons to indulge, this could have important practical implications. For 
instance, providing in-store advertisements with a possible justification could be more 
effective for more tempting products.  
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The idea that the ‘temptingness’ of the behavior plays an important role in determining 
the acceptability of the reasons for indulgence finds initial support in recent research 
by De Witt-Huberts, Evers, and De Ridder (2014b). In their research, 58 female 
undergraduate students were asked to rate the temptingness of a chocolate bar. Next, 
these students saw a list of 30 reasons that could be provided for eating the chocolate, 
and they ticked the ones that applied to them. The more tempting they rated the 
chocolate, the more reasons the students ticked. In another study, 36 female 
undergraduate students were asked to generate and write down the reasons they 
would have to eat a similar chocolate bar. Again, the more tempting the chocolate bar 
was rated, the more justifications the students wrote down. Together, these results 
show a correlation between the self-rated temptingness of behavior and the number of 
justifications that people indicate or generate to justify giving in to this temptation. 
The causal direction of the effect is not clear yet, as the chocolate bar could also become 
more tempting when students are asked to provide more reasons for eating it (e.g., 
after working out, high calorie food might be more tempting as one needs to replenish 
one’s energy level). To test our proposed model that people interpret reasons for 
indulgence in a different light when confronted with a temptation, it is crucial to 
experimentally manipulate the temptingness of the temptation and subsequently 
measure how this influences participants’ reasoning processes. 
If our prediction is correct that tempting situations make reasons to give in to these 
temptations seem more acceptable, this process can shed new light on existing 
theories. For example, an important theory about when people give into temptations 
is self-licensing (Miller & Effron, 2010). The traditional view of self-licensing is that a 
prior good deed allows someone to engage in subsequent behavior that one normally 
would refrain from. Various different theories on how the licensing process precisely 
operates exist (see Chapter 2 and Effron and Conway (2015) for reviews), but they all 
tend to focus on aspects of the prior good behavior that creates the license. For 
example, Khan and Dhar (2006) found that participants who first imagined performing 
voluntary work were subsequently more likely to prefer luxurious over practical 
sunglasses compared to participants who did not imagine performing voluntary work. 
They argued that (imagined) prior good behavior activates a positive self-concept, 
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which subsequently licenses the choice of a self-indulgent option (also see Dunning, 
2007). Theorizing on self-licensing thus tends to focus on how the prior good deed 
affects subsequent behavior. However, if people regard reasons for indulgence as more 
compelling when behavior is more tempting, licensing research should in our view 
also focus on the possibility that it is mainly the temptation to engage in undesirable 
behavior that makes someone look for a compelling reason, and in typical licensing 
studies that might be the good behavior that has just been made salient by the set-up 
of the experiment. Thus, it could also be the case that participants in the Khan and 
Dhar study felt tempted to choose a luxurious over a practical pair of sunglasses, and 
that this temptation made them search for a compelling reason, which could be found 
in the saliency of the intention to perform a good deed. 
Another domain in which the temptation-based reasoning model that we put forward 
here could be of importance is in comfort buying. Comfort buying or retail therapy 
refers to buying products as a way to alleviate negative moods (e.g., Garg & Lerner, 
2013; Kacen, 1998; Rick, Pereira, & Burson, 2014). Atalay and Meloy (2011) found that 
negative moods lead to a greater consumption of unplanned self-treats. If our 
prediction is correct that any reason for indulgence is regarded as more compelling 
when behavior is more tempting, research on comfort buying could also focus on the 
possibility that perhaps the temptation to buy a self-treat makes someone look for a 
compelling reason, which could be found in the saliency of the current negative mood 
(e.g., ‘These shoes are fabulous, but way beyond my budget. But I feel sad about failing 
my exam and think I deserve a break now and then’). 
In a similar vein, research on comfort eating – that is, eating to relieve negative 
emotions (Ganley, 1989) – could investigate the possibility that it is mainly the 
temptation to eat a mouthwatering snack that makes someone look for a compelling 
reason. For example, the finding that overweight individuals are more likely to overeat 
when feeling emotionally distressed than healthy-weight individuals (Arnow, 
Kenardy, & Agras, 1992; Baucom & Aiken, 1981; Chua, Touyz, & Hill, 2004; Lowe & 
Fisher, 1983; McKenna, 1972; Plutchik, 1976; Ruderman, 1983; Slochower, Kaplan, & 
Mann, 1981) may also occur if the food is more tempting for overweight individuals, 
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and, as a consequence, feeling emotionally distressed might be regarded as a more 
compelling reason for indulgence by those who find that type of food more tempting 
than others.  
We would like to emphasize that we do not argue that our proposed process (a 
temptation triggers the search for a reason) is the only explanation for the above three 
examples (self-licensing, comfort buying, and comfort eating). We merely think that is 
a potential alternative explanation, in addition to the process put forward by the 
original authors (prior good deeds make questionable behavior more likely, distress 
causes comfort buying or comfort eating).  
The studies in the current chapter 
Taken together, the present chapter aims to shed light on when people permit 
themselves to give in to temptations. We believe that the presence of a temptation can 
initiate a motivated reasoning process, where reasons become more attractive for 
indulgence when the temptation is stronger. This adds to existing work because, 1) it 
shows that people do not only search harder to find reasons to reach a desired 
conclusion, but also think reasons are more acceptable so as to reach a desired 
conclusion, and because, 2) we manipulate the temptingness of possible indulgences, 
which allows us to establish the causal link as we propose it here. We first test this in 
two studies. Specifically, Study 6.1 tests whether a manipulation that influences the 
temptingness of checking social media on a personal smartphone during working 
hours affects how acceptable people find different reasons to check their phones. We 
predicted that when the smartphone was made more tempting, people would find any 
reason more acceptable to check the phone. Similarly, Study 6.2 tests whether the 
temptingness of a hamburger affects how acceptable people find different reasons to 
consume this burger. 
In addition, we think that the process of temptation-based reasoning can account for 
established effects, such as self-licensing, comfort buying, and comfort eating. In Study 
6.3 we test whether in a more tempting situation (the tempting burger again) people 
find a prior good deed a better reason to indulge, compared to in a less tempting 
Temptation-Based Reasoning 
171 
situation, testing whether self-licensing is influenced by the temptingness of the 
questionable behavior. In Study 6.4 we test whether people regard a prior frustration 
as a better reason to indulge in a more tempting situation, compared to in a less 
tempting situation, testing whether theories on indulgence to cope with negative 
emotions are influenced by the temptingness of the indulgence. 
 Study 6.1. The temptation to check social media during working hours 
In Study 6.1, we investigated whether people find different reasons for checking social 
media on their personal smartphones during work more acceptable when there is a 
high temptation to check their smartphones. We manipulated temptation through 
showing pictures of a tempting smartphone screen with alerts and messages versus a 
less tempting smartphone screen without any alerts (Figure 6.1). We expected that 
participants who saw the picture of a tempting smartphone screen found various 
reasons to check their personal phones during work more acceptable than participants 
who saw the picture of a less tempting smartphone screen. In addition, we expected 
that the more tempted participants were by the pictures of the phone screen, the more 





Figure 6.1. The smartphone screens shown in the Tempting Phone condition (left) and 
the Less Tempting Phone condition (right). 
 
Method 
We first conducted a pretest including 109 participants (65 males and 44 females, Mage 
= 32.11, SD = 10.54) to examine whether checking both phones during work time was 
regarded as equally undesirable. In this pretest, participants imagined working for a 
company that restricts the use of personal phones and saw the picture of the tempting 
smartphone (n = 55) versus the less tempting smartphone (n = 54). Subsequently, they 
were asked whether they thought that checking the phone during working hours 
would break their company policy (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). The results showed 
that checking the tempting smartphone was regarded as equally undesirable (M = 6.25, 
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SD = 1.27) as checking the less tempting smartphone was (M = 6.22, SD = 1.61, t(107) 
= 0.12, p = .907), indicating that for both phones, people realize that checking it during 
work hours is a negative action. 
Four hundred and ninety-two U.S. based participants completed our study on 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). We excluded participants who indicated that they 
did not own a smartphone (n = 34)24, leaving 458 participants (272 males and 186 
females, Mage = 31.05, SD = 9.14) in our sample. Participants were randomly assigned 
to the Tempting Phone condition (n = 221) or to the Less Tempting Phone condition (n 
= 237). Participants were exposed to one of the phone screen images (Figure 6.1) and 
read the following instructions: 
Your work company has a policy that restricts the use of personal phones; in 
principle you are not allowed to check or use your personal phone during 
working hours. This is a screenshot of your personal smartphone that you use 
for private purposes only. You do not receive any work-related messages on 
this phone.  
Next, participants were asked to indicate how tempted they would be to check their 
personal phone if their screen looked like the presented image (1 = not at all, 7 = very 
much). Subsequently, participants were asked to read four potential reasons for 
checking this personal phone during work, and they indicated for each whether they 
found this reason an “acceptable” reason (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). The four reasons 
were: “You feel very frustrated about something that happened today”, “The past few 
days, you have worked very hard; you are ahead of your working schedule”, “You 
performed a good deed today, such as helping someone in need”, and “It is a Tuesday 
afternoon”.  
Results 
Participants in the Tempting Phone condition (M = 5.35, SD = 1.79) rated the phone 
screenshot as more tempting than participants in the Less Tempting Phone condition 
                                                          
24 When we included participants who did not own a smartphone in the analyses, we 
found similar results. 
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(M = 4.08, SD = 2.05), t(456) = 7.03, p < .001, d = 0.66. Means, standard deviations and 
statistics of the acceptability of reasons are displayed in Table 6.1. A MANOVA 
including all reasons demonstrated that participants in the Tempting Phone condition 
regarded the reasons as marginally more acceptable than participants in the Less 
Tempting Phone condition, Wilks λ (4, 453) = .918, p = .073, ηp² = .019. When analyzing 
the univariate results for each reason, we found that participants in the Tempting 
Phone condition regarded the frustration reason and the Tuesday afternoon reason as 
more acceptable reasons for checking their personal phones during work compared to 
participants in the Less Tempting Phone condition. There were no differences between 
conditions for the other two reasons. If we aggregate the acceptability of all four 
reasons into a general “reason acceptability”-score (α = .85), we see a significant effect 
of condition as well. For all reasons (including the reason acceptability at the aggregate 
level), the rated temptingness of the phones strongly predicted reason acceptability 




Table 6.1  
Effects of phone condition (Tempting Phone versus Less Tempting Phone) on the acceptability 
of the specific reasons to check the phone during work in Study 6.1 
 Phone    
 Tempting 
 
n = 221 
Less 
Tempting 
n = 237 
   
Reason M (SD) M (SD) F(1, 
456) 
p ηp² 
You feel very frustrated about 
something that happened 
today. 
3.76 (1.78) 3.41 (1.65) 4.93 .027 .011 
The past few days, you have 
worked very hard; you are 
ahead of your working 
schedule. 
4.78 (1.74) 4.65 (1.84) 0.67 .413 .001 
You performed a good deed 
earlier today, such as helping 
someone in need. 
3.51 (1.74) 3.27 (1.68) 2.19 .140 .005 
It is a Tuesday afternoon. 2.99 (1.85) 2.59 (1.66) 6.07 .014 .013 
Combined (α = .85) 3.67 (1.47) 3.48 (1.45) 4.41 .036 .010 
Note. Acceptability of the reasons was rated from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).  
 
Discussion 
The findings of Study 6.1 show that the more tempted people are to check their 
personal phone, the more acceptable they find different reasons to check their phone. 
These findings are supportive of our hypothesis that people regard similar reasons as 
more compelling when the temptation is stronger. A possible reason why we did not 
find that all reasons were seen as more acceptable when the situation was more 
tempting, was that the temptingness manipulation only had a moderate effect size on 
how tempting it was to check the phone (d = 0.66). If we expect that the difference in 
perceived temptingness created by our manipulation would predict how acceptable 
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reasons are, the effect size of the temptingness manipulation on acceptability of 
reasons would, even with a perfect correlation of perceived temptingness with the 
acceptability of reasons, be constrained to that maximum effect size of d = 0.66. Given 
that the pattern of results we found in Study 6.1 is clear, but the effect not that strong 
(nor strongly significant), we wanted to replicate the initial findings. To strengthen our 
findings we attempted to create a stronger manipulation of perceived temptingness. 
Study 6.2. The temptation to consume a tasty hamburger 
The second study had two objectives. First, we aimed to investigate whether the 
findings from Study 6.1 applied more broadly and tested it within another domain of 
temptations (unhealthy snacking instead of questionable work behavior). The second 
objective was to use a stronger manipulation of temptingness. We investigated 
whether the confrontation with a hedonic food temptation leads people to find various 
reasons for indulgence more acceptable. We manipulated temptation through 
showing pictures of a tempting burger versus a less tempting burger (Figure 6.2). We 
expected that participants who saw the picture of the tempting burger found various 
reasons to consume this burger more acceptable than participants who saw the picture 
of the less tempting burger. In addition, we expected that the more tempted 
participants were by the pictures of the burger, the more acceptable they found 





Figure 6.2. The burgers shown in the Tempting Burger condition (left) and the Less 
Tempting Burger condition (right)25. 
 
Method 
We first conducted a pretest including 95 participants (56 males and 38 females (1 
missing), Mage = 32.06, SD = 10.50) to examine whether eating both burgers was 
regarded equally undesirable. In this pretest, participants saw the picture of the 
tempting burger (n = 49) versus the less tempting burger (n = 46). Subsequently, they 
were asked how unhealthy they found this hamburger compared to other foods (1 = 
not unhealthy at all, 7 = very unhealthy). The results showed that eating the tempting 
burger (M = 5.33, SD = 1.16) and the less tempting burger (M = 5.70, SD = 1.19) was 
regarded equally undesirable, t(93) = 1.53, p = .130, indicating that in both conditions, 
people realize that eating the unhealthy burger is a negative action. 
Five hundred and one U.S. based participants completed our study on MTurk. We 
excluded participants who indicated that they were vegetarians (n = 19)26, leaving 482 
participants (310 males and 172 females, Mage = 31.70, SD = 10.91) in our sample. 
                                                          
25 These images were derived from http://i.imgur.com/4hIyvq8.jpg?1 and 
http://i.imgur.com/eW8Z5rJ.jpg  
26 When we included participants who indicated that they were vegetarians, we 
found similar results. 
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Participants were randomly assigned to the Tempting Burger condition (n = 243) or to 
the Less Tempting Burger condition (n = 239) and were exposed to one of the different 
burgers presented in Figure 6.2. Participants were asked to take a close look at the 
burger and to indicate how tempting they found this burger (1 = not at all, 7 = very 
much). Participants then read that this burger was intended as an indulgence and that 
the producers of the burger wanted to know for what reasons individuals would allow 
themselves this particular burger (adopted from De Witt-Huberts et al., 2014b). Next, 
participants were asked to read four potential reasons for eating the burger, and they 
indicated for each whether they found this reason a “good reason” for them to eat it (1 
= not at all, 7 = very much). The four reasons were: “Imagine that you had an intense 
workout at the gym today”, “Imagine that it is a Friday afternoon”, “Imagine that you 
have worked two hours on top of your normal working hours”, and “Imagine that you 
feel very frustrated about a conflict with your coworker that happened earlier today”.  
Results 
Participants in the Tempting Burger condition (M = 5.34, SD = 1.61) rated the burger 
as more tempting than participants in the Less Tempting Burger condition (M = 3.14, 
SD =1.84), t(480) = 13.97, p < .001, d = 1.27. The manipulation was intended to be 
stronger than the one in Study 6.1, which was successful (the manipulation of Study 
6.1 had an effect size of d = 0.66 on the temptingness measure).  
Means, standard deviations and statistics on the acceptability of reasons per condition 
are displayed in Table 6.2. A MANOVA including all reasons demonstrated that 
participants in the Tempting Burger condition found the reasons more acceptable than 
participants in the Less Tempting Burger condition, Wilks λ (4, 477) = .890, p < .001, ηp² 
= .110. When analyzing the univariate results for each reason, we found that 
participants in the Tempting Burger condition regarded each reason as a better reason 
for consuming the burger compared to participants in the Less Tempting Burger 
condition. If we aggregate the acceptability of all four reasons into a general “reason 
acceptability”-score (α = .84), we see a significant effect of condition as well. For all 
reasons (including the reason acceptability at the aggregate level), the rated 
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temptingness of the burgers strongly predicted reason acceptability (all β’s ≥ .43, t’s 
(480) ≥ 10.41, p’s < .001). 
Table 6.2 
Effects of burger condition (Tempting Burger versus Less Tempting Burger) on the 
acceptability of the specific reasons to eat the burger in Study 6.2 
 Burger    
 Tempting 
 
n = 221 
Less 
Tempting 
n = 237 
   
Reason M (SD) M (SD) F (1, 480) p ηp² 
You had an intense workout at 
the gym today 
3.98 (1.97) 3.10 (1.89) 24.80 <.001 .049 
It is a Friday afternoon 4.42 (1.88) 3.23 (1.86) 49.24 <.001 .093 
You worked two hours on top 
of your normal working hours 
4.77 (1.78) 2.62 (1.94) 45.26 <.001 .086 
You feel very frustrated about a 
conflict with your coworker that 
happened earlier today 
3.61 (1.94) 2.67 (1.73) 31.47 <.001 .062 
Combined (α = .84) 4.20 (1.43) 3.16 (1.57) 57.19 <.001 .106 
Note. Acceptability of the reasons was rated from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).  
Discussion 
Study 6.2 replicated the findings of Study 6.1 in the domain of unhealthy snacking: 
Participants in the Tempting Burger condition found all reasons more acceptable for 
indulgence compared to participants in the Less Tempting Burger condition. In 
addition, the results reveal that the more tempting people find a burger, the more 
acceptable they find different reasons to eat this burger. 
Together, Study 6.1 and 6.2 show a clear relation between how tempting something is, 
and whether diverse reasons for displaying this behavior are acceptable: When a 
temptation is more tempting, people find the same reason to give in to that temptation 
more acceptable than when the temptation is less tempting. Note that in both cases 
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participants would realize that their behavior is undesirable: the pretest shows that 
people think both burgers are equally unhealthy. 
Interestingly, participants in the conditions with more tempting behavior sometimes 
even judged ostensibly unrelated reasons as more acceptable reasons than participants 
in the conditions with less tempting behavior. For example, ‘it is a Friday afternoon’ 
was regarded as a more acceptable reason to consume a burger when this burger 
looked very attractive. This illustrates that even reasons that convey no relevant 
information are more acceptable in front of a temptation. This is consistent with the 
findings of Langer et al. (1978) that the content of a reason can be irrelevant for acting 
upon that reason. 
So far, we only investigated the acceptability of reasons we provided to participants. 
In addition, participants read about the different reasons directly after being exposed 
to the temptation. In Study 6.3 and 6.4, we investigate whether self-generated reasons 
prior to exposure to a temptation are interpreted differently depending on the 
temptingness of the temptation. We think this process has important implications for 
theories on self-licensing (as we will explain in Study 6.3) and comfort buying and 
eating (as we will explain in Study 6.4). 
 Study 6.3. The interpretation of previous good behaviors vis-à-vis a 
temptation 
We next investigated whether people find their own previous good deeds more 
acceptable reasons to indulge when they are exposed to a tempting burger versus a 
less tempting burger. So far, we have found the pattern of results that suggest that any 
reason is seen as a better reason to indulge when confronted with more tempting 
behavior. We therefore also expect that a prior good deed would be seen as a better 
and more acceptable reason to indulge with a stronger temptation. This resembles the 
process of self-licensing, the empirical finding that people are more likely to engage in 
questionable behavior after having performed a good deed (Miller & Effron, 2010). The 
process of self-licensing is typically perceived as one in which the initial good act later 
influences people’s behavior: “virtuous acts can license subsequent asocial and 
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unethical behaviors” (Mazar & Zhong, 2010, p. 495). However, given our results of 
Study 6.1 and 6.2, we think it also likely that the process works in the reverse order as 
well: When confronted with a temptation, people look for an acceptable reason to give 
in to that temptation, and a prior good deed is more easily accepted as a good reason 
when the temptation is stronger. 
To summarize, we expected that participants who saw the picture of a tempting burger 
would find their previously recalled good deeds more acceptable reasons to eat this 
burger than participants who saw the picture of a less tempting burger. In addition, 
we expected that the more tempted participants were by the pictures of the burger, the 
more they would regard their previous good deed as an acceptable reason to eat the 
burger. 
Method 
Five hundred and one U.S. based participants completed our study on MTurk. We 
excluded participants who indicated that they were vegetarian (n = 25)27, leaving 476 
participants (311 males and 165 females, Mage = 30.96, SD = 10.29) in our sample. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the Tempting Burger condition (n = 234) or to 
the Less Tempting Burger condition (n = 242). Participants read the following 
instructions: 
Think about a recent situation in which you performed a good deed. By a good 
deed, we mean a situation where you displayed good, moral, or virtuous 
behavior. Please describe this good deed. 
Next, participants saw a picture of either the tempting or the less tempting burger from 
Study 6.2. Participants were asked to take a close look at the burger and to indicate 
how tempting they found this burger (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). Participants then 
read that this burger was intended as an indulgence and that the producers of the 
burger wanted to know for what reasons individuals would allow themselves this 
                                                          





particular burger (adopted from De Witt-Huberts et al., 2014b). Next, the good deed 
that the participants previously recalled was displayed on the screen. Participants 
were asked whether they found their own good deed a good reason to eat the burger 
(1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
Results  
Participants in the Tempting Burger condition rated the burger as more tempting (M 
= 5.54, SD = 1.62) than participants in the Less Tempting Burger condition (M = 2.97, 
SD =1.73), t(474) = 16.15, p < .001, d = 1.53. Participants in the Tempting Burger 
condition (M = 3.22, SD = 2.05) regarded their own prior good deed as a better reason 
for eating the burger compared to participants in the Less Tempting Burger condition 
(M = 2.28, SD = 1.69), t(474) = 5.47, p < .001, d = 0.50. Like we found before, the more 
the burger was perceived as tempting, the more someone thought their prior good 
deed was an acceptable reason to indulge (β = .46, t(474) = 11.35, p < .001). 
Discussion 
Together, these results suggest that even reasons that are generated prior to exposure 
to the temptation can serve as acceptable justifications to eat the burger, depending on 
how tempting people find this burger. A recalled prior good deed is thus seen as a 
better reason to indulge when a temptation is really tempting, than when it is less 
tempting.  
This finding may closely resemble what happens when people display self-licensing 
effects, where initial good or moral behavior leads to behavior that is immoral, 
unethical, or otherwise problematic (Miller & Effron, 2010). Research on self-licensing 
predominantly focused on the role of previous good behavior in leading to unwanted 
behavior. For example, Fishbach and Dhar (2005) found that participants who first 
perceived that they made progress on their weight loss objectives were later more 
likely to choose a chocolate bar over an apple as a participation gift. Our findings imply 
that licensing research could also focus on the possibility that it is the temptation to 
indulge that makes someone look for a compelling reason to do so. Thus, it could also 
be the case that participants in the Fishbach and Dhar study felt tempted to choose a 
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chocolate bar over an apple, and that this temptation made them search for a 
compelling reason. In other words, a prior good performance is perhaps easier to 
accept as a good reason than a recalled neutral situation (their control condition).  
As we explained in the introduction, we think that these results are not limited to 
recalls of prior good behavior. If ‘any’ reason serves as a license to give in to 
temptation, we can expect similar effects for recalls of prior negative behavior. For 
example, having a bad day can also serve as a good excuse to indulge when something 
is really tempting (i.e., comfort buying or comfort eating). Therefore, in Study 6.4, we 
investigate whether recalls of recent frustrations are interpreted differently depending 
on the temptingness of the temptation. 
Study 6.4. The interpretation of previous frustrations vis-à-vis a 
temptation 
In Study 6.4, we investigated whether people find their previous frustrations more 
acceptable reasons to indulge when they are exposed to a tempting burger versus less 
tempting burger. We expected that participants who saw the picture of a tempting 
burger would find their previously recalled frustrations more acceptable reasons to eat 
this burger than participants who saw the picture of a less tempting burger. In 
addition, we expected that the more tempted participants were by the pictures of the 
burger, the more they would regard their previous frustration as an acceptable reason 
to eat the burger. 
Method 
Four hundred and eighty seven U.S. based participants completed our study on 
MTurk. We excluded participants who indicated that they were vegetarian (n = 24)28, 
leaving 463 participants (279 males and 184 females, Mage = 31.54, SD = 9.91) in our 
sample. Participants were randomly assigned to the Tempting Burger condition (n = 
                                                          
28 When we included participants who indicated that they were vegetarians, we 
found similar results. 
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233) or to the Less Tempting Burger condition (n = 230). Participants read the following 
instructions: 
Think about a recent situation in which you felt very frustrated. Please 
describe this situation. 
Next, participants saw a picture of either the tempting or the less tempting burger from 
Study 6.2. Participants were asked to take a close look at the burger and to indicate 
how tempting they found this burger (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). Participants then 
read that this burger was intended as an indulgence and that the producers of the 
burger wanted to know for what reasons individuals would allow themselves this 
particular burger adopted from De Witt-Huberts et al., 2014b). Next, the frustration 
that the participants previously recalled was displayed on the screen. Participants 
were asked whether they found their own frustration a good reason to eat the burger 
(1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
Results and discussion 
Participants in the Tempting Burger condition (M = 5.26, SD = 1.72) rated the burger 
as more tempting than participants in the Less Tempting Burger condition (M = 3.10, 
SD = 1.83), t(461) = 13.11, p < .001, d = 1.22. Participants in the Tempting Burger 
condition (M = 3.11, SD = 2.31) regarded their own frustration as a better reasons for 
eating the burger compared to participants in the Less Tempting Burger condition (M 
= 2.31, SD = 1.83), t(461) = 4.36, p < .001, d = 0.41. The more the burger was perceived 
as tempting, the more someone thought their prior frustration was an acceptable 
reason to indulge (β = .44, t(461) = 10.61, p < .001). 
These results show that unrelated frustrations can also serve as justifications to eat the 
burger, depending on how tempting people find this burger. Combined with the 
results of Study 6.3, these findings support our theorizing that ‘any’ reason can serve 
as a license to indulge when confronted with a temptation. We will come back to the 
general consequences of this finding for theories on comfort buying and eating in the 




We proposed a temptation-based reasoning model where the presence of a temptation 
can cause people to look for reasons to act on it. Our studies show that people find a 
large variety of reasons for indulgence more acceptable when exposed to a tempting 
situation compared to a less tempting situation (Study 6.1 and Study 6.2). In addition, 
our findings show that both recalled prior good deeds (Study 6.3) and frustrations 
(Study 6.4) are interpreted as better reasons to indulge when confronted with a 
temptation. The finding that temptations are important for the interpretation of 
different reasons for indulgence has important implications for theories on how people 
deal with temptations (notably self-licensing theory and theories on comfort buying 
and eating). We will first discuss the importance of our account of tempted reasoning, 
after which we discuss the implications of our findings for other theories. 
Tempted reasoning 
The present findings build on theories of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990) and 
reason-based choice (Bastardi & Shafir, 2000; Shafir et al., 1993), which posit that when 
people want to reach a certain conclusion they will construct supportive reasons for 
doing so. Our findings show that people who want to give in to temptation are not 
only more likely to find reasons for indulgence (see De Witt-Huberts et al., 2014b), but, 
importantly, they also regard the same reason as more compelling when the temptation 
is stronger. Consistent with the findings of Langer et al. (1978) that people are more 
willing to comply with a request in the presence of a reason - regardless of its content 
-, we found that participants in the conditions with more tempting behaviors judged 
ostensibly unrelated reasons as more acceptable for indulgence compared to 
participants in the conditions with less tempting behaviors. For example, ‘it is a 
Tuesday afternoon’ becomes a better reason for checking a personal phone at work 
when checking this phone is more tempting. Thus, people need a reason to give in to 
temptation, but they do not care about the contents of that reason.  
Of course, not all reasons are created equally. With which we mean that, although we 
have found that temptation tends to make all reasons somewhat more acceptable, it 
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does not mean that all reasons will become acceptable enough to act on the indulgence. 
It may as well be the case that the reason “It is Tuesday afternoon” is seen as a better 
reason when facing a stronger temptation, but it might still not be seen as a good 
enough reason to actually indulge and give in to the temptation. Our case for 
temptation-based reasoning does not imply that any reason is good enough to indulge, 
but that temptations will increase the acceptability of reasons for the indulgence and 
thereby make the indulgence more likely. It will still be the case that some reasons are 
simply better than others.  
Self-licensing 
Study 6.3 shows that previous good deeds are seen as a better reason to indulge when 
the temptation is stronger. This finding is very interesting in the perspective of 
research on self-licensing, the phenomenon that after displaying good behavior, 
people feel licensed to display undesirable behaviors (Miller & Effron, 2010). The 
assumed process is that self-licensing consists of two consecutive behaviors or events, 
where initial good behavior leads to less desirable behavior. Miller and Effron for 
example argue that the prior good deed creates either a credit (something that can later 
be used to trade in to transgress) or serves as a credential (the good deed builds a 
positive reputation, after which a transgressions is seen as less bad because of one’s 
good reputation). In both these cases it is the prior good deed that builds a credit or a 
credential, which later has effects. This reflects how self-licensing is typically 
investigated in the lab; initial good behaviors are manipulated and the effects on less 
desirable behaviors are measured. For instance, recalls of good or moral behavior 
(Conway & Peetz, 2012; Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011; Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 
2009) were used to manipulate the effect. However, it has not explicitly been tested 
whether the process of self-licensing necessarily operates in the order of these two 
consecutive behaviors. Our results suggest that the opposite process also works: A 
temptation triggers a search for acceptable reasons to transgress, and a prior good deed 
is seen as an acceptable reason to do so. 
Note that the effects of moral licensing (i.e., psychological licensing in the moral 
domain) turn out not to be as robust as previously assumed. For instance, we could 
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not replicate the original findings of Sachdeva et al. (2009) that writing about one’s 
positive traits leads to lower donations to charity and decreased cooperative behavior 
in a commons dilemma (cf. Chapter 4). In addition, the meta-analysis from Chapter 2 
revealed that the average effect size of moral licensing is small-to-medium (Cohens d 
= 0.31). Moreover, the p-curve analysis from Chapter 3 indicated that research on 
moral licensing lacks evidential value. Since the findings in the current chapter show 
that temptations play an important role in the interpretation of previous behaviors, the 
licensing effect may be stronger and more robust when the undesirable behavior is 
more tempting.  
Our findings on tempted reasoning thus serve as an initial step toward an alternative 
account of licensing where the temptingness of the undesirable behavior initiates a 
search for a license to indulge. This implies that it may not always be the case that after 
displaying good or moral behavior, people engage in less desirable behaviors. 
However, if one needs a license to give in to the temptation of undesirable behavior, it 
is likely that one will find such a license. This license can consist of previous good 
behaviors, but, as Study 6.4 shows, prior negative behavior or feelings can also serve 
as a license.  
We do not think or argue that all licensing effects occur via this justification process, 
but do believe that the current literature typically interprets licensing as a good deed 
leading to a bad deed. The reverse process (a temptation making a prior good deed 
seem as a better reason to indulge) may actually be just as likely to occur. As explained 
before, this is a slightly different view of licensing, but an important distinction to 
make as for typical licensing theories and studies the focus seems to lie on aspects of 
the prior good deed, while we think that for many examples of licensing the person 
actually focuses first and foremost on the desired bad deed. For instance, we think it 
is not necessarily the case that after working out or eating healthy, one feels that one 
has earned a license to eat unhealthy food. However, we do think it is very likely that 
the moments when people are tempted to eat unhealthy foods will elicit a search for 
justifications, which could be found in prior food restraints and prior workouts.  
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Comfort buying and comfort eating 
The finding from Study 6.4 that previous frustrations are regarded as more compelling 
reasons for indulgence in front of a tempting burger is very interesting in the 
perspective of research on comfort buying and comfort eating. Similar to research on 
self-licensing, research in these domains mainly focuses on previous negative affective 
states rather than the temptingness of the (food) products. For instance, it has been 
found that negative moods can lead to the purchase of self-treats (Atalay & Meloy, 
2011). In a similar vein, negative emotions such as sadness can trigger binge eating in 
obese individuals (Chua et al., 2004). Our findings imply that research could also focus 
on the possibility that it is the temptation to eat unhealthy foods or to buy self-treats 
that makes someone search for a compelling reason to indulge, and find prior negative 
feelings as a reason for doing so. Put it differently, participants who feel tempted to 
indulge may search for compelling reasons to justify indulgence, which can be found 
in their (previous) affective states.  
If our findings partially explain comfort buying and eating, interventions that focus on 
restoring someone’s self-esteem or improving someone’s mood (e.g., Schmeidel & 
Vohs, 2009) might not be fully effective for reducing these behaviors when the process 
we document in the current chapter is at play as well. Improving someone’s mood 
might just remove the prior negative feeling as a reason to indulge, but replace it with 
a positive mood that could serve as a reason to indulge as well. Interventions aimed at 
making temptations less strong might be more effective then. We do not wish to claim 
that interventions aimed at improving mood or self-esteem do not work, but do think 
the current chapter helps in identifying boundary conditions in which they are most 
likely to be effective. 
Conclusion 
The studies in the current chapter reveal a temptation-based reasoning process, in 
which the temptingness of the temptation strongly influences how people interpret 
different reasons for indulgence. The contents of these reasons do not seem that 
relevant: If something is very tempting, ‘any’ reason becomes seen as a better reason 
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to give in to temptation. These findings are not only important for our understanding 
of how people deal with temptations, but also have important implications for other 
theories. Notably, our findings suggest an alternative account of self-licensing where 
the temptingness of the undesirable behavior initiates a search for a license, instead of 
the previous good behavior making subsequent undesirable behaviors more likely. A 
similar account can be proposed for findings on comfort buying and eating, where the 







CHAPTER 7  
Reasonable Reasons for Indulgence 
 
Previous research identified the most common reasons people have for breaking their 
diet. In the current chapter we elaborate on this by shifting the focus from the 
quantitative aspects of the reasons for breaking a diet (which reasons are most 
common?) to the qualitative aspects (what are the consequences of breaking a diet for 
various reasons?). We expected that the types of reasons that people have for breaking 
their diet play a key role in determining whether they will be motivated to resume 
their diets. We found that reasonable reasons for unhealthy snacking have less 
negative consequences for goal motivation than unreasonable reasons for unhealthy 
snacking (Study 7.1). Furthermore, Study 7.2a and 7.2b revealed that reasons for 
unhealthy snacking that have been identified in the literature differ in how reasonable 
they are. Moreover, Study 7.3 shows that the two categories of reasons for unhealthy 
snacking that are most common (enjoying a special occasion versus opportunity-
induced eating) have different motivational consequences. Together, our results show 
that some reasons for breaking one’s diet may actually be good reasons that do not 







This chapter is based on: Blanken, I., Van de Ven, N., Spälti, A. K., & Zeelenberg, M. 
(2015). Reasonable reasons for indulgence. Manuscript under review.
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One of the problems dieters face is the frequent exposure to tempting high caloric 
foods. Such encounters will sometimes lead to dieting failures, when people give in to 
temptation. These failures have immediate implications for their dieting goals as one 
consumes more calories than one should have. But giving in to temptation can also 
have even more serious and longer term consequences. Goal violations can result in 
motivation loss, negative emotions, and a poorer goal performance (Soman & Cheema, 
2004). Specifically, violating one’s diet can produce a “What the Hell effect,” in which 
people abandon a dieting goal after eating a “forbidden” snack (Cochran & Tesser, 
1996; Polivy & Herman, 1985). To summarize, breaking one’s diet does not only lead 
to a higher intake of calories, it can also make people lose their motivation to continue 
dieting. As yet, however, it is not clear whether all goal violations have similar 
detrimental effects. In the current chapter, we investigate whether and when people 
lose their motivation after breaking their diet. 
We believe that the negative effects of breaking one’s diet may vary. We think this is 
the case because people have different reasons for breaking their diet. Some reasons 
may actually be considered “good” reasons that we expect not to result in a loss of 
motivation. You may be on a diet, but when your best friend is getting married it is 
not so bad to eat part of the wedding cake, and you easily pick up your diet the next 
day. 
When facing a conflict between an immediate temptation and a long-term goal, people 
often seek and construct reasons to make their decisions or to justify them after having 
made the choice (Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993; Kivetz & Simonson, 2002; Kivetz 
& Zheng, 2006). Recent research identified the specific common reasons that people 
provide for the consumption of unhealthy foods. Taylor, Webb and Sheeran (2014) 
asked 371 student participants to rate the prevalence of various justifications ‘just 
before eating something unhealthy’29 . They found six broad classes of reasons or 
                                                          
29 Taylor et al. developed these justifications in a pilot study with two focus groups (n 
= 10 and 6). Participants in these focus groups were asked to recall instances from the 
previous month when they had made a deliberate decision to eat something 
unhealthy and then to report what they had thought to themselves just before doing 
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justifications (in sequence of how common the reasons were): (1) the easy availability 
of the food, (2) compensatory behaviors (e.g., making up for snacking by exercising 
later), (3) exceptions to the norm (e.g., once in a while is OK), (4) deservingness (where 
the unhealthy food serves as a reward), (5) curiosity (e.g., it looks gorgeous), and (6) 
irresistibly (i.e., the hedonic aspects of unhealthy food such as taste and smell). They 
also found a correlation between the number of justifications used and the number of 
unhealthy snacks consumed, in that the more reasons one had for indulging the more 
one indulged. This is consistent with the idea that justifications are recruited to 
rationalize goal violations. Put differently, when people find a reason to snack, they 
are more likely to do so. 
In a similar vein, Verhoeven, Adriaanse, De Vet, Fennis and De Ridder (2015) asked 
1544 members of the general public to fill out the Reasons to Snack Inventory30. They 
detected six categories in the reasons that people provide for engaging in unhealthy 
snacking (again in sequence of how common they were): (1) to enjoy a special occasion, 
(2) opportunity-induced eating, (3) to gain energy, (4) to reward oneself, (5) because of 
social pressure, and (6) to cope with negative emotions. Thus, both Taylor et al. (2014) 
and Verhoeven et al. find that the a-typicality of the situation (e.g., ‘I have something 
special to celebrate’) and the availability of food (e.g., ‘the food looks good’) are among 
the predominant reasons that people use for unhealthy snacking. Importantly, 
Verhoeven et al. argued that health interventions should specifically target the reasons 
that people most frequently use to justify unhealthy snacking, because these are the 
main triggers for this undesirable behavior. Although Verhoeven et al. convincingly 
showed what the most common reasons for unhealthy snacking are, we are not yet 
convinced that these are the best reasons to target in health interventions. 
                                                          
so. An additional group (n = 15) then rated how frequently they used each type of 
justification. 
30 The Reasons to Snack inventory was developed from reasons that were identified 
in previous studies assessing reasons for unhealthy snacking (total n = 525), 18 items 




When designing health interventions, we propose that it is not only important to focus 
on the most common reasons for unhealthy snacking, but rather on those that have the 
largest negative effects on further goal motivation. Verhoeven et al. (2015) explored 
the categories of reasons that people use to justify incidental snacking, but did not 
investigate the motivational consequences of having violated one’s diet for reasons 
from these different categories. Taylor et al. (2014) found that the use of reasons can 
undermine participants’ dietary intentions. However, since they manipulated having 
justifications in general and did not distinguish between the different types of reasons, 
it was not possible to draw conclusions on the consequences of specific types of 
reasons. 
The present chapter examines the motivational consequences of the different reasons 
that people provide for breaking their diet. We expect that the reasons that people have 
for breaking a diet differ in reasonability, that is, how good people perceive them to 
be to break their diet. Some reasons are simply better reasons than other reasons. 
Breaking your diet during the dinner of your best friend’s wedding seems a good 
reason to us. Breaking your diet because a cake looks delicious does not seem like a 
good reason at all. It is further expected that bad reasons for breaking one’s diet will 
have the most negative consequences for goal motivation. 
We believe that breaking one’s dieting goal for a bad reason can influence the belief in 
one’s own self-control capacities (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Individuals who 
provide bad reasons for unhealthy snacking may experience that they lack self-control 
and therefore perceive their violation as a failure. Since prior goal failures can result in 
decreased motivation (e.g., Louro, Pieters, & Zeelenberg, 2007; Nelissen, De Vet & 
Zeelenberg, 2011), individuals who provide bad reasons for indulgence may feel that 
their goal is not achievable to them. 
In addition, if individuals perceive that the reasons they have for breaking their diet 
are not reasonable (e.g., I ate the cake because it looked delicious), this may signal that 
their goal is not important enough to them. Since perceived goal importance is a strong 
predictor of goal performance (Hollenbeck & Williams, 1987), we expect that 
individuals who provide bad reasons for indulgence will experience lower goal 
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commitment in the long run. In contrast, having a good reason (e.g., I ate the cake 
because it was my friend’s wedding) may inoculate one against the negative impact of 
goal violations. Therefore, we expect that if one has a good reason to violate one’s diet, 
the violation would only have little or no impact, and people would find their dieting 
goal as important as before. Note that the two reasons from the examples (opportunity-
induced eating and enjoying a special occasion) are among the most common reasons 
for breaking a diet, but we expected that only the bad reason would have longer term 
negative consequences. Thus, how good a reason for breaking one’s diet is can affect 
both goal feasibility and goal commitment. Therefore, we predict that, compared to 
good reasons, bad reasons for indulgence would have more detrimental effects on 
one’s diet.  
So far, research on the reasons people have for snacking has predominantly focused 
on the short-term negative effects of these reasons on dieting. The research in the 
present chapter aims to shed some light on how the different reasons that people 
provide for breaking their diet affect further goal commitment. We will identify how 
reasonable people find different reasons for breaking their diet. In addition, we will 
examine whether good reasons for indulgence have less negative consequences for 
long-term goal motivation than bad reasons for indulgence. A better understanding of 
these motivational consequences can assist in developing health-related interventions 
that target the reasons that have the most detrimental effects on weight loss goals. 
Study 7.1. Providing reasons for indulgence 
In order to examine whether the reasonability of a reason for breaking a dieting goal 
(i.e., how good or bad a reason is) plays an important role in determining whether 
people regain motivation to continue with their diet, participants were asked to 
generate a good versus a bad reason for eating French fries while on a diet. We 
expected that participants who imagined breaking their diet for a good reason would 
subsequently display more goal motivation, higher estimated goal feasibility, and 
higher perceived goal importance, compared to participants with a bad reason. Note 
that the infringement on the diet is the same in both conditions, but only the reasons 




Two hundred and seventy Tilburg University undergraduate psychology students31 
participated in a 60-minute research session of unrelated experiments (71 males and 
199 females, Mage = 20.12, SD = 2.42). Participants were randomly assigned to the Good 
Reason condition (n = 138) or to the Bad Reason condition (n = 132). Participants were 
asked to imagine the following situation:  
You recently gained weight. Your clothes are too tight and you are not feeling 
well. Therefore, you start dieting. You decide to stop eating unhealthy snack 
foods. A couple of days after starting your diet, you walk across a fast-food 
restaurant during dinnertime. You smell the mouth-watering aroma of French 
fries. You are hungry and are craving for a portion of French fries. 
Participants in the Good Reason condition were then asked to provide a reason that 
made eating the French fries in this particular situation acceptable to them, whereas 
participants in the Bad Reason condition were asked to provide a reason that was not 
acceptable.  
Next, all participants imagined eating the French fries for the reason that they 
provided, after which they responded to questions tapping goal motivation, goal 
feasibility, and goal importance (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). Goal motivation and goal 
feasibility were measured by four different items; ‘After eating the fries, would you 
feel that your diet is ruined?’, ‘After eating the fries, would you feel that there is not 
much point in continuing your diet?’, ‘After eating the fries, how easy would it be to 
resume your diet?’, and ‘After eating the fries, how attainable would your dieting goal 
be for you?’ and goal importance via ‘After eating the fries, how important would your 
dieting goal be for you?’ (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
                                                          
31 Ninety-one of those students indicated that they were currently on a diet. The 
results did not differ between dieters versus non-dieters.  
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 Results and discussion  
Participants in the Good Reason condition often provided reasons related to special 
occasions (‘because it is my birthday’, ‘because I want to celebrate passing my exam’) 
previous healthy behaviors (‘because I just went to the gym’) or their current energy 
levels (‘because I would otherwise faint’). Participants in the Bad Reason condition 
often provided reasons related to laziness (‘because I am too lazy to make dinner 
myself’), hunger (‘because I am really hungry’), or simply feeling like eating a snack 
(‘I am really craving for French fries’). 
Participants in the Good Reason condition were more motivated to continue with their 
diet and found their dieting goal more feasible compared to participants in the Bad 
Reason condition. In addition, participants in the Good Reason condition indicated 
that their dieting goal would be more important to them than participants in the Bad 





Table 7.1  
Means, standard deviations, and statistics of goal motivation, goal feasibility, and goal 








n = 132 
   
Measure M (SD) M (SD) F p ηp² 
After eating the fries, would you 
feel that your diet is ruined? 
3.72 (1.68) 5.23 (1.40) 63.52 <.001 .19 
After eating the fries, would you 
feel that there is not much point in 
continuing your diet? 
2.74 (1.45) 4.05 (1.81) 43.40 <.001 .14 
After eating the fries, how easy 
would it be to resume your diet? 
4.92 (1.51) 3.82 (1.48) 36.74 <.001 .12 
After eating the fries, how 
attainable would your dieting goal 
be for you? 
5.22 (1.26) 4.31 (1.39) 32.26 <.001 .11 
After eating the fries, how 
important would your dieting 
goal be for you? 
5.59 (1.27) 5.84 (1.43) 19.69 <.001 .07 
Note. All variables ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).  
 
These results provide initial support for our theorizing that the reasonability of a 
reason for breaking a diet plays a crucial role in further goal striving: People who 
provide good reasons for indulgence do not lose motivation to resume their diet, 
compared to people who provide bad reasons. At first sight, this may seem intuitive, 
but note that the implications of this finding for health interventions could be far-
reaching. Verhoeven et al. (2015) indicated that health interventions should focus on 
the most common reasons, while we believe we should also focus on those with the 
worst consequences (the bad reasons). We continued our investigation by examining 
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whether the various reasons for unhealthy snacking identified in the literature (Taylor 
et al., 2014; Verhoeven et al.) may differ in reasonability. 
Study 7.2a and 7.2b. The reasonability of reasons for indulgence  
Method 
The participants for Study 7.2a and 7.2b were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk). One hundred and fifty-two U.S. based participants (85 males and 67 females, 
Mage = 34.38, SD = 11.30) completed the survey for Study 7.2a. Study 7.2b was 
completed by 149 participants (88 males and 61 females, Mage = 33.07, SD = 11.22). 
In both studies, the participants were asked to evaluate the different reasons for 
unhealthy snacking using seven-point Likert scales (1 = not at all acceptable, 7 = very 
acceptable). For Study 7.2a, the 22 reasons for unhealthy snacking from the Reasons to 
Snack inventory by Verhoeven et al. (2015) were measured for acceptability by all 
participants. As in Verhoeven et al. the relevant items were averaged to create the six 
subscales for unhealthy snacking: (1) to enjoy a special occasion (α = .83), (2) 
opportunity-induced eating (α = .82), (3) to gain energy (r = .43), (4) to reward oneself 
(α =.84), (5) because of social pressure (α = .73), and (6) to cope with negative emotions 
(α = .90). 
For Study 7.2b, the participants evaluated the 54 reasons from Taylor et al. (2014). The 
relevant items were averaged to create the six categories of reasons for unhealthy 
snacking: 1) the availability of the food (α = .90), (2) compensatory behaviors (α = .96), 
(3) exceptions to the norm (α = .90), (4) deservingness (α = .94), (5) curiosity (α = .92), 
and (6) irresistibly (α = .92). In both studies, the order of all items was randomized. 
Finally, participants indicated whether they were on a diet, if they were trying to lose 
weight, and if eating healthy was important to them32.  
                                                          
32 In Study 7.2a, thirty-six participants (23.7%) indicated that they were currently on a 
diet, 71 (46.7%) indicated that they currently had the goal of losing weight. On 
average, participants found it quite important to eat healthy (low-calorie) food, 
Mimportance = 4.62 (SD = 1.61). In Study 7.2b, forty-nine participants (32.9%) indicated 
that they were currently on a diet, 80 (53.7%) indicated that they currently had the 
Chapter 7 
200 
 Results Study 7.2a 
An ANOVA with the perceived acceptability of each of the categories of reasons from 
the Reasons to Snack inventory (Verhoeven et al., 2015) was conducted with the 
categories as a within-subjects factor. Maulchy’s test indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had been violated, χ2(14) = 71.23, p < .001, therefore the degrees of freedom 
were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε = 0.85). The results 
showed that the six categories of reasons for snacking varied significantly in their 
perceived acceptability, F(4.25, 641.02) = 88.04, p < .001, ω2 = 0.33. Means, standard 
deviations, and the results of the LSD post hoc comparisons are displayed in Figure 
7.1.  
  
                                                          
goal of losing weight. On average, participants found it quite important to eat 
healthy (low-calorie) food, Mimportance = 4.59 (SD = 1.74). In both studies, these factors 
did not affect responses and were therefore not included in the analyses. 




Figure 7.1. Mean acceptability of the six reasons (in order of how common they are) for 
unhealthy snacking provided by Verhoeven et al. (2015). Error bars represent standard 
deviations. Different letters indicate significant differences at the p ≤.002 level tested 
with post hoc LSD tests. 
 
Results Study 7.2b 
An ANOVA with the perceived acceptability of each of the reasons for snacking 
provided by Taylor et al. (2014) was conducted with the categories as a within-subjects 
factor. Maulchy’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, 
χ2(14) = 131.29, p < .001, therefore the degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-
Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε = 0.73). A significant difference in perceived 
acceptability of the six categories of reasons was found, F(3.66, 542.29) = 52.53, p < .001, 
ω2 = 0.20. Means, standard deviations, and the results of the LSD post hoc comparisons 

































Figure 7.2. Mean acceptability of the six reasons (in order of how common they are) for 
unhealthy snacking provided by Taylor et al. (2014). Error bars represent standard 
deviations. Different letters indicate significant differences at the p <.001 level tested 
with post hoc LSD tests. 
 
Discussion 
Previous research identified various reasons for unhealthy snacking and documented 
how these differ in prevalence (Taylor et al., 2014; Verhoeven et al., 2015). Our study 
7.2a and 7.2b found that these reasons also differ clearly in how good they are 
perceived to be to break a diet. Some are more acceptable as a reason for breaking one’s 
diet than others. Our data reveal that the ‘enjoying a special occasion’ and ‘gaining 
energy’ of Verhoeven et al. were found to be the best reasons. For the reasons that were 
identified by Taylor et al., ‘exceptions to the norm’ was found to be the best reason. 
Together, this suggests that people find it most acceptable to break a diet for a special 
occasion (as a special reason by definition is an exception to the normal situation).  
Importantly, this goodness or acceptability of the reasons to break a diet does not 
follow the pattern of how frequent reasons are given for unhealthy snacking. In the 
data of Verhoeven et al., both “enjoying a special occasion” and “opportunity induced 
eating” were the most frequently mentioned reasons for unhealthy snacking, but our 
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reasons for doing so. People find it acceptable to break a diet for a special occasion, 
such as the wedding of one’s best friend, but not to break a diet simply because the 
food is there. Verhoeven et al.’s suggestion that interventions should focus on the most 
common reasons for breaking a diet, is thus not the full picture as one of the categories 
with the most common reasons is likely to be much more harmful to future motivation 
than the other category of reasons. 
The results of our first study (people remained more motivated to continue a diet after 
having broken it for a good reason than a bad one) indicated that the goodness of a 
reason for breaking a diet can affect the motivation to resume one’s diet after the 
violation. Thus, the what-the-hell effect is not always as likely to occur. It is important 
to examine what this implies for the most frequently mentioned reasons in the 
literature, since it turns out that they differ in reasonability. Therefore, in Study 7.3, we 
explored the effects of the types of reasons that people use for unhealthy snacking on 
future diet motivation. 
Study 7.3. Celebrating a special occasion versus opportunity-induced 
snacking 
In Study 7.3, we aimed to demonstrate that the types of reasons for unhealthy snacking 
that were categorized by Verhoeven et al. (2015) differently affect future diet 
motivation. Therefore, half of the participants read that they ate a dessert because they 
were enjoying a special occasion (Special Occasion condition), whereas the other half 
read that they ate a dessert simply because it was lying right in front of them 
(Opportunity-Induced Eating condition). Note that enjoying a special occasion and 
opportunity-induced eating are the most common reasons given for unhealthy 
snacking, and thus something that Verhoeven et al. argue interventions should focus 
on. Since the results of Study 7.2 revealed that enjoying a special occasion is a more 
acceptable reason for unhealthy snacking than opportunity-induced eating, we 
expected that participants in the Special Occasion condition would display more 
positive emotions, less negative emotions, and a lower decrease in further goal 




One hundred and forty-nine U.S. based participants completed our study on MTurk 
(99 males and 50 females, Mage = 33.95, SD = 10.74). Participants were randomly 
assigned to the Special Occasion condition (n = 75) or to the Opportunity-Induced 
Eating condition (n = 74). Participants in the Special Occasion condition were asked to 
imagine the following situation [the Opportunity-Induced Eating condition differs 
only in why they have dinner. See text in brackets]:  
It is two months until your beach holiday. You are not happy with how your 
body looks like nowadays. You have gained some weight over the past few 
months and your clothes feel tighter. You think it is time to do something about 
it. You decide to follow a strict diet in order to look good at the beach during 
your vacation. You have been right on track since you started dieting two 
weeks ago. Things are going according to plan.  
Today is a very special day. Your best friend is getting married! After the 
ceremony, you join the wedding dinner [vs. “Today you have dinner.”] 
Your favorite dessert is available. It looks mouthwatering. You look at the 
dessert; think about how you have been dieting for the last two weeks and how 
indulging in this high calorie dessert would break your diet. You decide that 
you can make an exception and allow yourself to indulge. You eat the dessert. 
Next, participants indicated how much happiness, satisfaction, pride, frustration, 
guilt, and regret they would experience in this situation (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
Subsequently, participants indicated the extent to which their decision to indulge 
would feel like a failure and to what extent their decision to indulge would feel like a 
boost to continue their diet (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). Finally, participants specified 
how motivated they would be to continue their strict diet (1= not at all motivated, 7 = 
very motivated) and how likely they would be to indulge the next day (1 = very unlikely, 
7 = very likely) after eating the dessert. 
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 Results 
The results are shown in Table 7.2. First, we investigated differences in emotions 
between the two conditions. Participants in the Special Occasion condition displayed 
less guilt, regret, and frustration compared to participants in the Opportunity-Induced 
Eating condition. There were no differences in happiness, satisfaction and pride. 
Next, we looked at motivation to stick to dieting goals. Participants in the 
Opportunity-Induced Eating condition indicated that their decision to indulge felt 
more like a failure, and were more likely to indulge the next day, compared to 
participants in the Special Occasion condition. There was no difference in how much 
they thought the indulgence was a boost to continue their diet. Participants in the 
Special Occasion condition indicated that they would be more motivated to continue 
their diet and were less likely to indulge the next day compared to participants in the 
Opportunity-Induced Eating condition. Together, these results suggest that of the two 
most common reasons for breaking a diet, one (breaking a diet for a special occasion) 
is less detrimental for future motivation than the other (breaking a diet simply because 




Table 7.2  
Means, standard deviations, and statistics of emotions and goal persistence in Study 7.2 
 Special Occasion 
condition 
 




n = 74 
   
 M (SD) M (SD) F p ηp² 
Emotions      
Happiness 4.95 (1.46) 4.92 (1.64) .010 .919 .000 
Satisfaction 5.00 (1.56) 5.07 (1.62) .065 .799 .000 
Pride 3.45 (1.54) 3.01 (1.60) 2.84 .094 .019 
Guilt 4.57 (1.86) 5.36 (1.87) 6.72 .010 .044 
Regret 4.39 (1.85) 5.04 (1.77) 4.79 .030 .032 
Frustration 3.85 (1.80) 4.63 (1.77) 7.02 .009 .046 
Goal persistence      
Indulgence perceived as a failure 4.03 (1.83) 4.92 (1.67) 9.71 .002 .062 
Indulgence perceived as a boost 3.74 (1.78) 3.57 (1.85) 0.33 .570 .002 
Motivation to continue diet 5.91 (1.16) 5.27 (1.70) 7.18 .008 .047 
Likeliness to indulge the next day 3.49 (2.06) 4.19 (2.15) 4.11 .045 .027 
Note. All variables ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). 
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Discussion 
Our findings show that participants who imagined consuming an unhealthy dessert 
because they are enjoying a special occasion thought they would experience less 
negative emotions, less feelings of failure, more motivation to continue with their diet, 
and a lower likelihood to indulge compared to participants who imagined consuming 
an unhealthy dessert because the opportunity arose. Participants in the special 
occasion condition indicated that they would not display more positive emotions after 
imagining eating the dessert compared to participants in the opportunity induced 
eating condition. In addition, both conditions did not differ in how much they felt that 
eating the dessert would serve as a boost to continue with their diet. 
Taken together, our findings demonstrated that the most common reasons for 
unhealthy snacking have different motivational consequences. This implies that 
health-related interventions should not solely focus on the frequency of reasons, but 
also on the unacceptable reasons that negatively affect long-term goal commitment.  
General discussion 
We started this chapter with the question of whether and when people lose their 
motivation after breaking their diet. We expected that the types of reasons that people 
have for breaking their diet would play a key role in determining whether they will be 
motivated to resume their diets. The results of our studies clearly show that reasonable 
reasons for indulgence have less negative consequences for goal motivation than 
unreasonable reasons for indulgence (Study 7.1) and that reasons for unhealthy 
snacking that have been identified in the literature differ in how reasonable they are 
(Study 7.2a and 7.2b). Our data also reveal that the most common reasons for 
unhealthy snacking (as identified by Verhoeven et al. (2015) and Taylor et al. (2014): 
enjoying a special occasion versus opportunity-induced eating) have different 
motivational consequences (Study 7.3). 
The present findings point to the importance of also considering the qualitative 
consequences rather than solely the quantitative frequencies of the targeted behavior 
when developing (health-related) interventions. Similar to the legislator who has to 
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decide whether to focus on punishing driving violations that are most frequently 
displayed versus driving violations that lead to the most fatal accidents, health care 
professionals should carefully consider which behaviors they want to target in their 
interventions. Reasons that have important consequences and are frequent seem most 
important. 
Coelho do Vale, Pieters, and Zeelenberg (2015) found that implementing a priori 
moments of goal-relaxation can increase the likelihood of long-term focal goal 
attainment. Thus, individuals experience less difficulties sticking to their diet when 
planning moments when they do not have to adhere to their strict dieting rules. In a 
similar vein, Liu, Haws, Lamberton, Campbell and Fitzsimons (2015) found that 
occasional indulgences can promote healthy eating. Based on our findings, we expect 
that these moments of goal-relaxation or occasional indulgences are most beneficial 
for further goal attainment when planned at a moment when one can provide a 
reasonable reason, like a enjoying a special occasion. 
A potential drawback of our investigation of reasons for unhealthy snacking is that we 
only focused on situations where individuals provide one clear reason for giving in to 
temptation. Taylor et al. (2014) found that people sometimes use multiple justifications 
prior to indulgence (e.g., I ate the cake because it was my friend’s wedding and because 
it was lying in front of me). However, we think that this is not problematic for our 
studies since people often have a predominant reason to rationalize their goal 
violations (e.g., the main reason for eating the cake is celebrating my friend’s 
wedding). People having one reason, after all, are more likely to act upon that reason 
than people who have a disjunction of reasons (Shafir et al., 1993). 
Another potential limitation is that in Study 7.3, we operationalized the categories of 
reasons detected by Verhoeven et al. (2015) into two specific scenarios. Note that we 
developed this study to demonstrate that having different reasons for unhealthy 
snacking can have different motivational consequences. Future research could 
investigate how different operationalizations of the reasons affect future motivation. 
In addition, future research could explore whether the reasons could be classified into 
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broader categories based on underlying dimensions, such as internally versus 
externally generated reasons. 
The results indicated that the negative effects of breaking one’s diet vary. In our 
studies, we looked at the immediate consequences of breaking a diet. Since dieting is 
a continuous goal, it would be very interesting to investigate the effects of providing 
different reasons for breaking a diet on long-term goal motivation. It may be the case 
that reasonable reasons not only buffer detrimental effects on one’s diet, but also cause 
positive effects that sustain over time. Modern technologies33, such as smartphones 
and tablets, enable researchers to perform ecological momentary assessments of 
dieters’ goal violations (e.g, Hofmann, Baumeister, Förster, & Vohs, 2012). Future 
research could benefit from these technologies to examine the longer-term 
consequences of providing different reasons for indulgence in a natural setting.  
Conclusion 
The studies in the present chapter serve as an initial effort to explore whether the 
different reasons for breaking a diet play an important role in determining whether 
one will ultimately succeed in regaining motivation to lose weight. Our results show 
that some (frequent) reasons for breaking one’s diet may actually be good reasons that 




                                                          
33 Online technologies have also been proven effective in the clinical domain 










In the previous 215 pages I have described my and others’ research on self-licensing 
theory. Now it is time to take score and see what we have learned. The first part of this 
dissertation presented a state-of-the-art overview of published and unpublished self-
licensing research. In this part, the effect size of licensing, possible theoretical 
moderators, and the robustness and replicability of the effect were investigated. The 
results were not very rewarding, neither promising. The different chapters casted 
serious doubt on the whole phenomenon of self-licensing. The second part of this 
dissertation has been much more rewarding, and presents novel theoretical 
perspectives on self-licensing and empirical tests of those. I examined the ways in 
which self-licensing can come about in daily life, provided an alternative account of 
self-licensing, and revealed the consequences of different (licensing-related) reasons 
for goal-incongruent behavior. Now, in this final chapter, I will summarize and 
integrate the findings from these empirical chapters and discuss them in relation to the 
gaps in the literature that were identified in the introductory chapter. The implications 
for self-licensing theory, the associated practical implications, and potential fruitful 
lines of future research are discussed. 
The state-of-the-art of self-licensing 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 provided a state-of-the-art overview of self-licensing. In Chapter 
2, a meta-analysis was conducted to establish the mean effect size of moral licensing 
(i.e., self-licensing in the moral domain) and to advance the existing theoretical 
framework by analyzing several moderators. The data for this meta-analysis were 
collected through an extensive literature search on moral licensing using the definition 
of Merritt et al. (2010, p. 344): “Past good deeds (or good intentions) liberate 
individuals to engage in behaviors that are immoral, unethical, or otherwise 
problematic, behaviors that they would otherwise avoid for fear of feeling or 
appearing less moral”.  
The meta-analysis, including 91 studies with a total of 7397 participants, showed that 
the size of the moral licensing effect is a Cohen’s d of 0.31, which is a small-to-medium 
effect size (Cohen, 1992). The analysis could not confirm any of the moderators that 
were theorized to be of importance. Specifically, the moderator analyses did not show 
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that moral licensing conditions (e.g., recalling moral behavior) contrasted with 
negative control conditions (e.g., recalling immoral behavior) resulted in larger effects 
than licensing conditions contrasted with neutral control conditions (e.g., recalling 
neutral behavior, such as doing groceries). This was suprising in light of the moral 
cleansing effect, which implies that people who recall immoral behavior feel the need 
to compensate for the negative feelings through displaying subsequent moral behavior 
(Conway & Peetz, 2012; Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011; Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 
2009; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). The meta-analysis did also not confirm the prediction 
in Conway and Peetz (2012) that recalling good actions leads to licensing effects, 
whereas recalling good traits results in consistency effects (i.e., good behavior follows 
good traits).  
In addition, the meta-analysis did not find a difference between hypothetical and 
actual behavior, and it did not find support for the prediction that licensing effects are 
larger when the initial and subsequent behavior occur on the same domain (compared 
to in a different domain). Strikingly, the only moderator that was confirmed was that 
published studies had larger effects (average d = 0.43) than unpublished studies 
(average d = 0.11). This finding was in line with the funnel plot that indicated the 
presence of a positive publication bias. Furthermore, a post-hoc power analysis 
revealed that based on the effect size estimate, the included studies on average only 
have 28% predictive power. 
Chapter 3 further focused on the evidential value of the moral licensing hypothesis by 
conducting a novel method for meta-analyses, a p-curve analysis (Simonsohn, Nelson, 
& Simmons, 2014a,b), on the published self-licensing tests that were included in the 
meta-analysis in Chapter 2. The results of this analysis indicated that research on moral 
licensing lacks evidential value; based on the distribution of p-values, the published 
moral licensing tests did not provide support for the hypothesis that previous moral 
behavior leads to behaviors that are immoral, unethical, or otherwise problematic. 
The results from Chapter 3 may seem inconsistent with the results from the meta-
analysis in Chapter 2, which show a small but significant licensing effect. A meta-
analysis is a traditional approach to estimate the size of an effect and to test its 
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moderators, but does not correct for publication bias. P-curve is a relatively new 
method to provide an unbiased estimate of an effect, but since it has been introduced 
very recently the possible limitations of this method have not been identified. The 
meta-analysis from Chapter 2 revealed a positive publication bias, which could have 
led to an overestimation of the effect size. The p-curve analysis is not influenced by 
such a publication bias, which could explain the different results of both chapters. It is 
important to note that both methods are needed to draw a complete picture of an effect: 
Meta-analyses can analyze moderators, whereas p-curve analyses can provide an 
unbiased estimate of an effect. 
Chapter 4 included three attempts to replicate the moral licensing effect by Sachdeva 
et al. (2009). The original authors found that writing about positive traits led to lower 
donations to charity and decreased cooperative behavior. They also found the opposite 
effect (i.e., moral cleansing): Writing about negative traits led to more charity 
donations and increased cooperative behavior. Based on these findings, it was 
proposed that moral-licensing and moral-cleansing effects can occur convergently as 
part of a moral self-regulation process. Following our own call to replicate important 
earlier licensing studies with larger sample sizes to verify the robustness of the moral 
licensing effect, three studies were conducted. Study 4.1 and 4.2 aimed to replicate 
their findings in larger samples (95% power based on the initial findings, NStudy4.1 = 
105, NStudy4.2 = 150). Both studies did not confirm the original moral licensing effect. 
Study 4.3, which used an even larger sample (95% power based on the meta-analysis 
in Chapter 2, N = 940), did not confirm the original licensing effect, but did find a moral 
cleansing effect in that the recall of negative traits increased subsequent moral 
behavior. Thus, in none of these three studies, the original moral licensing effect was 
replicated. A meta-analysis including the original and the replicated effects revealed 
that the mean Cohen’s d effect size was 0.07. In other words, there was no significant 
moral licensing effect across all studies. 
Taken together, these chapters paint a rather bleak picture of the licensing effect. The 
small-to-medium effect size of moral licensing that was obtained in the meta analysis, 
the lack of confirmation of the theoretical moderators, the finding that the effect is 
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larger for published than for unpublished work (all in Chapter 2), the lack of evidential 
value for the licensing hypothesis in the p-curve analysis (Chapter 3) and the three 
failures to replicate the effect (Chapter 4) imply that the existence of the effect should 
be called into question. However, it is important to note that the meta-analysis, the p-
curve analysis, and the replication studies focused on experiments that tested for the 
moral licensing effect in the ‘traditional way’. It is typically assumed self-licensing 
consists of two consecutive behaviors or events, where initial good behavior leads to 
less desirable behavior. This reflects the way self-licensing was investigated in the 
studies that were included in the meta-analysis and p-curve analysis: Initial good 
behaviors were manipulated and the effects on less desirable subsequent behaviors 
were measured. For instance, recalls of good or moral behavior (Conway & Peetz, 2012; 
Jordan et al., 2011; Sachdeva et al., 2009) were used to manipulate the effect. Perhaps 
the way licensing was induced in these experiments does not solely reflect how the 
effect operates. After all, self-licensing is suggested to occur when after a prior good 
deed the chance of subsequent undesirable behavior is higher. In essence, it is just a 
description of a state of affairs, not a process. 
The results in the first part of this dissertation thus suggest that there is very little 
evidence for self-licensing in the experiments that have been published so far. While it 
is tempting to conclude that self-licensing does not exist, I believe this is not the right 
conclusion. The second part of this dissertation provides a fresh start for the study of 
self-licensing. The necessary next steps were to get a better understanding of whether 
and how licensing occurs in daily life and to consider an alternative account of self-
licensing. 
Novel perspectives on self-licensing34 
Despite the fact that these early chapters were not quite supportive of the licensing 
effect, I continued my efforts. These were for a large part inspired by the fact that most 
                                                          
34 Note that the first part of this dissertation predominantly focused on licensing in 
the moral domain (i.e., moral licensing), whereas the second part mostly focused on 
licensing related to goal-directed self-regulatory behaviors. As outlined in Chapter 1, 
self-licensing can lead to a broad spectrum of undesirable behaviors, both at the 
individual and societal level. I believe that for both the social and the individual 
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people easily understand what licensing is when I discuss it with them, and that they 
readily recall such events from their own life. Therefore, novel ideas and new 
perspectives on self-licensing were needed. I described my attempts in Chapter 5 and 
6. Chapter 5 attempted to investigate the different ways in which self-licensing can 
come about. Since previous research on self-licensing predominantly studied the 
phenomenon in controlled lab-experiments, and Chapters 2, 3, and 4 revealed that the 
existence of the self-licensing effect as it has previously been investigated should be 
called into question, Chapter 5 explored two different ways in which licensing can 
come about in daily life. Specifically, it was suggested that self-licensing can occur 
when a prior good deed makes one more likely to engage in subsequent questionable 
behavior (‘good deed licensing’) and when the temptation to display undesirable 
behavior initiates a search for a license (‘temptation-based licensing’). In support of 
this distinction between two ways of licensing, participants in Study 5.1 categorized 
their own recalled episodes of licensing as either ‘after displaying good behavior, I felt 
that I had permission to display certain behaviors’ (good deed) or ‘when I wanted to 
display certain behaviors, I justified these behaviors through my previous good 
behaviors’ (temptation-based). Many participants indicated that their self-licensing 
episode resembled good deed self-licensing (53.8%) or temptation-based self-licensing 
(37.0%).  
Study 5.2, in which participants were specifically instructed to recall one of the two 
ways of licensing, showed that participants could recall both good deed licensing 
(76.9%) and temptation-based licensing (73.9%), and that temptation-based licensing 
is more likely to be activated when the undesirable behavior is both more tempting 
and (marginally) more negative. In both studies, participants experienced more 
negative emotions after temptation-based licensing experiences compared to good 
                                                          
domain, the underlying processes of the licensing effect are very similar. 
Importantly, research on moral self-regulation (Zhong, Liljenquist, & Cain, 2009) 
shows that similar to other self-regulatory behaviors, moral behavior is characterized 
by internal regulations where the desired ‘moral self’ motivates goal achievement, 





deed licensing experiences. The findings from Chapter 5 support the proposition that 
self-licensing can be elicited in (at least) two ways and show that both ways have 
different antecedents and affective consequences, signifying the importance of 
distinguishing between the different ways in which self-licensing can be triggered.  
Importantly, the findings of Study 5.1 also revealed that 95.3% of the participants could 
recall a licensing episode, and of those 89.3% indicated that the latest episode took 
place in the last month. This testifies to the importance of self-licensing theory by the 
frequency with which it occurs. These numbers are likely even underestimations, as 
these are only the examples of conscious licensing experiences, and some licensing also 
likely occurs without one being aware of it (as suggested by Khan and Dhar (2006)). 
Chapter 6 continued this search for novel approaches to self-licensing. In this chapter 
I suggested that reasons play a key role, and I built on motivated reasoning (Kunda, 
1990) and reason-based choice theory (Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993). These 
theories posit that when individuals have a preferred conclusion, they want to 
construct justifications that are supportive of that particular conclusion. This idea was 
applied to temptations: It was proposed that the temptation to display undesirable 
behavior creates the desire to conclude that indulgence is acceptable, which in turn 
influences the reasoning process. Specifically, it was hypothesized that reasons are 
regarded as more compelling when a temptation is stronger. Accordingly, the results 
of four studies showed that individuals find a large variety of reasons for giving in to 
temptation more acceptable when exposed to a tempting compared to a less tempting 
situation.  
Specifically, Study 6.1 and 6.2 showed that the more people think a given behavior is 
tempting, the more acceptable they think a variety of reasons is to justify indulgence. 
Interestingly, Study 6.3 revealed that people think that their own previous good deeds 
are more acceptable reasons for indulgence when the temptation is stronger. This 
finding served as a first step toward an alternative account of licensing where the 
temptingness of the undesirable behavior initiates a search for a license to give in to 
temptation. Study 6.3 shows that this license can consist of previous good behaviors, 
but, as Study 6.4 shows, prior negative feelings can also serve as a license. These results 
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thus suggest that when people are tempted to display certain behaviors, they search 
for justifications and any reason may serve as one.  
The findings from Chapter 6 are especially interesting in the light that previous 
literature on self-licensing typically interprets it as a good deed leading to a bad deed. 
A reverse process, where the temptation to display undesirable behavior makes 
previous good behavior seem as a better reason to indulge, is possibly just as likely to 
occur. This temptation-based reasoning model seems in line with the temptation-based 
way of self-licensing account that was identified in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 6 showed that temptations increase the acceptability of reasons for indulgence 
and therefore make indulgence more likely. Of course, it varies between reasons how 
much justification they offer. Chapter 7 focused on such differences and tested how 
different reasons for indulgence affect subsequent goal-motivation. Specifically, 
Chapter 7 investigated the consequences of having different reasons for giving in to 
temptation (i.e., breaking a diet by unhealthy snacking). Study 7.1 showed that 
reasonable reasons for unhealthy snacking have less negative consequences for goal 
motivation than unreasonable reasons for unhealthy snacking. Furthermore, Study 
7.2a and 7.2b revealed that reasons for unhealthy snacking that have been identified 
in the literature differ in how reasonable they are. Some of these reasons closely 
reflected reasoning that is typical for self-licensing, such as ‘rewarding oneself’ and 
‘deservingness’. Moreover, Study 7.3 revealed that the two categories of reasons for 
unhealthy snacking that are identified as the most common reasons (enjoying a special 
occasion versus opportunity-induced eating) have different motivational 
consequences. Together, the findings from Chapter 7 showed that reasons that people 
provide for indulgence differ in how reasonable people think they are and that 
reasonable reasons for breaking a diet seem to have less negative consequences for 
further goal motivation than less reasonable reasons. 
Toward a more complete theory of self-licensing  
In this section, I will explain what these findings mean for self-licensing theory. The 
meta-analysis showed that the licensing effect is small and the conclusion of the p-
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curve analysis is even more dramatic: There is no evidential value for the licensing 
effect in the body of empirical research. This suggests that research on self-licensing 
faces a dead end. On the bright side, I do believe that there are vital new directions for 
self-licensing that we can start to explore.  
First, I believe it is important to revise the theoretical framework of self-licensing so it 
becomes studied less as an effect, but more as a theory. When doing so, I think that 
one should 1) integrate self-licensing with theorizing on consistency, 2) include 
temptation as an important component of self-licensing theory, and 3) consider 
whether predictions and explanations from related theories also hold for self-licensing. 
I will elaborate on these thoughts below.  
Licensing and consistency 
What we really need is a theory of licensing that integrates the licensing process with 
theories and findings that show the importance of consistency in behavior (Abelson et 
al., 1986; Gawronski & Strack, 2012). Consistency theory seemingly predicts the 
opposite of self-licensing. Traditional consistency theories predict that people who are 
likely to perform a good deed are expected to be more likely to engage in future good 
behavior, as people want to appear consistent (both to themselves and to others). A 
prior good deed makes one see oneself as a good person, after which one becomes 
more likely to engage in future good behavior (Bem, 1972). Thus, just like licensing, 
consistency theories predict that past behavior is a main predictor of future behavior. 
A comprehensive theory on self-licensing should therefore incorporate knowledge on 
licensing with established theories on consistency. 
Note that these basic consistency theories do not claim that people are always 
consistent, but that they have a drive to make things consistent. This has important 
implications, for example that when inconsistency arises people will become 
motivated to reduce those inconsistencies. Classic examples are balance theory (Heider, 
1946) and cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957, 1964) that postulate that when 
one’s behavior (i.e., not giving money to a poor person) is not in line with one’s view 
of oneself (“I am good person who cares for those who need it”), this can be resolved 
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by reframing the situation so it becomes consistent (“the poor person would not need 
my money if he would be less lazy and look for a job”). People thus want to appear 
consistent, but can also reappraise situations to make them consistent. This is again 
why I think that studying the effect of licensing (bad behavior following good behavior) 
is less interesting than studying the process of licensing (why does the licensing effect 
occur?). Thus, more knowledge on this process will help to integrate licensing theory 
with well-established theories on consistency. One possible avenue to do so seems 
considering the role of temptations in licensing, as I explain next. 
Licensing and temptation 
Another aspect that is vital when revising the theoretical framework of self-licensing 
relates to the temptingness of the bad behavior. Temptations play a key role in the 
licensing process. This is clearly supported by the findings from Chapter 5 and 6. Note 
that the results from Chapter 5 revealed that although the undesirable behavior was 
more tempting for participants who experienced temptation-based self-licensing, for 
both types of licensing the average temptingness of the undesirable behavior was 
rather high (M = 5.46 for good deed licensing, and M = 5.74 for temptation-based 
licensing in Study 6.2). It is remarkable that the role of temptations is never mentioned 
in the literature on self-licensing (apart from De Witt-Huberts, Evers, and De Ridder 
(2014b)). After all, it makes sense that people do not need a license to wash their 
windows or to go to the gym, but they do need a license to eat a mouthwatering 
chocolate cake, to drink a lot of alcohol, or to buy an expensive new dress.  
Thus, theorizing on licensing should not only focus on the prior good deed, but also 
on the temptingness of the undesirable behavior. The often unremarked role of the 
temptingness of the undesirable behavior may for a part explain the discrepancy 
between the findings of the first part of this dissertation, which revealed that there is 
no evidential value for the self-licensing effect, and Chapter 6, which showed that the 
large majority of people experiences both good deed and temptation-based self-
licensing in their daily lives: In some cases, the undesirable behavior that was 
measured in the research paradigms may not have been that tempting for participants.  
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One could argue that some dependent variables, for instance making a choice between 
a mouthwatering chocolate bar and a boring apple (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005), may be 
more tempting than others, such as preferring a Black over a White person in a job 
hiring task (Effron, Cameron, & Monin, 2001; Monin & Miller, 2001). In fact, it seems 
odd to assume that people are tempted to be racist, and refrain from engaging in such 
behavior until they find a reason that justifies racism. This can either imply that our 
proposed account of temptation-based reasoning does not apply to all types of 
licensing or that studies using racism as the dependent measure might not be 
representative for the self-licensing effect. Given that the p-curve indicates that the 
prior body of empirical research on licensing does not contain evidential value, I think 
future research on self-licensing would do well to test for temptingness as a possible 
moderator, where licensing is expected to be stronger for more tempting behaviors. 
The main conclusion from Chapter 5 and 6 that the undesirable behavior itself can play 
a key role in the manifestation of the self-licensing is an important complement to 
licensing theory: Temptations can trigger a search for acceptable reasons to transgress, 
and a prior good deed can be seen as an acceptable reason to do so. This is closely 
related to several well-established psychological theories that show that people like to 
find reasons for what they want to do, such as motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990), 
reason-based choice (Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993) and moral reasoning (Haidt, 
2001). These existing theories can thus provide vital insights in the processes behind 
self-licensing, as research that shows how motivated reasoning can be influenced 
might also influence self-licensing. An example is research on motivated reasoning 
that finds that people’s ability to justify unethical behavior can be impeded by asking 
them to judge the justification that someone else would use to justify similar unethical 
behavior (Bersoff, 1999). If motivated reasoning plays a role in self-licensing, this 
would imply that judging the justifications that others use to license undesirable 
behavior can be a way to inoculate against licensing effects.  
Because the tempting aspects of the undesirable behavior seem such an essential 
component of self-licensing, it is important to integrate knowledge on everyday 
temptations with licensing theory. Factors that play an important role in giving in to 
Chapter 8 
222 
temptation are self-control (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998), higher 
priority goals (Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003), situational factors such as the 
presence of others, and certain personality traits (Hofmann, Baumeister, Förster, & 
Vohs, 2012). It is likely that giving in to temptation happens most easily when people 
are tired. This would predict that after exerting self-control, people may more easily 
find any reason for indulgence even more acceptable, because they are less able to see 
the irrationality of these reasons. 
A positive aspect of a temptation-based theory of licensing is that it seems more in line 
with theories on consistency than traditional theories on licensing. It seems that people 
who experience temptation-based licensing try to make their attitudes consistent with 
their desired behaviors (i.e., giving in to temptation) by searching for justifications that 
they find in their prior good behavior. Specifically, temptation-based licensing shows 
some close resemblances with cognitive dissonance reduction, which implies that 
individuals want to reduce the negative tension that they experience when they realize 
that their behaviors contradict their beliefs (Festinger, 1957). For example, when 
someone wants to lose weight, but is unable to resist the temptation of a 
mouthwatering hamburger, one can decide that it is probably not a large goal 
violation, with the justification that the hamburger is probably not that unhealthy (“I 
chose the regular hamburger rather than the more unhealthy cheeseburger”). The urge 
to reduce cognitive dissonance emerges in situations where people experience feelings 
of discomfort. This can be prior to, during, or after displaying certain behaviors. 
Chapter 6 showed that temptation-based licensing occurs when people are tempted, 
so when they are likely to indulge. Thus, temptation-based licensing can be regarded 
as a process to reduce cognitive dissonance in the situation prior to indulgence. This 
process of ‘anticipated dissonance’ was first described by Festinger in 1964. So, while 
licensing may look like inconsistent behavior, people’s inherent preference for 
consistency can still play a large role in licensing theory. The fact that temptation-based 
licensing seems to have so much similarities with consistency theories, such as 
cognitive dissonance, is a good step towards more integrative framework of 
consistency and self-licensing.  
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Licensing and related effects 
There is a variety of literature describing “negative spillovers”, where a second action 
offsets the effectivity of a prior action or state. I will discuss some findings from that 
literature, as I think they can play role in constructing an integrative framework of self-
licensing.  
First, self-licensing seems to capture what economists call the rebound effect, which is a 
behavioral response that offsets the effects of a measure that aimed to reduce 
environmental impacts (Greening, Greene, & Difiglio, 2000). For instance, households 
are found to increase the frequency of clothes washing after receiving a high-efficiency 
washing machine, partially offsetting the energy that was saved by buying the more 
efficient machine (Davis, 2008). The rebound effect is a relabeling of 'The Jevons Effect' 
(or the 'Jevons Paradox', named after William Stanley Jevons, 1865), which posits that 
when technological advances increase the efficiency with which a resource is used, 
consumption rate of that particular resource subsequently grows as a consequence of 
rising demand. Second, risk homeostasis theory (Wilde, 1998) suggests that to maintain 
constant levels of overall risk, people take less risk when their environment becomes 
more risky, and more risk when their environment becomes safer. In other words, 
when wearing seat-belts people might drive faster because they feel safer in their car. 
A third theory is moral hazard theory, which predicts that having insurance leads people 
to take more risk (Arrow, 1963). All these theories and findings suggest that doing 
something better, more safe or more efficiently, does not have a full effect as people 
adjust their behavior that offsets (part of) the gain. 
Fitting those theories to self-licensing, they posit that prior actions or states offer a 
license (or in these cases efficiency, protection, and security), that can lead to 
paradoxical adverse consequences. An example of how such similar findings of 
negative spillovers can be informative for research on self-licensing is the work by 
Shavell (1979), who found that moral hazard is predominantly driven by the 
motivation to prevent losses. This motive can also play a role in self-licensing; perhaps 
one of the motivations that people have to search for a license is the prevention of 
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losing for example money (by making donations) or time (by performing voluntary 
work). 
Self-licensing also seems related to theories on entitlement, which posit that people can 
feel ‘entitled’ to take more than others because of their previous positions and 
behaviors (Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004; De Cremer & Van 
Dijk, 2005). Campbell et al. argue that entitlement is a component of narcissism. 
Narcissists likely label their behavior as more virtuous and good compared to other 
people. That is why I predict that narcissists would more often feel licensed to ‘take a 
bigger piece of the cake’.  
It is not only the case that licensing research can learn from existing theories, but it is 
also the case that these theories can learn from insights in licensing. For instance, the 
temptingness of the undesirable behavior may not only play a main role in the 
occurrence self-licensing, but also in the occurrence of moral hazard. One could argue 
that skiing off-piste is more tempting than losing one’s luggage is. Given that the costs 
associated with both are covered by a travel insurance, moral hazard (with more risky 
behavior when one is insured) is likely for both. However, the temptation account of 
licensing would thus predict that moral hazard is more likely in the former case: the 
temptingness of off-piste skiing makes the search for a license more likely.  
Practical implications 
The initial chapter of this dissertation started with an example of self-licensing related 
to the Ice Bucket Challenge, in which people post videos of themselves dumping a 
bucket with ice water on their head to promote awareness of ALS disease and to 
encourage donations to ALS-related charities. The previous literature on self-licensing 
would predict that individuals who participated in this challenge engage in fewer 
future charitable actions. In this section, the practical implications of the findings of 
the current dissertation for these kinds of situations will be discussed. 
It is not always the case that after displaying good or virtuous behavior, people feel 
licensed to display less desirable behavior. This is especially illustrated by the findings 
from Chapter 4. Therefore, I believe that people should not necessarily worry that after 
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making a donation via the Ice Bucket Challenge, individuals will engage in 
undesirable behaviors. However, in some cases, prior good deeds do lead to less 
desirable behaviors; this is apparent from the findings of Chapter 5 and 6. This is 
especially likely if people are tempted to display undesirable behavior (in this case, 
declining an additional donation request): They will search for a justification to give 
in to this temptation. Thus, when individuals do not want to make a second donation, 
they can refer to their prior good behavior to justify this. For some individuals, it will 
be less tempting not to make a donation (for instance because they have more money 
to spend), and even after participating in the Ice Bucket Challenge, there is a 
considerable chance that they will also donate money to other charities. For others, 
who have less money to spend, this would imply that they will probably donate less 
money to other charities. This is consistent with findings of Young, Chakroff, and Tom 
(2012) that doing good can lead to more good. Accordingly, it is important to consider 
multiple situational features when determining when people display undesirable (or 
less desirable) behaviors, rather than solely focusing on situations in which people just 
performed good behaviors. 
To summarize, I believe that people should not necessarily worry that after good 
behavior, they will feel a strong urge to compensate for this good behavior through 
displaying less desirable behavior (as one would have done based on the previous 
literature on self-licensing). However, people should worry that individuals will 
display less desirable behavior when the vicious or goal-incongruent behavior is very 
tempting. Therefore, interventions aimed at stimulating virtuous and healthy behavior 
should not underestimate the power of temptation. For instance, when people are 
tempted to engage in unhealthy behaviors, justifying giving in through using prior 
good behaviors should become more difficult. Health practitioners can use descriptive 
norms (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990) to inform people that healthy actions, such 
as going to the gym and eating vegetables are normal rather than good (e.g., “75% of 
the people visits the gym regularly”). This should be done at critical moments when 
people are tempted to indulge. In this way, the good behavior ‘loses’ its licensing 
capacities, which makes it more difficult to justify the undesirable behavior. Another 
way of making justifying through previous good deeds more difficult is to implement 
Chapter 8 
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a system where people have to justify their choices to others. For instance, people who 
intend to save money can engage in a “commitment system” where they have to 
explain all their intended expenditures to other people. 
The findings that temptations affect reasoning can also have important practical 
implications for marketing professionals. Previous research suggested that self-
licensing might play a role in buying luxurious products (Khan & Dhar, 2006). As the 
purchase of luxurious products is often associated with feelings of guilt (Strahilevitz 
& Myers, 1998), people need to reduce these feelings through justifying their purchase. 
Since the findings from Chapter 6 show that externally provided or created reasons 
are actually regarded as better reasons to indulge when a product is more tempting, 
providing in-store advertisements with a possible justification could be more effective 
for more tempting products. Based on these findings one could expect that applying 
cause-related marketing to a hedonic product, such as the company making a small 
donation to a third-world-country when buying a luxury designer jeans, is more 
effective than applying cause-related marketing to a functional product, such as a 
vacuum cleaner.  
Future directions 
The results described in this dissertation have important implications for future 
research on self-licensing, which are outlined in this section. Since there is no 
evidential value for the self-licensing effect as it used to be studied, more research on 
self-licensing is highly warranted. Both the meta-analysis and the p-curve analysis 
revealed that “traditional” studies on self-licensing are highly underpowered. 
Accordingly, researchers studying self-licensing are strongly advised to increase the 
power of the studies. As a rule of thumb, in a study with a control and licensing 
condition, at least 165 people in each condition are required to have 80% power (see 
Chapter 2). 
In addition, when studying self-licensing it is important to not solely focus on the prior 
good behavior, but also on the temptingness of the undesirable behavior, when 
developing paradigms to measure the self-licensing effect. Two studies from De Witt-
Discussion 
227 
Huberts et al. (2014b) show a correlation between self-rated temptingness of indulgent 
behavior and the number of justifications that people indicate or generate to justify 
giving in to this temptation. Apart from our studies in Chapter 6 linking those ideas to 
self-licensing, research on self-licensing did not focus on the temptingness of the 
undesirable behavior. Therefore, future research should extend these novel insights 
through investigating in which domains temptation-based licensing occurs. It has been 
found in the domain of individual self-regulatory behaviors, but it has not yet been 
established whether this also plays a role in the emergence of racist attitudes, 
ecofriendly behaviors, cheating, and other behaviors that have harmful consequences 
at the societal level. 
Moreover, researchers should critically reflect on the manner in which they intend to 
induce self-licensing, especially since individuals often try to engage in socially 
desirable responding (Paulhus, 1984). As discussed in Chapter 2, a more careful 
consideration of the dependent variables being used in self-licensing studies is 
essential. For example, quite some research on licensing includes scales that measure 
people’s stated intention to want to help out (for instance the Willingness to Volunteer 
Scale, DeVoe & Pfeffer, 2007). On these types of scales, people may overstate their 
willingness to help other persons, perhaps partly due to social desirability concerns. If 
people in a self-licensing condition indicate a lower willingness to help others 
compared to people in a control condition, this could indeed reflect a licensing effect. 
However, this could also suggest that people in the licensing condition actually 
became consistent with their prior good self and became more honest. It is important 
that researchers studying licensing are aware of these possible confounds and address 
or prevent them in their studies. 
Future research should in my view also focus more directly on the consequences of 
self-licensing. This is of particular interest because the results from Chapter 7 show 
that some justifications for undesirable behaviors have more negative affective and 
motivational consequences than others. So far, it is not clear whether self-licensing is 




To conclude  
There is low evidential value for the licensing effect in the body of empirical research. 
This is a problem. It means that the published research does not warrant any firm 
conclusions about when the effect would occur and how strong it may be. Importantly, 
the novel ideas present in the latter half of this dissertation make it clear that the lack 
of evidential value in the published literature does not necessarily imply that the 
phenomenon of licensing does not exist: If one needs a license to give in to the 










‘Zelf-licensing’ houdt in dat mensen zichzelf toestaan om ongewenst gedrag (of 
minder gewenst gedrag) te vertonen omdat zij eerder goed gedrag hebben getoond. In 
het morele domein wordt dit effect ook wel ‘morele licensing’ genoemd; wanneer 
mensen eerst moreel gedrag vertonen zijn ze later eerder geneigd om immorele of 
onethische gedragingen te vertonen.  
In het eerste gedeelte van dit proefschrift wordt onderzocht wat de grootte van het 
morele licensing effect is, hoe robuust dit effect is, en wat de belangrijkste moderatoren 
van dit effect zijn. In hoofdstuk 2 is een meta-analyse over het morele licensing effect 
uitgevoerd waarin 91 eerdere studies werden meegenomen. Deze analyse laat zien dat 
de Cohen’s d effectgrootte 0.31 is, een klein tot middelgroot effect. Daarnaast laat deze 
meta-analyse geen empirisch bewijs zien voor het bestaan van verschillende 
moderatoren die er op basis van bestaande theorie wel zouden moeten zijn. De meta-
analyse levert wel bewijs voor publicatie bias: de effectgroottes van gepubliceerde 
artikelen zijn groter dan de effecten van ongepubliceerd werk. In hoofdstuk 3 wordt 
direct op deze bevindingen voortgeborduurd door het uitvoeren van een p-curve 
analyse. Deze recentelijk ontwikkelde statistische techniek toetst het bestaan van een 
effect zonder beïnvloed te worden door publicatie bias. De resultaten van deze analyse 
laten zien dat er geen evidentie is voor het bestaan van het zogeheten morele licensing 
effect. In hoofdstuk 4 worden drie experimenten uitgevoerd om eerdere gepubliceerde 
zelf-licensing effecten te repliceren. De originele resultaten worden in deze 
experimenten niet gerepliceerd. Samengevat schetsen de eerste drie empirische 
hoofdstukken uit dit proefschrift geen rooskleurig beeld over de licensing theorie. 
Echter, zoals aangegeven in stelling 10 betekent het niet kunnen repliceren van een 
effect in experimentele paradigma’s niet dat het effect er in de werkelijkheid niet is. 
In het tweede gedeelte van dit proefschrift worden nieuwe theoretische perspectieven 
op de zelf-licensing theorie beschreven en onderzocht. Hoofdstuk 5 laat zien dat 95.3% 
van alle participanten in staat is om de manifestatie van het zelf-licensing effect in hun 
eigen gedrag te herinneren. Dus, ondanks het feit dat het moeilijk is om zelf-licensing 
effecten te vinden in experimentele settings blijken mensen dit effect wel degelijk in 
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hun dagelijks leven te ervaren. Daarnaast laat hoofdstuk 5 zien dat er twee manieren 
zijn waarop het zelf-licensing effect zich in het dagelijks leven kan manifesteren: 1) 
mensen vertonen goed gedrag en vinden dat zij het daarna verdienen om iets minder 
goeds te mogen doen en 2) mensen worden verleid om iets slechts te doen en praten 
het ingaan op deze verleiding goed door er eerder goed gedrag ‘bij te halen’. Dus, 
zowel eerder goed gedrag als de verleiding om slecht gedrag te vertonen kunnen het 
zelf-licensing effect opwekken. In hoofdstuk 6 is geopperd dat de verleiding om 
ongewenst gedrag te vertonen het redeneringsproces van mensen beïnvloedt. Een 
viertal experimenten laat zien dat naarmate een verleiding sterker wordt, mensen 
irrelevante argumenten als meer acceptabel gaan zien om in te gaan op de verleiding. 
Deze resultaten komen overeen met het tweede type zelf-licensing dat in hoofdstuk 5 
werd gevonden: Mensen worden eerst verleid om iets slechts te doen en trachten het 
ingaan op deze verleiding vervolgens met hun eerdere goede gedrag goed te praten. 
Voorheen focuste de zelf-licensing theorie zich volledig op de effecten van eerder goed 
gedrag en werd de optie dat het effect wordt opgewekt door de verleiding nagenoeg 
niet genoemd. Dus, deze hoofdstukken laten een omgekeerd proces van het zelf-
licensing effect zien, waar goed gedrag niet altijd tot slecht gedrag hoeft te leiden, maar 
de verleiding van het slechte gedrag ertoe kan leiden dat mensen het goede gedrag als 
reden gaan inzetten. Hoofdstuk 7 gaat verder in op deze redeneringsprocessen en laat 
zien dat redenen voor het ingaan op een verleiding kwalitatief van elkaar kunnen 
verschillen. Hierdoor hebben sommige redenen wel een negatief effect op verdere 
doelmotivatie en andere redenen niet. 
De literatuur over zelf-licensing moet sterk herzien worden omdat het huidige 
onderzoek naar het effect niet robuust blijkt te zijn. Daarnaast zullen zowel het 
voorgestelde onderliggende proces uit dit proefschrift alsmede gerelateerde theorieën 
(die in hoofdstuk 8 uitgebreid worden beschouwd) in de bestaande zelf-licensing 
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